Honor & Insult - Some Torah Perspectives

[muman613]

I hope that a lesson can be learned by posting this message. I hope all who read it can find the reason I posted it hear so JTF members could read it...

http://www.torah.org/learning/hamaayan/5758/emor.html

     "The kohen who is greater than his brothers . . . he shall not marry a widow." (21:14)

The prohibition on the kohen gadol's marrying a widow reminds us how powerful a person's desires are, and how far one must go to distance himself from temptation. How so?

The commentary of the Ba'alei Tosfot gives as the reason for this prohibition that the kohen gadol may find himself attracted to a married woman, and on Yom Kippur, when he enters the Holy of Holies, he may pray for the woman's husband to die.

Of whom are we speaking?! Of the spiritual leader of all of the Jews, and at the holiest and most solemn moment of the year, no less. But such is the power of the yetzer hara! (Shai Latorah)

    "When you slaughter a todah/thanksgiving offering to Hashem, you shall slaughter it willingly." (22:29)

R' Raphael Yom Tov Lipman Halpern z"l (the "Oneg Yom Tov"; 19th century) asks: Why is the korban Todah singled out here to be brought willingly? All sacrifices must be brought willingly!

He explains: We read in Tehilim (116:16-17), "Please, Hashem, for I am Your servant, son of Your handmaid; You have released my bonds. To You I will sacrifice a todah/thanksgiving offering and the Name of Hashem I will invoke." King David meant: I am Your servant, the son of a servant; therefore, it should be impossible for me to act against Your will. However, You have released my bonds, and given me free will. Therefore, I must acknowledge You. ("Todah" shares a root with "hoda'ah"/ "acknowledgment.")

What did King David mean? R' Halpern writes: There are certain halachic rules which apply to a person who is classified as a "modeh be'miktzat"/"one who acknowledges owing a creditor only part of what the creditor claims." However, one can be considered a modeh be'miktzat only if he has the opportunity to deny the other part of the debt. If, for any reason, that possibility does not exist (for example, if there are witnesses to the contrary), once cannot become a modeh be'miktzat.

Thus, King David said: "Because You have released my bonds and granted me the free will to deny You, therefore I can acknowledge You." Similarly, R' Halpern writes, the verse in our parashah is teaching: When you bring a thanksgiving offering to Hashem to acknowledge your debt to Him, be aware of your free will. One who acknowledges a debt because he has no free will to do otherwise is not worthy of the name, "One who acknowledges." (She'eilot U'teshuvot Oneg Yom Tov: Introduction; quoted in Yalkut Lekach Tov p. 219)

    "The son of an Israelite woman went out - and he was the son of an Egyptian man - among the Children of Israel; they fought in the camp, the son of the Israelite woman and an Israelite man. The son of the Israelite woman pronounced the Name and blasphemed." (24:10-11)

R' Avigdor Nebenzahl shlita (rabbi of the Old City) asks: On the surface it would seem that the introductory pasuk telling us that they fought in the camp is superfluous. One who blasphemes the Name of Hashem is liable with the death penalty; does it really matter to us that prior to his doing so, he fought with another Jew?

He answers: Perhaps we can explain that the Torah was trying to teach us the principle of "aveirah goreret aveirah"/"one sin leads to another sin." (Avot 4:2). This son of the Egyptian fought with his fellow Jew, a sinful act. This initial sin [fighting with another Jew] eventually led to the very severe sin of blaspheming the Name of Hashem.

[How does the sin of fighting with another man lead to blaspheming the name of G-d?] Perhaps we can explain it as follows, says R' Nebenzahl. The mishnah (Avot 4:1) states: "Who is honored? He who honors others, as it is said (Shmuel I 2:30), 'For I honor those who honor Me, and those that scorn Me will be accursed'." Why does the mishnah, when outlining for us that in order to be honored by one's fellow man, one must honor others, quote a pasuk describing what will happen to one who does or does not honor Hashem? We must explain that honoring one's fellow man is tantamount to honoring Hashem, for Hashem created these people and for that reason they are deserving of honor. This can be compared to an artist who painted a picture; an insult to the painting is an insult to the artist, and so too complimenting the painting is equal to complimenting the artist. Honoring Hashem's creations is the same as honoring Hashem.

