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Winograd said that the IDF was unprepared because Israel's political echeclon had believed that the era of war was over
IDF brass criticized for role in years before warBy YAAKOV KATZPrint Subscribe E-mail Toolbar Talkbacks for this article: 3Tensions ran high at the Kirya military headquarters in Tel Aviv on Sunday, a day ahead of publication of the Winograd Report on the failures of the Second Lebanon War. A number of top officers, including Chief of General Staff Lt.-Gen. Gabi Ashkenazi, face the possibility of being condemned for their involvement in the decision-making process that led to the IDF's poor showing during the 34 days of fighting last summer. The Winograd Committee's interim report being released Monday will focus on the first few days of the war as well as the six years that led to it, starting with the IDF's withdrawal from southern Lebanon in 2000. Ashkenazi was OC Northern Command in October 2000 when three Israeli soldiers were kidnapped by Hizbullah - six months after the withdrawal - and was a partner to the IDF's and government's policy of "containment" along the border with Lebanon, according to which war with the guerrilla group was to be avoided. Defense officials said Sunday it was possible Ashkenazi would come under criticism in the report due to his part in formulating military policies in the aftermath of the 2000 withdrawal. Two other officers who are anxiously waiting for the report are Deputy Chief of General Staff Maj.-Gen. Moshe Kaplinsky and OC Northern Command Maj.-Gen. Gadi Eizenkot, who was head of the IDF Operations Directorate during the war. Kaplinsky and Eizenkot could be criticized for not applying enough pressure on then-chief of General Staff Lt.-Gen. Dan Halutz to launch a ground operation in southern Lebanon early in the war. At the time, Kaplinsky and Eizenkot were the IDF's most senior officers with a ground forces background and according to defense officials, they could be blamed for not doing enough to make their opinions known to Defense Minister Amir Peretz or Prime Minister Ehud Olmert. One officer who might actually be cleared from the report is Brig.-Gen. Gal Hirsh, who commanded Division 91 during the war and stepped down from his post after he was blamed by an internal military probe for the abduction of reservists Eldad Regev and Ehud Goldwasser. According to information leaked from the Winograd Report, Hirsh might be cleared of direct responsibility for the kidnappings. Also on Sunday, senior IDF officials pointed to the ongoing processes within the military aimed at returning the army to its former glory. A majority of infantry and armored brigades have undergone several weeks of training in recent months and most emergency warehouses have been stocked with new equipment and supplies. "While the criticism that comes from the report might be in place it is important to remember that the IDF is in the midst of an unprecedented process of rehabilitation," an IDF source said. Meanwhile, Deputy Defense Minister Ephraim Sneh accused the Treasury of holding up the transfer of funds to the defense establishment needed to prepare the home front for the next war. Speaking at a press conference on changes made to reserve service, Sneh said the Treasury's obstruction might thwart plans to reward reservists. According to a new bill Sneh said he planned to bring to the Knesset in the coming weeks, ministries would be authorized to create lists of benefits for the 90,000 citizens who serve in the reserves.
