The Revolt is Proclaimed.

[Ultra Requete]

I found this one article and it's interesting becouse it shows haw 60 yaers of liberal zionist had changed Israeli Jews:

 

In 1943, it was already clear that the victory of the Allies was only a question of time. The dimensions of the Holocaust were known in Palestine, but the British government adhered to the White Paper policy, and continued to bar the gates of the country to Jewish immigration. Moreover, those immigrant ships which succeeded in escaping from occupied Europe were not only prohibited from entering Palestine, but were sometimes even forced to return to Europe, although the fate that awaited their passengers was clear to all.

The conduct of the British government further infuriated young Jews in Palestine. The Irgun General Headquarters came to the conclusion that the truce it had proclaimed when war broke out had to be ended, and that it was essential to take action against the British without waiting till the war was over.

In the higher echelons of the Irgun the feeling prevailed that, in order to renew the struggle against the British, it was essential to make far-reaching changes in the leadership. According to Eliyahu Lankin, who was then a senior commander in the Irgun:

 We said that we had to find a man to command us who had no connection with what had occurred during and after the split (i.e. the split with Avraham Stern), but it was hard to find such a man in Eretz Israel. 

Menahem Begin, Betar leader in Poland, arrived in Eretz Israel at this point When war broke out, he had been arrested by the Soviet authorities and sent to a detention camp in Siberia. About a year later he was released under the terms of the Soviet-Polish treaty, which freed all Polish nationals from Soviet jails. He then joined the Polish force established in the Soviet Union (General Anders Army) and reached Eretz Israel with this army. He reported immediately to the Irgun command, but refused to desert from the ranks. Only after being officially discharged was he asked to accept command of the Irgun. Eliyahu Lankin, one of those who approached Begin, remembers that his response was: "Gentlemen, I have been a Betarite and a soldier in the Polish army, but I have no military experience." "We told him," Lankin recalls, "that we did not lack fighters. We needed a leader of authority to blaze our political and ideological path."


Menahem Begin
 
In December 1943, Begin was chosen as Commander of the Irgun Zvai Le'umi in Eretz Israel. He established a new General Headquarters, which included Aryeh Ben Eliezer, Eliyahu Lankin and Shlomo Levi-Lev Ami (Levi was the only one who had been a member of the previous command). At its first meeting, the General Headquarters passed two important resolutions: the first - that an armed struggle against the British Mandatory government had to be launched without delay, and the second - that the Irgun had to detach itself from the Revisionist party and determine its own path.

On February 1, 1944, the Irgun plastered posters on the walls of buildings all over the country, proclaiming a revolt against British rule. It stated, among other things:



TO THE HEBREW NATION IN ZION!

We are in the last stage of the world war. Each and every nation is now conducting its national reckoning. What are its triumphs and what were its losses? What road must it take in order to achieve its goal and fulfil its mission? Who are its friends and who its enemies? Who is the true ally and who the traitor? And who is proceeding towards the decisive battle?
[....]
Sons of Israel, Hebrew youth!
We stand at the final stage of the war, we face an historic decision on our future destiny.
The truce proclaimed when war broke out has been violated by the British authorities. The rulers of the country have taken into account neither loyalty nor concessions nor sacrifice; they have continued to implement their aim: the liquidation of sovereign Zionism.
[...]
We must draw the necessary conclusions without wavering. There can no longer be a truce between the Hebrew nation and youth and the British administration of Eretz Israel, which is betraying our brethren to Hitler. Our nation will fight this regime, fight to the end.
[...]

And this is our demand:
Rule over Eretz Israel must immediately be handed over to a provisional Hebrew government.
The Hebrew government of Eretz Israel, the sole legal representative of the Jewish people, must, immediately after its establishment, begin the implementation of the following principles:
a. establish a national Hebrew army.
b. conduct negotiations with all authorized bodies on the organization of the mass evacuation of European Jewry to Eretz Israel.
[...]

Jews!
The establishment of a Hebrew government and the implementation of its plans - this is the sole way of rescuing our people, salvaging our existence and our honor. We will follow this path, for there is no other.
We will fight! Every Jew in our homeland will fight!
[...]

Jews!
Our fighting youth will not be deterred by victims, blood and suffering. They will not surrender, will not rest until they restore our past glory, until they ensure our people of a homeland, freedom, honor, bread, justice and law. And if you help them, then your own eyes will soon behold the return to Zion and the rebirth of Israel.
May God be with us and aid us!


THE IRGUN ZVAI LE'UMI IN ERETZ ISRAEL 



When the struggle began, the Irgun stipulated two restricting conditions: avoidance of individual terror as a method and postponement of attacks on military targets until the war ended.

THE BEGINNING
The first target of the Irgun fighters were the immigration offices of the British Mandatory authorities. These offices, more than anything else, symbolized the restriction of immigration and the frustration of efforts to rescue the Jews of Europe. The Immigration Office was careful to grant certificates only according to the quota fixed by the White Paper, i.e. the number of immigrants was not permitted to exceed 1,500 per month. From this tiny number were deducted those Jews who immigrated illegally and were caught by the authorities. According to the White Paper, immigration was to cease completely on March 31, 1944.

On Saturday night, February 12, 1944, Irgun fighters attacked immigration offices simultaneously in Jerusalem, Tel Aviv and Haifa. The operation went smoothly and without casualties. Two weeks later, the fighters set out again, this time to blow up the income tax offices, again in the three large towns. An income tax law had been introduced in Eretz Israel in 1941 and, as anticipated, had proven highly unpopular, particularly since most of the burden fell on the Jewish population. One of the reasons for selecting this target was that even those who did not support the Irgun campaign against the British were unlikely to condemn an attempt to prevent the collection of income tax. This operation also proved successful and claimed no casualties.



Income Tax office in Jerusalem after the blowing up
After the baptism of fire, it was decided to take a more daring step and attack the nerve center of British rule, British Intelligence and the police. Once again the operation was co-ordinated to take place simultaneously in the three large towns. In Jerusalem, the task was more difficult since the British Intelligence was housed in the Russian Compound, as were the police headquarters and the law courts. Despite the difficulties, the Irgun fighters, under Rahamim Cohen (Gad) succeeded in infiltrating the British Intelligence offices and placing the explosives. However, the duty officer that night, Sergeant Scott, on a routine patrol of inspection noticed a suspicious movement on the balcony. He was injured when fire was opened on him, but before he collapsed he succeeded in shooting one of the Irgun fighters, Asher Benziman (Avshalom). Despite the exchange of fire, the sappers succeeded in preparing the explosive devices and retreating. Several minutes later, there was a loud explosion and the building collapsed. Asher Benziman succeeded in escaping, but died of his wounds shortly afterwards - the first casualty of the revolt. The British officer also died as a result of his injuries.

The raid on the British Intelligence headquarters in Jaffa was commanded by Amichai Paglin (Gidi) and the attack on the Haifa British Intelligence was led by Yaakov Hillel. The two raids were carried out successfully.



The British Intelligence headquarters after the blowing up
As more operations were undertaken, the fighters gained military experience and they became increasingly daring. On May 17, 1944, some 40 fighters set out to attack and occupy the government broadcasting station at Ramallah in order to make an underground broadcast from there. The takeover was smooth and was carried out without loss of life, but the broadcast itself did not take place because of an unexpected hitch in operating the transmitters. On the other hand, two months later, the blowing up of the district British Intelligence in Jerusalem was carried out without a hitch: on the night of July 13, 1944, an Irgun unit broke into the building in Mamilla Street, detonated explosive devices and retreated without suffering casualties.

THE 'WALL' SCHEME
 One of the operations which undermined the prestige of the British authorities and made them the object of ridicule was the 'Wall' scheme, which concerned prayer arrangements at the Western Wall. In the late nineteen twenties, the Arabs had already begun to complain that blowing the shofar at the Western Wall was an insult to Islam. In 1931, the King's Order in Council (the legislative authority of the Mandatory government) stipulated that the Moslems' ownership rights to the Temple Mount also encompassed the Western Wall area. As a result, Jews were banned from blowing the shofar at the Wall, despite the fact that this ceremony is an integral part of the Rosh Hashana (New Year) and Yom Kippur (Day of Atonement) prayer services.