The gemara relates a relevant story: A Tanna/sage of the mishnah met a man whom he found extremely ugly. The Tanna stated: "How ugly is that man!". The man responded, "Go and tell the craftsman who made me, 'How ugly is this vessel that you made'." The craftsman in this case was Hashem, and the ugly person was telling the Tanna to go tell Hashem that He had made an ugly vessel. The Tanna regretted what he said, as the gemara relates: "When he realized that he had sinned he got down from the donkey, prostrated himself before him and said to him 'I have spoken out of turn to you, forgive me'." (Taanit 20b). One who ridicules what Hashem created is ridiculing the Creator. (From a lecture delivered at Yeshivat Hakotel, 9 Iyar 5758) [To obtain the full text of the lecture, write to: "[email protected]"]

[muman613]

On a similar topic I find the following article beneficial to understand how we should treat others, especially our brothers and sisters.


http://www.shemayisrael.com/parsha/bonchek/archives/achrei66.htm

Parashios Achrei Mos/Kedoshim(66)

These two sedras are packed with many interesting laws. In Achrei Mos we learn the laws of the Yom Kippur service in the Temple and the laws of prohibited sexual relations. In Kedoshim we have a blend of strictly "religious" (Between Man & G-d) and civil laws.

We will look at a verse, which shows the beauty and uniqueness of Torah judicial law.

Leviticus 19: 15

You shall not do wrong in justice; you shall not favor a poor man and you shall not honor a rich man , with righteousness you shall judge your fellow.

RASHI

You shall not favor a poor man: Rashi: You should not say: He is a poor man, and the rich man is obligated to support him, I (the judge) will acquit him (the poor man) in court and thus he will have income in an acceptable way. (not having to beg for it).

And you shall not honor a rich man: Rashi: You should not say: This is a rich man, the son of great people, how can I (the judge) embarrass him (by ruling against him) and see his embarrassment, there is a punishment for such things (for embarrassing someone), therefore it says [explicitly] 'you shall not honor a rich man.'

WHAT IS RASHI SAYING?

Rashi gives the rational behind the need for telling judges to stay within the bounds of justice and not let other (reasonable) considerations pervert their just decision. Rashi spells out the rationalizations of the "good hearted" judge.

QUESTIONING RASHI

A question: In the first case, one could understand that since the rich man is, in fact, obligated to give charity, the judge might be justified in "perverting" the judgment so that the poor mans wins the case and the rich man fulfills his mitzvah of charity in this way. But in the second case why should the poor man loose, just so the rich man is not embarrassed? That seems quite unjustified.

A good question. To get a better idea, see Rashi on Devarim 1:17.

Your Answer:

UNDERSTANDING RASHI

An Answer: Rashi in Devarim 1:17 says the following: "you shall not say: 'How can I hurt the honor of this rich man for a (measly) dinar? I will decide in his favor now (in court) and when we go out of court, I'll tell him (the rich man) you really owe him the money so pay him now.'

So we see by Rashi's addition here, that justice will be done in the end. Only in the courtroom, for appearance's sake, does the judge think to rule in favor of the rich man to save his honor, even though he is not the just party.

On these the above rationalizations, what can you ask?

Your Question(s):

SOME ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS

Some Questions: What is so wrong with the judge's rationalizations? The rich man does have to give charity, why not to this poor man?

And, in the second case, what is so wrong with judging in favor of the rich man to save his honor, when in the end the poor man will get what is coming to him?

Your Answer(s):

UNDERSTANDING RASHI

An Answer: Every Jew is commanded to give charity and help the needy. But each can person decide for himself to whom he will give his charity. The Torah does not decide for him. It is his choice and his privilege. So the judge has no right to mandate who should be the recipient of this man's charity In fact the judge, himself, is no less obligated to give charity than the disputant. If the judge thought this poor man who stands before him in court was in need of financial help, the judge has no less a mitzvah of giving him tzadakah than the disputant. This should be contrasted to some modern socialistically inclined courts. Liberal judges may feel they have the right to impose their judgment on who is and who is not deserving of the citizens' charity.

The Torah's view in the second case is also enlightening. The Torah is telling us that the rich man's honor is no more sacred than the poor man's honor. If the poor man was to be proclaimed guilty in court, when in fact he is not guilty, this would be an insult to the poor man's honor - even if he eventually receives his money after the court is dismissed. The Torah is concerned about everyone's honor regardless of his social standing. All are equal in the courtroom. Another example of this equality is regarding the issue of standing and sitting in court. Although the disputants are supposed to stand in front of the judge, if a person is weak or aged and needs to sit during the proceedings, he can sit. But then his opponent, even though quite healthy and strong, also sits. We can't have one sitting and one standing.

The Torah Lesson : Justice is not measured in financial terms only, human feelings are also important. The Torah's justice takes them into account.

Shabbat Shalom
Avigdor Bonchek