Winograd Blames Olmert, Peretz, Halutz by Hillel Fendel(IsraelNN.com) Justice Eliyahu Winograd read aloud the findings of his government-appointed commission's partial report on the Second Lebanon War late Monday afternoon; many said that they were even harsher than had been expected. Winograd explained that the findings are limited to the days just prior to the beginning of last summer's war against Hizbullah.The commission found that Prime Minister Ehud Olmert bears the ultimate and overall responsibility for what it called the "faulty and improperly-judged decisions" made regarding the outbreak of the Second Lebanone War. "There was a weakness in strategic thinking... They went into war without thinking how they would get out of it.""The entire government supported the decisions," the report states, "but it must be emphasized that these decisions were made in a faulty manner - mainly by Olmert, Peretz and Halutz... Responsibility for these decisions is shared by others, but is chiefly theirs - and primarily that of the Prime Minister, Ehud Olmert."The report's main points include the following: "The decision to carry out an extreme military operation [in response to the kidnapping of the two Israeli soldiers on the Lebanese border] was not based on a careful analysis of the situation in Lebanon... It was rather overly-ambitious and unrealistic... The capacity to attain genuine accomplishments was limited... Olmert said he would fight until the objectives were achieved, but the fighting was not done in a manner designed to achieve these goals... He did not ask for a detailed plan from the army...""Olmert bears the ultimate responsibility... He is responsible for the fact that the goals were not clearly or cautiously set, and for the fact that there was no coordination between these goals and how they might be achieved... He acted without organized consultation with other bodies, such as the National Security Council and the mini-security Cabinet... Even after he saw that the initial assumptions were not practical or implemented, he continued on. All of this adds up to a grave error and great misjudgement."The report also castigated Defense Minister Amir Peretz and ex-IDF Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. (ret.) Dan Halutz. Winograd said the Defense Minister "did not have the required knowledge or the experience in security or diplomatic matters, or in how to use military strength to achieve objectives. Despite this, he made decisions without consulting others, and did not give sufficient weight to differing opinions... He did not take into account the army's lack of readiness... His influence on decisions were only on local matters; he did not try to grasp or deal with the overall picture. His lack of experience and knowledge weakened the government's ability to deal with the challenges." The Winograd Commission did not find fault with Olmert for appointing the inexperienced Peretz as Defense Minister, leaving this "political issue" to be judged by the public.Winograd termed the Chief of Staff as the top officer of the army and the man responsible for presenting military options to the government. "His involvement was dominant, but he was not ready when the kidnapping occurred; he acted impulsively and did not accurately present the complexity of the situation to the government. He did not present plans to the government, nor the fact that the army was not prepared for a ground operation, and the fact that this might be critical to its performance in a war situation. His responsibility is multiplied because of the lack of experience of Olmert and Peretz...""At the same time," Winograd said, "though the responsibility of the above three is supreme, many others were partner to the above problems." He noted that Hizbullah's readiness was not dependent on Israel, and its ability to "sit on our border and build up its military capabilities" was the result of our unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon in May 2000. In addition, the lack of readiness was the responsibility of previous governments, and the fault of false and out-dated conceptions that did not take into account the entire realm of threats against Israel. Justice Winograd blamed the Cabinet of Israel for not fulfilling its duty and not trying to understand the threats, not delving into the issues, and wrongly depending too much on those who made the decisions. The Commission also found fault with officers in the IDF General Staff who knew the problems but did not warn of them sufficiently. The Winograd Commission recommended that Cabinet ministers be more fully informed and involved in decision-making; that the Foreign Ministry be more involved in issues that could have diplomatic ramifications; improvements in the National Security Council; and the formation of a Crisis Management Center in the Prime Minister's Bureau.No specific recommendations about various persons are included in the report, but Judge Winograd did not rule out the possibility that this would not be the case when the final report is issued this summer. ReactionsThe Knesset will hold a special session this week on the Winograd findings. Reserve soldiers and others are planning to hold a mass protest on Thursday in Tel Aviv, calling on Olmert to resign. Political ReactionsPrime Minister Olmert "appointed the committee and will honor its conclusions," an aide said, while emphasizing that Olmert has no plans to resign. The Prime Minister announced this morning that he will convene the ministers of his Kadima party at 6:45 PM. It is expected that he will outline his plan to rebuff calls for his resignation, including a list of quotations from opposition members and others in support of the war.Minister Peretz's lawyer seemed to be relieved, saying that the findings of the report are the same as that which had been leaked. Labor MK Danny Yatom repeated his demand that Olmert must quit, as did MK Zevulun Orlev of the National Religious Party. Likud party activists protested this afternoon in Jerusalem against Olmert.
It's ultra liberal,i think it's almost anti Israel
Because to show even communist paper like ha'aretz states this factQuoteWinograd said that the IDF was unprepared because Israel's political echeclon had believed that the era of war was over
Quote from: mord on May 03, 2007, 08:33:24 AMBecause to show even communist paper like ha'aretz states this factQuoteWinograd said that the IDF was unprepared because Israel's political echeclon had believed that the era of war was overHere's another article: http://www.nypost.com/seven/05012007/postopinion/opedcolumnists/olmerts_oops_opedcolumnists_john_podhoretz.htm