The ban deeply offended Jews, and the Irgun decided to act. After the imposition of the ban, Irgun and Betar members "smuggled" a shofar into the Western Wall area every Yom Kippur. There a volunteer was waiting to blow the 'Tekia Gedola', the blast which marks the end of the fast. This was not easily done, since large numbers of British policemen were stationed along the routes to the Wall and conducted careful searches of the belongings of the Jews visiting the Wall. The shofar blower was usually arrested and jailed in the Kishleh, the police building in the Old City, which had served as a jail since the Turkish era. (The building is still standing and is now used by the Israeli police). The blowing of the shofar at the Wall at the end of Yom Kippur was not only a religiously ceremony, but also bolstered national pride throughout the country. On Yom Kippur 5703 (September 1942), Menahem Begin visited the Wall and witnessed the British policemen bursting into the area in search of the Betarite who had blown the shofar.

In summer, 1944, the question of the shofar ceremony at the Wall was raised again. This time the Irgun decided not to confine itself to bringing in a single shofar-blower to mark the end of Yom Kippur. Several weeks before the High Holydays, the Irgun began to issue warnings to the British to keep away from the Wall, and announced that any policemen found near the Wall on Yom Kippur would be punished. As the fast-day approached, the warnings were reiterated daily. Nine proclamations were issued in all; the following is the text of one of them:



NOTICE


Any British Constable who will commit acts of violence near the Western Wall on the Day of Atonement and, in defiance of the moral law of civilized people, will disturb the worshippers assembled there and will desecrate the sanctity of prayer will be regarded and LISTED by the HEBREW Youth as a CRIMINAL OFFENDER.

Visitors or passers-by, whether Moslems or Christians, will not be disturbed in their approaching or passing the Western Wall.


IRGUN ZVAI LE'UMI IN ERETZ ISRAEL 



The tension mounted. The Irgun created the impression that it intended to concentrate large forces in the Western Wall area, to bar access by violent means. This was, however, a diversionary tactic, and the Irgun had an entirely different plan in mind. As Yom Kippur came to an end, attacks were launched at four police stations throughout the country. These buildings, known as Taggart fortresses, were large structures of reinforced concrete, built in the 1930s according to the design of the British engineer, Sir Charles Taggart. The Irgun's warnings about the Western Wall were examples of psychological warfare, serving to divert attention from the main military operation. Surprisingly enough, the authorities heeded the Irgun's warnings, and not a single British policeman was present in the Wall area on Yom Kippur. The traditional blowing of the shofar after the final prayer took place without interruption, and the congregation then burst into a loud rendering of "Hatikva", the national anthem. No clashes occurred that day at the Wall or en route to it, and the British detectives, who were present in mufti, were disappointed by the absence of Irgun armed forces. They were unaware that the Irgun's fighting units were at that very moment conducting an operation against the Taggart fortresses in Haifa (under Rahamim Cohen), Kalkiliya (under Nathan-Niko Germant), Gadera - Katra (under Yehoshua Weinstein and Shraga Alis) and Beit Dagan (under Yaakov Sika-Aharoni).

http://www.etzel.org.il/english/ac06.htm

[Ultra Requete]

The 'Hunting Season', or 'Season' for short, was the code-name for the Haganah's persecution of the Irgun, aimed at putting an end to its activities.

As a result of the Irgun's proclamation of a revolt against British rule, military operations were launched against various government targets. The official leadership of the Yishuv, the heads of the Jewish Agency, were opposed to this activity and demanded that it cease. They argued that the national institutions had been democratically elected, and that consequently the Irgun and Lehi should accept their authority.

In September 1944, Menahem Begin, Irgun commander, held two meetings with Moshe Sneh, head of the Haganah General Headquarters, and Eliyahu Golomb, one of the Haganah leaders. At these meetings, which lasted into the night, relations between the Irgun and the Yishuv leadership were discussed at length.

On the question of national authority, Moshe Sneh said, inter alia:   To expand your activities requires control of the souls and the property of the public. And it is we who control the public. We do not intend to renounce that control, because it is we who have received a mandate from the Jewish people... If you continue your activities, a clash will result. 


Eliyahu Golomb was even blunter:

 We demand that you cease immediately [your activity against the British]... We do not want a civil war... but we will be ready for that as well. We will be forced to adopt our own measures to prevent your activities. The police, in our opinion, will not be able to liquidate you, but if the Yishuv rebels, it could come to that. It is clear that we are not speaking of your physical liquidation, but the developments could lead to that as well, they could lead to your destruction. And then it will not matter who started - it is a question of propaganda and information. 


Begin vehemently rejected the charge that the Irgun wanted to take over control of the Yishuv and said:

 We have no intention of seizing power in the Yishuv. We have said this on many occasions. We have no such ambitions... we think that Ben-Gurion is the man who can lead our youth into battle today. But in order to do so, Ben-Gurion must leave his residence in Rehavia. For as long as he is there - he cannot conduct that war. We have no party or administrative interests. We pray for the day when we can proclaim the end of the Irgun's task and disperse it. And the moment that you go out to war - we will all rally under a united leadership, in which you will constitute the decisive majority. But as long as you have not done this, we will conduct our battle. 




The Round Table at the Vackses
The table around which Begin and Sneh met in September 1944
The turning point in the struggle against the Jewish underground was the assassination of Lord Moyne in Cairo. Lord Moyne, who was known to be an anti-Zionist, had been appointed Minister of State for the Middle East, and from his place of residence in Cairo was responsible for implementing the White Paper policy. Lehi, which considered Lord Moyne to be responsible for the deportation of the immigrant ships, plotted to assassinate him. Two of its members - Eliyahu Hakim and Eliyahu Bet-Zuri - were despatched to Cairo, and on November 6, 1944, they carried out the assassination, but were caught shortly after carrying out their mission. On January 10, 1945 they were charged with murder. Hakim and Beit-Zuri, manacled, stood calmly beside their Egyptian guards with red fezzes. Both were, and had been since their capture, completely self-possessed. They did not take part in the proceedings, and when the testimony was completed, Eliyahu Hakim rose to his feet and said:

 We accuse Lord Moyne and the government he represents, with murdering hundreds and thousands of our brethren; we accuse him of seizing our country and looting our possessions... We were forced to do justice and to fight. 

After being sentenced to death, they rose to their feet and sang the national anthem. On March 23, 1945, they were dressed in the traditional, ill-fitting red burlap suit of condemned men, marched barefoot to the gallows, were blindfolded at the scaffold, and hanged.

 The assassination of Lord Moyne created shock waves in Palestine and throughout the world. Even before the identity of the assassins became known, the Jewish Agency Executive convened and issued a fierce condemnation of the act. At the same meeting, it decided on a series of measures against "terrorist organizations" in Palestine.

Once the Season had been approved by the Jewish Agency Executive, the matter was submitted to the Histadrut Council, the body which, more than any other framework, determined the conduct of the "organized Yishuv". It published an official announcement on the matter:


Jewish youth must fight terror and its perpetrators!

[...] The perpetrators of terror, who call themselves the 'Irgun Zvai Le'umi' and 'Lohamei Herut Israel' are traitors!
... They must be removed from our classrooms, banished from our workshops!
Their propaganda, whether written or spoken, must not be permitted...
No refuge must be given to these malefactors in the homes of your parents, relatives and acquaintances!
The incorrigible despoilers must be isolated and abandoned, until they are spewed out of the ranks of the Yishuv, until terror ceases and its organization is eradicated. 

As regards collaboration with the British police, the announcement went on to declare:


The Jewish Agency proposes herewith that all persons who are acquainted with any of the terrorists, should immediately inform the police by word of mouth, in writing or by telephone and observe the injunction: 'And thou shalt root out the evil from thy midst'. Fathers who have sons in these organizations should, in the same fashion, inform the police and observe thereby the injunction: 'If a man have a stubborn and rebellious son, he must take him out to the elders and say to them: This our son is stubborn and rebellious, he will not obey our voice. And all the men of the city shall stone him with stones.' Particularly since the English do not intend to do the terrorists any harm. They will hold them for a year or two apart from other people until their surplus energy, which apparently results from overeating and from inactivity and sloth, has cooled down [...]

It is time to act for the sake of the Jewish people and the homeland. 

Two members of the Jewish Agency Executive, Rabbi Yehuda Fishman-Maimon and Yitzhak Greenboim, continued to oppose any form of collaboration with the British police, and when the decision was taken, Greenboim announced his resignation.

The following is a 1944 pamphlet published by the Irgun proclaiming the policy of non-retaliation.



THERE WILL BE NO FRATERNAL WAR

[...] It is with gloomy face that the loyal Jew asks himself and his neighbor: Are we to suffer this as well? Will a civil war break out in Eretz Israel? Will our home be destroyed before it has been built? Will our enemies see their base aspiration fulfilled? The air is filled with gunpowder. Orators and leaders do not cease to speak of the internal strife. One of them has said that it has already begun; the second - even more loudmouthed - has profaned his lips with the hysterical cry: blood for blood, an eye for an eye! A third has labored and labored until he has finally devised a plan to save the Jewish people. And this is the plan: to expel from their homes, to expel from schools, to starve and to hand over our fighting youths to the British Police. 'It is them or us,' it declared, 'and all means are acceptable in order to liquidate them.' (From Ben-Gurion's speech at the Histadrut Conference).
Yes, the dread of the loyal Jew is understandable. Are we to witness our children raising their hands or aiming their weapons against one another? What will they do, those persecuted people against whom the terrible edicts are directed? How will they defend themselves?...

These are grave questions, and we feel it our duty - on our own behalf and on behalf of the Irgun Zvai Le'umi in Eretz Israel - to provide an answer. And this is our answer: you may stay calm, loyal Jews; there will be no fraternal strife in this country...
 

It was not easy for Begin to persuade his subordinates to exercise restraint. There were two underlying reasons for his decision: firstly, he said, to react could result in the Yishuv being plunged into a civil war, which would spell the end of the struggle against British rule in Eretz Israel. Secondly, he felt it undesirable to exacerbate relations with the Haganah, because they might later decide to join the struggle against foreign rule. Members of the Irgun who had been trained in the spirit of 'breaking the havlaga', found it hard to accept the decision of the General Headquarters. They did not, however, violate the order, possibly in the hope that their leader's evaluation would prove correct, and that the Haganah would join the struggle against the British. (This did indeed occur a year later, when the United Resistance - Tenuat Hameri Ha'ivri - was established).

The entire Haganah command was preoccupied with the Season, and information on the Irgun and the Lehi was amassed by the Haganah's intelligence service, 'Shai'. The intelligence service had some 250 Palmach fighters (the elite Haganah unit) at its disposal, who were brought to town and assigned to the Season operation. They shadowed suspects and kidnapped Irgun fighters on the basis of lists they received from the Shai. In addition, the Palmach guarded the Jewish Agency leaders for fear that the Irgun or Lehi might react by perpetrating counter-kidnappings. The Jewish Agency in Jerusalem set up a Department for Special Assignments, which maintained close contact with the British Intelligence. It was this department which handed over to the British a list of names of persons suspected of being members of the Irgun.

Close to one thousand people were handed over to the British. Most of them were taken to the Latrun detention camp and several hundred were deported to detention camps in Africa (see "African Exile"). In addition, dozens of suspects were kidnapped and detained in prison cells built especially for this purpose on various kibbutzim. They were interrogated by members of the Haganah Intelligznce Service and occasionally suffered torture.



The Watch-Tower in Kiryat-Anavim
The Hagana Used this Tower as a Jail for Irgun Kidnappees
A letter from the High Commissioner in Jerusalem to the Colonial Secretary in London dated March 1, 1945 reveals that the Jewish Agency exploited its collaboration with the British Intelligence in order to hand over active members of the Revisionist party, who were not even members of the Irgun, and thereby to rid itself of political rivals. The letter states, among other things: (Public Records, CO733/457).



1.
[...] In all, the Jewish Agency has supplied so far details of 830 suspects, of whom 337 have been located and detained so far. Of these, 241 are being held under the Emergency Regulations; the remainder have been released either under surveillance or unconditionally... Several useful arrests have also been made in the Irgun center in Tel Aviv.
2.
Unfortunately, the Jewish Agency's lists of so-called terrorists continues to include numerous people who have no terror connections, but politically speaking are undesirable to the Jewish Agency. This adds to the difficulties the police has in separating the sheep from the goats [...]
 

The most serious kidnapping incident was the case of Yaakov Tavin, who was in charge of the Irgun's intelligence service and on the Haganah's most wanted list. For three months, Tavin succeeded in evading the Haganah men who were shadowing him, but at the end of February 1945, he finally fell into their hands. The kidnapping was described in Ha'aretz of March 2, 1945 as follows:


Passersby in Dizengoff and Yirmiyahu streets were greatly struck on Tuesday, February 27, 1945, by the kidnapping of a young man in the street. The kidnapping occurred at 11 a.m, and was witnessed by a large number of people. A large taxi halted at the corner of Dizengoff and Yirmiyahu streets, and several men emerged, one of them dressed in police uniform. They approached the young man, who was standing on the pavement holding a package. Shouting 'Thief!', they attacked him and began to hit him.
The crowd thought that he was in fact a thief, and several of them joined the attackers and helped them to push the young man into the taxi. He struggled with them and shouted in Yiddish and in Hebrew: 'Jews, help me! Why do you let them hit a Jew?' He was thrown into the car, which swiftly drove away. 


Tavin's kidnappers blindfolded him, tied his hands and forced him to lie on the floor of the car. He was driven to Kibbutz Givat Hashlosha and from there was taken to Kibbutz Ein Harod, where he was imprisoned in a barn which had been converted into a detention room. Tavin was held there for six months and underwent numerous interrogations, accompanied by severe torture. He was released when the war ended and the Haganah entered into negotiations with the Irgun for the establishment of 'The United Resistance' .

The kidnappings were fiercely condemned in the Yishuv. The Chief Rabbinate published a strongly-worded notice, which declared:


This cruel deed is utterly prohibited by the Torah, and is alien and abominable to the Jewish people and to every Jew. It desecrates the name of Israel and our settlement in Eretz Israel.
Cease these cruel and despicable acts. 


The distinguished philosopher, Hugo Bergmann, who was a member of 'Brit Shalom' and a sworn opponent of the Jewish underground, wrote:


The kidnappings are the tomb of democratic public life... a death sentence against all we hold dear in the Yishuv... These Ku Klux Klan acts are being committed lawlessly, and those accused have no opportunity to defend themselves. 


The protesters were joined by civil organizations and by the Tel Aviv Municipality, together with municipalities and local councils all over the country. Public pressure proved effective and the Season gradually lapsed.

Although the Season caused the Irgun considerable harm, it did not liquidate it. Many of the fighters were arrested, but new recruits took the place of the veterans, and in the spring of 1945 the organization began to recover. After a seven-month interval, the Irgun again went into action. In May 1945, telephone poles were sabotaged throughout the country, and home-made mortars were set up opposite various government targets in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. In Jerusalem, mortars were put into position opposite the King David Hotel (the seat of the British military command and the government secretariat), and opposite the government printing press (alongside the railway station). In Tel Aviv, the mortars were located near the Sarona military camp (now the Kirya government area in Tel Aviv). The oil pipeline linking the Iraqi oilfields to the Haifa refineries was also sabotaged. On July 23, 1945, a joint unit of Irgun and Lehi fighters, under the command of Yehoshua Weinstein (Benyamin) blew up a railway bridge adjacent to the Arab village of Yibne (present-day Yavne). This was the first joint operation of the two organizations, after they had resolved to act together against British rule.

http://www.etzel.org.il/english/ac07.htm

[Ultra Requete]

Take note haw British liberals betrayed Jewish couse:

 

As the second World War approached its end, hopes ran high among the leaders of the Zionist movement that the British government would amend its policy towards Jewish immigration to Eretz Israel. Such hopes, however, were soon dashed. In the summer of 1945, a general election was held in Britain. Labor pledged that if they were returned to power, they would revoke the White Paper and permit Holocaust survivors to immigrate to Eretz Israel without delay. They also promised to act for the establishment of a Jewish national home in Eretz Israel, which would gradually evolve into an independent state.

However, after sweeping victory at the polls, the new Labor government soon declared that there would be no changes in Britain's foreign policy, nor would any concessions be granted with regard to Jewish immigration. Labor's attachment to the White Paper greatly disappointed Jewish leaders in Eretz Israel and the Diaspora. On September 23, 1945, Moshe Sneh, head of the Haganah General Headquarters, cabled David Ben-Gurion (then in London) as follows:


...it has been proposed that we stage a grave incident. Then we will issue a statement declaring that this is only a warning, and hint at much more serious incidents to follow. 




Ben-Gurion replied swiftly on October 1: (from the Slik No.1, 1991, Haganah Archives)


[...] We must not confine our reaction in Palestine to immigration and settlement. It is essential to adopt tactics of S [sabotage] and reprisal. Not individual terror, but retaliation for each and every Jew murdered by the White Paper. The S. action must carry weight and be impressive, and care should be taken, insofar as possible, to avoid casualties...
The two rival factions [Irgun and Lehi] should be invited to collaborate on condition that there is uniform authority and that total discipline is observed. Constant effort is required to ensure solidarity within the Yishuv and, above all, among the fighters, for the sake of the struggle.

Our reaction should be constant, bold and calculated for a considerable period...
 




Sneh regarded Ben-Gurion's letter as a warrant for the launching of military action against the British. As a first step, the Season was suspended, and discussions initiated on collaboration between the Haganah, Irgun and Lehi. The negotiations were crowned with success, and at the end of October, 1945, an agreement was signed between the three organizations for the establishment of The United Resistance. The following are the main points of the agreement: (Menahem Begin, 'In the Underground' vol.2, p.7)



a. The Haganah organization has entered upon a military struggle against British rule.
b. The Irgun and Lehi will not implement combat plans without the approval of the command of the United Resistance.
c. The Irgun and Lehi will carry out combat missions assigned to them by the command of the United Resistance Movement.
d. Discussions of proposed operations will not be formal. Representatives of the three fighting organizations will meet regularly, or whenever the need arises, and will discuss such plans from a political and practical viewpoint.
e. Once operations have been approved in principle, experts from the three organizations will clarify the details.
f. The need to obtain the consent of the United Resistance command does not apply to arms' acquisition (i.e. confiscating weapons from the British). Irgun and Lehi have the right to conduct such operations at their discretion.
g. The agreement between the three fighting organizations is based on 'positive precepts'.
h. If, at some time, the Haganah should be ordered to abandon the military struggle against the British authorities, the Irgun and Lehi will continue to fight. 



The leadership of the United Resistance consisted of two representatives of the Haganah (Yisrael Galili and Moshe Sneh), an Irgun representative (Menahem Begin) and a Lehi representative (Nathan Yellin-Mor). It held general discussions, and the Irgun and Lehi were required to submit all plans of action to this body.

Operations were authorized by the Haganah command, after discussions between the senior operations staff: Yitzhak Sadeh (Palmach commander), Eitan Livni (Irgun's chief operations officer) and Yaakov Eliav (Lehi's chief of operations). Later, Eliav withdrew from these meetings and asked Eitan Livni to represent him. The Haganah command had the right to veto plans on operational, political or other grounds.

In November 1, 1945, the three organizations conducted their first joint attack, the "Night of the Trains". That night, Haganah units sabotaged some 153 spots along railway tracks throughout the country, and blew up patrol launches in Jaffa and Haifa ports, while a joint Irgun-Lehi unit, commanded by Eitan Livni, attacked the main railway station at Lydda.

This operation had a strong impact in Britain. The newspapers published detailed articles on the acts of sabotage, and the government hastened to denounce the perpetrators. The Jewish Agency, in a special statement issued in London, declared, inter alia:



It is a tragedy that matters in Palestine have reached such a pass. The Jewish Agency abhors the use of violence as a weapon in the political struggle, but realizes that its ability to impose restraint has been severely tested by the continued policy (of the British government), which the Jews regard as fatal for them. 


Whilst this statement did not constitute an endorsement of the operation, it did mark the first occasion on which the Jewish Agency expressed sympathy for its underlying motives.
THE SECOND EXPLOSION AT THE BRITISH INTELLIGENCE OFFICES
Nearly two months later, on December 27, 1945, a joint Irgun-Lehi force, led by Shraga Alis, launched an assault on the British Intelligence offices in Jerusalem for the second time. The British had learned the lesson of the first attack (March 23, 1944), and had introduced special security arrangements in the Russian Compound in Jerusalem; despite these, however, the underground fighters succeeded in evading the British patrols, entered the building and set the explosive charges. The central British Intelligence building collapsed.

Once again, it was demonstrated that nothing could stand in the way of the acumen and daring of the Jewish underground. The success was overshadowed, however, by the death of Zvi Aharoni - fatally injured in the attack; and the wounding of Yaakov Granek (later known as 'blond Dov'), both of Lehi. Seven British policemen lost their lives in the explosion and a large number were injured.

At the same time the district headquarters of the police and the British Intelligence office in Jaffa were housed in a four-storey building on the Jaffa-Tel Aviv Road were attacked. The force, led by Eliyahu Tamler (Yehoshua), approached the building under cover of darkness and succeeded in setting an explosive charge. Several minutes later the second storey of the building, housing the British Intelligence was destroyed.

That night, another Irgun unit, under Amichai Paglin (Gidi), attacked the army camp at the Exhibition Grounds in north Tel Aviv. In the exchange of fire, a British soldier was killed. An Irgun fighter, Dov Sternglass, lost his life, and five other fighters were injured.


 
A poster published by the Irgun

THE 'NIGHT OF THE AIRFIELDS'
 One of the most impressive operations conducted by the United Resistance was the joint assault on three military airfields. As noted above, the Irgun had refrained from striking military targets while Britain was still fighting the Germans. However, once the war was over, the restrictions no longer applied, and the British army, which had played an active part in harrassing the Yishuv, was no longer exempt from attack by the underground.

After the war, Palestine became an important center of activity for the RAF (Royal Air Force), and aircraft of various types were stationed here. These aircraft were natural targets for the underground. On the cold, rainy night of February 25, 1946, a combined operation took place: a Lehi unit attacked the airfield near Kfar Syrkin and set eight aircraft ablaze. At the same time, an Irgun unit made its way on foot to Lydda airfield, seven kilometers from Kfar Syrkin. The British had installed a powerful searchlight on the control tower, which illuminated the airfield and the perimeter fences. In the center of the field were two guard tents, from which armed Bren-carriers patrolled the area. Moreover, the RAF garrison was housed in barracks across the road from the airfield, and the personnel were on constant alert against intruders.

The Irgun unit arrived at the airfield behind schedule, and as the men approached the fence, they heard from afar the echo of the explosion at Kfar Syrkin. Although they feared that the British might have had time to prepare an ambush, Dov Cohen (Shimshon), the commander of the operation, decided to proceed according to plan. One of the squads crept cautiously up to the nearby transformer, and a loud explosion plunged the entire airfield into darkness. The alarm was sounded, summoning the British troops to their positions, but the Irgun fighters cut the barbed wire, advanced under cover of darkness and attached explosive charges to the aircraft. Another squad directed heavy fire at the barracks, preventing the RAF troops from emerging. After the charges had been detonated, the strike unit withdrew to the rendezvous point, and the entire force proceeded on foot through the muddy fields to the orange groves of Petah Tikva and Ramat Gan. The next day, it became known that the raid on Lydda airfield had destroyed 11 military aircraft.

While Shimshon and his men were proceeding towards Lydda airfield, two trucks were making their way from Rehovot to the military airfield at Kastina (present day Hatzor). The first truck was loaded with weapons and explosives, which were covered with straw and crates of vegetables. Twelve fighters, disguised as Arabs, were seated on the crates. The other fighters were in the second truck, dressed in work-clothes, like moshav farmers returning home from the field. The trucks halted not far from the airfield, weapons were allotted and the force, led by Amichai Paglin (Gidi), advanced on foot towards the target. They reached the airfield perimeter fence without being spotted, and cut the wire silently. The sappers slipped through the fence, and ran swiftly towards the aircraft. Using ladders they had brought with them, they positioned the charges on each plane between fuselage and wing. After setting the time fuses, they withdrew to the meeting point. The RAF personnel on the airfield were prevented from leaving their barracks by the machine-gun fire of the covering unit. While the fighters were re-assembling outside the airfield, there were loud explosions as some twenty military aircraft went up in flames.

 The force retreated through the orange groves, and after fifteen minutes or so, a single shot rang out. One of the fighters, Nazim Ezra Ajami (Yehonatan), was hit and died soon after. He was the sole victim of the widescale operation that night.



 
A poster published by the Irgun
THE DEATH SENTENCE
On March 6, 1946 at 1.30 pm, a military truck carrying 30 Irgun fighters disguised as British soldiers approached the Sarafand army camp. While the "officer" seated beside the driver was handing over the documents to the guard, several fighters climbed down from the truck. They easily overcame the guard and the five other soldiers who were on duty in the guard tent. The truck hastened to the armory, and the "soldiers" began loading crates of weapons onto the vehicle. While they were engaged in this task, a British soldier returned from his lunch break, his suspicions aroused by the unusual activity. He opened fire and was joined by other soldiers. In the exchange of gunfire, five fighters were injured, two of them, Yosef Simchon and Michael Ashbel, seriously. The truck, loaded with the fighters and the crates of weapons, drove off at high speed, but not before the commander of the operation, Eliyahu Tamler (Yehoshua) had detonated a mine, which blew up the remaining weapons and ammunition in the armory. The truck halted at Rishon Lezion, where the wounded were given medical treatment and the weapons were unloaded in the dunes. The lightly-injured slipped away with the other fighters, while Simchon and Ashbel were loaded into a car escorted by Shulamit Shmueli and Zippora Flumin (who had been on duty at the first-aid station). The driver took off for hospital in Tel Aviv. On the way they were intercepted by a British armored car, and the soldiers searched the vehicle and arrested the passengers. The two injured men were taken to Jaffa jail and, after interrogation, were transferred to a government hospital, where they underwent surgery. The two women were taken to the women's jail in Bethlehem, where they remained until the British evacuation of Palestine.



Sarafand armory
More than two months after their arrest, Simchon and Ashbel were tried by a military tribunal in Jerusalem. They refused to be represented by the lawyer, Max Critchman, who was assigned to them, and chose to use the occasion to make a political statement denying the right of the British to rule the country:

 [...] You cannot break the spirit of the Jewish people nor can you destroy the desire for freedom which fires the hearts of its sons. And my proclamation, made in this place, will serve as one more testimony - one of many - to the indomitable stand of six hundred thousand Jewish citizens, who are united in the struggle for the liberation of their country from the bloody rule of the British (Statement of Michael Ashbel) 


The military tribunal sentenced Simchon and Ashbel to death by hanging. After hearing their sentence, the two rose to their feet and sang Hatikva, together with the Jewish reporters in the courtroom. Kol Zion Halohemet (The Voice of Fighting Zion, the clandestine Irgun broadcasting station) broadcast the following warning:

  If you hang our captive soldiers, then, as God is our witness, we will break your gallows. We will give you gallows for gallows. 


On June 18, 1946, Irgun fighters were despatched to seize British hostages, in order to save the lives of their comrades who had been sentenced to death. In Tel Aviv, two units raided the Gat Rimon and Hayarkon hotels, where British officers were billeted. In both cases, they encountered a large number of officers; they chose the five most senior among them and took them to a pre-designated hiding place. The British army conducted widescale searches of Tel Aviv and its environs, without success. In the end, the officers were released and the High Commissioner commuted the death sentence to life imprisonment.

THE SABOTAGING OF THE RAILWAY TRACKS IN THE SOUTH
On the night of April 2, 1946, the Irgun conducted a widescale operation with the aim of immobilizing the railway network in the south. It was the largest operation the organization had ever planned, with about 100 participants. The same night, the Lehi blew up the Naaman bridge south of Acre.

The Irgun force, which was dispersed over an area of forty five kilometers, was divided into three groups: the northern force, under Menahem Schiff (Zeev), assembled at a packing house in an orange grove in Rehovot and proceeded from there to the Arab village of Yibne. When they reached their destination, the sappers laid explosive charges around the supporting pillars of the bridge and, after igniting the fuses, withdrew rapidly. Shortly afterwards, there were several explosions and the bridge collapsed into the wadi. Another unit advanced towards the railway station, and while they were engaged in blowing up various installations, a British unit arrived and opened fire.

 The Irgun force returned fire and three British soldiers were injured. After completing its mission, the Irgun unit withdrew to the sand dunes south of Rishon Lezion, the arms were cached away, and the fighters dispersed to their homes.

The two other units assembled in another packing house, also in the Rehovot area. After being briefed, they boarded two trucks. As was the case at Kastina , the first truck carried unarmed fighters posing as workers returning from the field, while the second truck was loaded with oranges. "Arab workers" were seated on the oranges, with the weapons concealed under the fruit. The convoy moved southward, and halted at the pre-arranged spot (not far from Kibbutz Yavneh). The oranges were discarded, and the weapons taken out and distributed. The force now split in two: one unit (the eastern force) moved towards Zarnuga (between the Arab villages of Yibne and Ashdod), while the second (southern) force headed for the railway station near Ashdod.

The three units were co-ordinated only as regards the hour of the attack, timed for 8 pm. The eastern force (under Eliezer Pedatzur) was delayed en route; as it approached the target, the fighters heard the explosions from the direction of Yibne. The guards greeted the oncoming force with a volley of flare rockets, which impeded their progress. They split into several squads, which dispersed over the terrain, placing explosive charges under bridges and water conduits and beside the tracks and telephone poles. One of the squads came under fire from the guards, and Ezra Rabia was severely injured. After detonating the devices, the squads assembled at a meeting point on a nearby hill, and the entire force withdrew across the dunes to Bat Yam, 25 kilometers away. Rabia was carried on a stretcher, while another fighter, injured in the arm, managed to walk with the help of a comrade. Rabia lost consciousness, and died shortly afterwards. He was buried in the dunes, on the assumption that the British would find the body the next day and give him a proper burial in a nearby settlement. His comrades stood in silence beside the grave and one of them recited Kaddish (the prayer for the dead). The next day the British found Rabia's body and burried him at Kfar Warburg under the name of "Avraham Ben Avraham".

The fighters continued to march through the dunes and reached Bat Yam in the early morning hours, where they handed in their weapons and dispersed. The wounded man was transferred to a maternity hospital in Tel Aviv, which was temporarily treating Irgun casualties.

The southern force, under Dov Cohen (Shimshon), also reached Ashdod behind schedule. The unit which attacked the bridge encountered resistance from the guards, who took up defensive positions in the pillbox. In the exchange of gunfire, two policemen were killed. After setting the charges, the force proceeded to the railway station, overcame the five police guards and the station staff, and placed explosive devices beside various installations. They also blew up an engine, which happened to arrive. When their mission was completed, they set out for their home base. The trek through the sand-dunes was difficult, and progress was slow. It was already dawn as they approached Bat Yam and a British reconnaissance aircraft spotted them. Shortly afterwards, British troops poured into the area and surrounded the weary fighters. In the ensuing battle, Avner Ben-Shem was killed and four other fighters were injured.

Thirty-one fighters in all were arrested by the British in the Bat Yam dunes, among them some of the Irgun's best commanders. The mass arrest was a severe blow to the Irgun's fighting force, but at the same time the detention of so large a number of the underground made a strong impression on the local and international media.

 Among those arrested was Eitan Livni, the Irgun's chief operations officer He was sentenced, together with his comrades, to 15 years imprisonment, but two years later, was freed in the Acre jail break. He was sent clandestinely to Europe to organize action against British targets there, and on May 15, 1948, he returned home to take part in the struggle aganst the Arab invaders.



 
A poster published by the Irgun
HAGANAH ACTION
While Irgun and Lehi fighters were attacking military targets, the Haganah confined itself, initially, to assaults on targets connected with immigration. It attacked the coast guard stations at Givat Olga and Sidni Ali (near Herzliya), and blew up radar installations at Haifa. But as the armed struggle against the British gathered momentum, the front was extended to encompass military targets unconnected with immigration. On February 23, 1946, for example, the Haganah raided the mobile police force at Kfar Vitkin, Shfar'am and Sarona (now the Kirya in Tel Aviv).

The acme of Haganah activities was the destruction, in one night, of 11 bridges linking Palestine to the neighboring countries. The operation on the night of June 17, which became known as "The Night of the Bridges", was the largest the Haganah launched within the framework of the United Resistance, and was also its final one. All four Palmach battalions (the Haganah elite units) took part in the action, stationed on all the country's borders: north, south and east. The operation achieved its objective, and the country was cut off from all its neighbors.

After the Night of the Bridges, Oz, the illegal publication of Achdut Haavoda (one of the socialist parties), wrote:



The recent operations attest to the fact that the struggle has reached a more acute stage; these were no longer mere cautionary acts. They were intended to cause real damage to the authorities, and such damage was indeed inflicted. They were aimed at immobilizing transportation between this country and its neighbors, and it was in fact suspended. These activities have demonstrated that as long as there is no Zionist solution for this country, the government will not be able to rule . 

http://www.etzel.org.il/english/ac08.htm#31


 

[Ultra Requete]

The British retaliated swiftly to the blowing up of the bridges by the Palmach. The following day British forces were sent to the Western Galilee to search Kibbutz Matsuba which was thought to be the base of the Palmach unit. Twenty-seven kibbutz members were arrested and sent to Acre jail. Searches were also conducted at Kibbutz Bet Haarava on the northern Dead Sea, on suspicion that it had served as the base for the group which attacked the Allenby Bridge. In the clashes with the soldiers, 12 kibbutz members were injured, two of them severely, and 70 people were arrested. The next day, military forces cordoned off Kibbutz Kfar Giladi in the north and when the soldiers broke in, the kibbutz members displayed passive resistance. Hundreds of members of nearby settlements hastened to their aid, and when they approached the kibbutz, the British troops opened fire on them. Three Jews were killed and six injured.

In total, four Jews were killed, eighteen injured and more than 100 detained in the operations carried out by the British after the Night of the Bridges. These events, however, were merely a prelude to the much larger operation which took place two weeks later and became known as Black Sabbath.

The action against the organized Yishuv, which had been planned carefully and in great secrecy, began in the early hours of Saturday, June 29, 1946. A countrywide curfew was proclaimed, and 17,000 soldiers entered institutions and settlements in order to confiscate weapons and documents, and to arrest leaders of the Yishuv and Haganah activists. The Mandatory government announced that it was determined to uproot terror and violence, and that the military action had been endorsed by the Cabinet in London.

Operation Agatha, as the British called it, took the Yishuv by surprise, and achieved most of its objectives. A considerable amount of intelligence information was collected, and thousands of Jews were arrested and jailed in a special internment camp which had been prepared at Rafiah. In Jerusalem, British troops entered the Jewish Agency buildings and, after ransacking the offices and in particular the archives, confiscated a large number of documents. This material was loaded onto three trucks and taken to the King David Hotel in Jerusalem, which housed the government secretariat and the military command. The documents included cables, which clearly demonstrated the role of the Jewish Agency in the leadership of the United Resistance. Also found was the text of the agreement between the Haganah and the Irgun and Lehi, and cables approving Irgun and Lehi operations against the British in the framework of the United Resistance. Another discovery was the text of broadcasts of Kol Yisrael (the Haganah's clandestine broadcasting station), stating, among other things, that everything possible would be done "to foil the transfer of British bases to Palestine and to prevent their establishment in Palestine".



Searching for Armes
In addition to the numerous documents confiscated from offices, the soldiers broke into the homes of members of the Jewish Agency Executive and arrested them.

 At 4.15 a.m on the Sabbath, a police officer, followed by an army officer with two army vehicles, arrived at the home of sixty-year-old Rabbi Fishman-Maimon. The soldiers surrounded the house. Rabbi Fishman informed them that he was unable to travel on the Sabbath and proposed that he walk, or that the house be placed under guard until the Sabbath ended, when he would be able to travel. He asked the officers to consult their superiors on this proposal, but they had received orders to take him at once. Rabbi Fishman sat down and replied that he would not budge. The soldiers tried to carry him together with the chair, but the rabbi slipped off the chair, and they then took him by force and pushed him into the vehicle. Since there was no electricity because of the Sabbath, the soldiers used flash lights. (Davar newspaper, July 1, 1946) 


Among those arrested were Moshe Shertok (Sharett) and Bernard Joseph (Dov Yosef) of the Political Department of the Jewish Agency, and David Remez, chairman of the Vaad Le'umi. Other public figures were detained all over the country and brought to the special VIP camp built for them at Latrun. In Tel Aviv, a thorough search was conducted at the Histadrut Executive and at the offices of the Davar newspaper and Bank Hapoalim.

Searches and arrests were also carried out in many kibbutzim, but the British had their greatest success at Kibbutz Yagur. The search there lasted a week, and the British apparently had prior information about the arms caches there. The kibbutz members resisted passively, but were dispersed by tear gas and incarcerated in enclosures set up by the soldiers. At first it was merely a routine search, but once the first arms cache was found, the British attitude changed, and the soldiers began to dig under the floors and in all possible hiding places in their search for arms. Their find included more than 300 rifles, some 100 2-inch mortars, more than 400,000 bullets, some 5,000 grenades and 78 revolvers. The loot was displayed at a press conference on the spot, and after arresting all the men of Yagur, the British withdrew.



Weapons found in Yagur
At Kibbutz Mizra, the British broke into Palmach headquarters, and confiscated a large number of documents, including the card-index of Palmach members. The names were written in code, and even though the British Intelligence did not succeed in deciphering them, the very fact that the list had fallen into their hands was a blow to morale.

During Black Sabbath, some 2,700 people were arrested throughout the country and taken to the Rafiah internment camp. Two days later, the Haganah command, headed by Moshe Sneh, convened to discuss retaliation. The opinion was that the armed struggle had to be continued in order to prove to the British that, despite the mass arrests, they had not succeeded in paralysing the United Resistance.

The Haganah command decided to carry out three operations against the British authorities. The first was a Palmach raid on the Bat Galim army camp, in order to requisition weapons (according to Haganah Intelligence Service information, the weapons confiscated at Yagur were being stored there). The second mission entrusted to the Irgun was the blowing up of the King David Hotel, where the offices of the Mandatory government and the British military command were located. The Lehi was allotted the task of blowing up the adjacent David Brothers building, which housed government offices. In a letter to Begin, Sneh wrote: (Jabotinsky Institute Archives, k-4 1/11/5)


a) At the earliest possible opportunity, you are to carry out the operation at the 'chick' (code name for King David Hotel) and at the house of "your servant and messiah" (code name for David Brothers building). Inform me of the date. Preferably at the same time. Do not reveal the identity of the implementing body - either by announcing it explicitly or by hinting.
b) We too are preparing something - will inform you of details in good time.
c) Exclude TA (Tel Aviv) from any plan of action. We are all interested in preserving TA - as the center of Yishuv life and the center of our own activities. If, as the result of any action, TA is immobilized (curfew, arrests), this will paralyse us and our plans as well. And the important objects of the other side are not focused here. Hence, TA is 'out of bounds' for the forces of Israel.

1.7.46. M. (Moshe Sneh). 


While preparations for the operations were at their height, Meir Weisgal arrived at Sneh's hideout. Weisgal was on a personal mission from Chaim Weizmann, President of the World Zionist Organization (Weizmann himself was then ailing at his home in Rehovot). Weisgal told Sneh that Weizmann urged that the armed struggle against the British be halted. Among other things, Weisgal quoted Weizmann as saying:

 In other countries it is accepted that the president is the commander in chief of the armed forces. I have never sought this authority nor has it ever occurred to me to interfere in your affairs. For the first and only time , I am exercising this right and demanding of you that you cease all this activity. 


Weizmann demanded an immediate answer, and announced that if his request was rejected, he would resign and publicly announce the reasons for his resignation. Sneh, who was opposed to stopping the armed struggle against the British, informed Weisgal that he could not decide this matter alone, and would submit Weizmann's request to the X Committee. The Committee debated the question of the powers of the president of the World Zionist Organization, but eventually decided, by majority vote, to accede to Weizmann's request. Sneh, who opposed the resolution, resigned from his post as head of the Haganah General Headquarters, but remained liaison officer with the Irgun and Lehi. Sneh met with Begin, did not inform him of the X Committee's resolution, and merely requested that the assault on the King David Hotel be postponed. Sneh then decided to leave for Paris to attend a meeting of the Jewish Agency Executive, which was to discuss the continued struggle against the Mandatory government. Before leaving the country, on July 19, he sent Begin another note:


Shalom!
I have heard from my comrades about the recent conversation. If my personal appeal still holds weight with you, I beg you to delay the scheduled actions for another few days. 


As a result of Sneh's appeal, the attack on the King David Hotel was scheduled for July 22, 1946. Because of coordination problems, the Lehi decided to cancel its plan to blow up the David Brothers building.

http://www.etzel.org.il/english/ac09.htm

[Ultra Requete]

The King David Hotel in Jerusalem was built by the Moseri family, members of the wealthy and influential Jewish establishment in Cairo and Alexandria. They set up a shareholding company to finance its construction, consisting mainly of Egyptian businessmen and wealthy Jews from all over the world. The luxurious seven-storey building, with 200 rooms, was opened to the public in 1931. In 1938, the Mandatory government requisitioned the entire southern wing of the hotel, and housed the military command and the Mandatory government secretariat there. The British chose the King David for its central location and because it was easy to guard. They built a military communications center in the hotel basement and, for security reasons, added a side entrance linking the building to an army camp south of the hotel. Fewer than a third of the rooms were reserved for civilian use.

It will be recalled that after Black Sabbath (Saturday), Menahem Begin received a letter from Moshe Sneh (chief of the Haganah General Headquarters) with instructions to blow up the King David. After preparatory work and several postponements, Irgun fighters gathered at 7 am. on Monday, July 22, 1946 at the Bet Aharon Talmud Torah seminary in Jerusalem. They arrived one by one, gave the password and assembled in one of the classrooms. They realized that they were being sent on a mission, but none of them knew what the target was. Shortly afterwards, the senior command arrived and it was only when the briefing began that the assembled fighters discovered that they were going to strike at the King David Hotel.

After the weapons had been distributed, the first unit - the group of "porters" - commanded by Yosef Avni, set out. Their assignment was to reach the hotel by bus and to wait at the side entrance so as to assist in unloading the explosives from the van when it arrived. All six "porters" were disguised as Arabs so as to avoid arousing suspicion. The strike force left next in a van loaded with seven milk-churns, each containing 50 kilograms of explosives and special detonators. The commander of the operation, Yisrael Levi (Gidon), rode in the van dressed as a Sudanese waiter, while his deputy, Heinrich Reinhold (Yanai), and the other members of the unit, were dressed as Arabs. The van drove through the streets of Jerusalem, its tarpaulin cover concealing the milk-churns and the passengers, and halted at the side entrance of the hotel, through which foodstuffs were brought into the basement 'La Regence' restaurant. The fighters easily overcame the guards by the gate and hastened to the basement, where they searched all the rooms, and assembled the workers in the restaurant kitchen. They then returned to the van, brought the milk-churns into the restaurant, and placed them beside the supporting pillars . Gidon set the time fuses for 30 minutes, and ordered his men to leave. The staff gathered in the kitchen were told to leave the building 10 minutes later to avoid injury.

During the withdrawal from the basement, heavy gunfire was levelled at the group and two fighters were injured. One of them, Aharon Abramovitch, later died of his wounds.

After exiting the hotel, Gidon summoned two women fighters who were waiting nearby, and ordered them to carry out their mission. They ran over to a nearby telephone booth, and delivered the following message to the hotel telephone operator and to the editorial office of the Palestine Post:


 I am speaking on behalf of the Hebrew underground.
We have placed an explosive device in the hotel.
Evacuate it at once - you have been warned. 


They also delivered a telephone warning to the French Consulate, adjacent to the hotel, to open their windows to prevent blast damage. The telephone messages were intended to prevent casualties.

Some 25 minutes after the telephone calls, a shattering explosion shook Jerusalem, and reverberated at a great distance. The entire southern wing of the King David Hotel - all seven storeys - was totally destroyed. For reasons unclear, the staff of the government secretariat and the military command remained in their rooms. Some of them were unaware of events, and others were not permitted to leave the building, thus accounting for the large number of victims trapped in the debris.



King David Hotel after the explosion
For ten days, the British Engineering Corps cleared the wreckage, and on July 31 it was officially announced that 91 people had been killed in the explosion: 28 Britons, 41 Arabs, 17 Jews and 5 others.

 The success of the Jewish underground in striking at the heart of British government in Palestine, and the high toll of victims, sent shock waves through England and the rest of the world. At first, the Mandatory government denied having received a telephone warning, but testimony submitted to the interrogating judge made it clear beyond a doubt that such a warning had in fact been given. Moreover, the Palestine Post telephone operator attested on oath to the police that, immediately after receiving the telephone message, she had telephoned the duty officer at the police station. The French Consulate staff opened their windows as they had been told to by the anonymous woman who telephoned them, and this was further evidence of the warning.



King David Hotel after the explosion
It is almost impossible to recapitulate what occurred in the government secretariat offices in the half hour preceding the explosion, but all the evidence suggests that there were numerous flaws in the security arrangements in the King David, and that a series of omissions occurred. The telephone warning was disregarded, and although the warning signal was given, an all-clear was sounded shortly before the explosion. These facts indicate that there were serious errors in the decision-making process and that internal communication did not function properly.

The heads of the Jewish Agency were stunned. They feared that the British would adopt even more severe retaliatory measures than on Black Sabbath, and hastened to denounce the operation in the strongest terms. The statement they issued the following day expressed "their feelings of horror at the base and unparalleled act perpetrated today by a gang of criminals." Even David Ben-Gurion, who was then in Paris, joined the chorus of condemnation, and in an interview to the French newspaper 'France Soir', declared that the Irgun was "the enemy of the Jewish people".

The denunciation by the Jewish Agency totally ignored the fact that the bombing of the King David was carried out as part of the activities of the United Resistance, and on the explicit instructions of Moshe Sneh. At the request of the Haganah, the Irgun issued a leaflet accepting responsibility for the operation. It stated, among other things:



[...]
e. The telephone warnings were given at 12:10-12:15. And if it is true, as the British liars have announced, that the explosion occurred at 12:37, they still had 22 minutes at their disposal in order to evacuate the building of its residents and workers.
Therefore responsibility for loss of life among civilians rests solely with them.
f. It is not true that the persons who delivered the warning spoke 'on behalf of the United Resistance' (as the press reported)... On this matter, we are refraining at present from making any further statement, but it is possible that - in the context of the savage and dastardly incitement - it will be necessary to issue such a statement at the appropriate time.

g. We mourn the Jewish victims; they too are the tragic victims of the tragic and noble Hebrew war of liberation
[...]
 

A year later the Irgun issued the following statement:



THE TRUTH ABOUT THE KING DAVID HOTEL

[...] On July 1 - two days after the British raid on the National Institutions and on our towns and villages -we received a letter from the headquarters of the United Resistance, demanding that we carry out an attack on the center of government at the King David Hotel as soon as possible...
Execution of this plan was postponed several times - both for technical reasons and at the request of the United Resistance. It was finally approved on July 22...

Notwithstanding this, days later, Kol Yisrael broadcast a statement - in the name of the United Resistance - abhorring the high death toll at the King David caused by the actions of the 'dissidents'...

We have kept silent for a whole year. We have faced savage incitement, such as this country has never before known. We have withstood the worst possible provocations - and remained silent. We have witnessed evasion, hypocrisy and cowardice - and remained silent.

But today, when the United Resistance has expired and there is no hope that it will ever be revived... there are no longer valid reasons why we should maintain our silence concerning the assault against the center of Nazi-British rule - one of the mightiest attacks ever carried out by a militant underground. Now it is permissible to reveal the truth; now we must reveal the truth. Let the people see - and judge.


July 22, 1947. 


The Hebrew press, and the Haganah publications, continued to condemn the Irgun in the strongest possible terms. They were echoed by the British press, which was briefed by the Mandatory government. However, the effect of the British denunciations was blunted to a large extent by the publication of instructions issued by General Sir Evelyn Barker (British army commander in Palestine) several hours after the explosion. He ordered all the Jewish places of entertainment, restaurants, shops and Jewish homes - "out of bounds for all British officers and soldiers". The instructions ended by saying that:


 "The aim of these orders are to punish the Jews in a way the race dislikes as much as any, namely by striking at their pockets" 

Barker's letter reached the Irgun's intelligence service and was immediately made public in Palestine and throughout the world. The antisemitic tone of the letter greatly embarrassed the British government and diverted public opinion from the attack on the King David Hotel. Questions were asked in the House of Commons about the letter and the London Daily Herald wrote, among other things, that if General Barker had in fact written the letter, he was demonstrating his unsuitability for his position.

The order was officially rescinded two weeks after it was issued, but the damage to the British cause in Palestine could not be erased.

However, as a result of Black Sabbath, the moderates now held the upper hand, and at a meeting of the Jewish Agency Executive in Paris on August 5, 1946, it was decided to terminate the armed struggle against the British in Palestine. This marked the end of the glorious ten-month period when all the Jewish forces in Eretz Israel (Haganah, Irgun and Lehi) fought together against foreign rule.

The terminating of the armed struggle provoked considerable resentment among many members of the Haganah, and Yitzhak Sadeh (commander of the Palmach) gave vent to this emotion in his article "Proposal and Response" in Ahdut Ha'avoda, October 15, 1946 which he signed Noded (Wanderer).

 There will be no capitulation, because there is nobody to order capitulation, and should such a person be found, he would find nobody to carry out the order. 


The Haganah focused its efforts on bringing in illegal immigrants, and in order to appease those activists in the Haganah ranks who continued to favor armed struggle, it sanctioned the sabotaging of British naval vessels which were hunting down illegal immigrants. Thus, on August 18, 1946, Palmach fighters sabotaged the Empire Haywood and two days later damaged the Empire Rival, the two ships used for deporting immigrants from Haifa to Cyprus.

When the United Resistance ceased to exist, the Irgun and Lehi continued the armed struggle alone. The Irgun was now both morally and materially stronger than ever before. Support for its cause had grown, since the United Resistance had legitimized its activities. The number of recruits increased, and its stock of weapons and ammunition was expanded as a result of its acquisitions from British army depots. Free of the restrictions imposed by the Haganah command, the Irgun now intensified its anti-British activities.

http://www.etzel.org.il/english/ac10.htm

[Ultra Requete]

When the decision was taken to attack the railway station in Jerusalem, Heinrich Reinhold (Yanai) was appointed commander of the operation. On October 29, a day before the assault, Yitzhak Avinoam, Jerusalem district commander, and Amichai Paglin (Gidi), chief operations officer, came to Yanai's apartment in the Rehavia quarter of Jerusalem. There was a curfew in Jerusalem that evening, but Rehavia was one of several quarters outside the curfew area. They wanted to find out why Yanai had not arrived at that evening's scheduled meeting. They went up to the second floor apartment, where the door was opened by the landlady. Avinoam told her that they had come to visit Yanai, and they were surprised to hear that he was not at home. Their first thought was that he had been kidnapped by the Haganah, or possibly arrested by the British. In either event, he was liable to be interrogated and Avinoam decided to take precautionary measures in case Yanai broke down under interrogation and revealed the plan for the raid on the railway station. It was also essential to replace him as commander of the operation.


Yitzhak Avinoam
 
The following day, October 30, Avinoam and Gidi went to the room in the Sukat Shalom quarter from which the fighters set out on missions. At 7 am, they arrived one by one. Among them was Eliyahu Levi (Aviel), one of the senior commanders in Jerusalem, who had been privy to the preparations and knew all the details of the plan. Aviel had been appointed as Yanai's replacement, but it was decided to postpone the operation and to check on the situation in the target area.

At 10 am, Salomon, the signals officer, was sent to the station area on a tour of reconnaissance. He set out on his motorbike and returned soon after to announce that he had seen nothing suspicious. An hour later he was sent on an additional tour and, on his return, informed Avinoam again that nothing appeared suspicious.

He was sent out later for the third time. On his return, he encountered Aviel, who was seated with his unit, in two taxis, awaiting the signal to depart.  "What's going on?" asked Aviel.
"Everything's OK" replied Salomon. 
Salomon had not yet had time to report to Avinoam on his reconnaissance tour. Aviel gave the signal and the force set out in two taxis (which had been requisitioned that morning in Jerusalem). Seated in the first taxi were Yosef Levi (Kushi) and Mas'ud Biton, disguised as Arab porters.


Meir Feinstein
 
In the second vehicle Sima Fleishhaker-Hoizman, dressed elegantly, sat beside Eliyahu Levi (Aviel), also in formal dress. They were posing as a young couple setting out on their honeymoon. With them were three guards, and at the wheel was Meir Feinstein. In the trunk of the car were three suitcases filled with explosives and detonators.

When the second taxi reached the railway station, the two "porters" came over to assist their "clients". Sima and Aviel emerged from the taxi, whilst all the Arab porters at the station offered their services. Aviel chose Kushi and Biton (to the annoyance of the real porters), who unloaded the suitcases from the taxi and put them down in the waiting room beside the ticket office. Aviel set the fuse connected to the devices, and Sima went over to the ticket office to buy tickets. No-one seemed suspicious at this point. After purchasing the tickets, Sima took a large cloth sign out of her handbag and placed it on top of the cases. On it, in three languages (Hebrew, English and Arabic), was written:


"Danger, mines" 

and the Irgun symbol. An Arab policeman who was standing nearby went over to Sima, gripped her by the dress and asked: "What's this?" Sima hit him in the face and freed herself. One of the Irgun security men saw what had happened, aimed his sub-machinegun at the policeman and shot him. The fighters ran towards the two taxis waiting at the entrance to the station and jumped in. Suddenly the cars came under fire from all sides. Feinstein, who was in the driver's seat, was severely wounded in the left arm, but managed to drive with one hand. Sima, seated beside him, tore his shirt and bandaged his wounded arm. The heavy fire continued, and in addition to Feinstein, Azulai was hit in the stomach and leg, and Horovitz in the neck. Feinstein continued to drive rapidly and succeeded in shaking off the British armored car. The car halted at the entrance to the Yemin Moshe quarter of Jerusalem, where several Irgun girls were waiting to collect the weapons. Sima accompanied Feinstein to Yemin Moshe, where they found refuge in an apartment belonging to an old couple. Sima laid the wounded man on a bed, untied the temporary bandage and placed a tourniquet on the wounded arm. While she was treating Feinstein, a 14-year-old boy entered the room and told her that the police had arrived in the quarter, and were tracking the blood stains. Sima asked him to camouflage the stains with soil, while she herself went out to see what was happening. She discovered that the police had reached the house where Feinstein was hiding, and feared that they would arrest her as well. She bent over as if to tie her shoelace, thus hiding her dress, which had been torn in the struggle with the Arab policeman. Then she slipped away and fled Yemin Moshe.

Azulai, wounded in the stomach and leg, was also taken to a house in Yemin Moshe, where his wounds were bandaged. Shortly afterwards, the entire area was surrounded by police reinforcements and placed under curfew. All the men were asked to come outside and report for an identity parade. The two wounded men were apprehended and taken, under guard, to the government hospital.

Horovitz and Biton were arrested by Arab Legion soldiers, as they walked towards Jerusalem's commercial center and were handed over to the British police.

At 2 pm. large numbers of policemen reached the railway station. When the police sapper tried to lift one of the suitcases, there was an explosion which destroyed the interior of the building and killed him.



Jerusalem Railway Station after the explosion
Avinoam was waiting in one of the Irgun's safe houses when he received word of the ambush which the British had prepared for the fighters, and learned of the casualties and arrests. While he was absorbing this information, he was informed that the police had seized an arms cache at Givat Shaul. Avinoam recalled that the location of the arms cache at Givat Shaul had been known to Yanai. He approached Adina Hai (the district liaison officer) and asked her to go immediately to Tel Aviv with a note for headquarters. It consisted of only two words:



"Yanai sarakh"
(Yanai has betrayed us) 

Information flooded in, all of it connected to Yanai. The police had raided several rooms in Jerusalem, all known to Yanai. The vehicle used by the district command, which had been kept in a parking lot near the Strauss clinic (a fact known to Yanai), was seized by the British. In Tel Aviv and Haifa, the police arrested several commanders, who were hiding in safe houses, whose location was also known to Yanai.

Yanai's treachery stunned and angered the Irgun. It was the first (and only) time that a senior commander had abandoned his men before they set out on a combat mission, and the question as to why he acted as he did remained unanswered for many years.

A British Intelligence document released for publication thirty years after the operation (Haganah archives 31/74) revealed that Yanai was arrested by the British Intelligence, broke down during interrogation, and in order to save his life, decided to collaborate with the British. He told them everything he knew about the Irgun, including the planned assault on the Jerusalem railway station, and was immediately flown to Belgium by the British.

http://www.etzel.org.il/english/ac11.htm

[Ultra Requete]

On January 31, 1947, Kol Yerushalayim (The Voice of Jerusalem) broadcast a Mandatory government announcement to the effect that, as a consequence of the recent disturbances in Palestine, it had been decided that British women and children and other British nationals whose presence in Palestine was not essential, would be evacuated. Soon after, some 1,500 men, women and children were evacuated by train to Egypt and transported from there by sea to England.

In addition to evacuating women and children, the British army began constructing 'security zones' in the three large cities. In Jerusalem itself, four such zones were set up and the atmosphere in the city changed drastically. The central 'security zone' was set up near the Russian Compound. Local nationals, most of them Jews, were ordered to abandon their shops and offices, without being offered alternative places by the authorities. The entire area, which included the Generali building, the Anglo-Palestine Bank building and the central post office, was cordoned off by barbed wire fences and entrance was by identity card only. The police often conducted body searches of citizens who wanted to enter the fenced area. The area opposite the Yeshurun synagogue was also cordoned off, and became a 'security zone', which included the officers club in Goldschmidt House and the adjacent military depot. Additional security zones were located in the Talbieh quarter, in parts of Rehavia and the Schneller camp.



The Security Zone in Jerusalem ("Bevingrad")
The security zones (or 'Bevingrads', as the local population called them) soon became 'internment camps' for British soldiers and policemen, who were permitted to leave only when on duty. Places of entertainment (which were all outside the security zones) were now 'out of bounds' to the British, and contact with the civilian population gradually dwindled.



 
A poster published by the Irgun
The atmosphere in the Yishuv was increasingly anti-British. This was largely due to the attitude of the British authorities towards the Jewish population, and their brutal treatment of the immigrants brought from Europe by the Haganah. In that period, the Haganah stepped up its activities, and the number of illegal immigrant vessels was increased. However, in most cases the ships did not succeed in breaking the British naval blockade on Eretz Israel, and the immigrants were intercepted, and taken aboard British vessels, which conveyed them to internment camps in Cyprus.  Those immigrants who resisted were taken by force and many of them were injured in the struggles. This brutal treatment of defenceless people, who had come from the European graveyard to seek refuge in Eretz Israel, aroused a storm of protest in Palestine and throughout the world.

The Irgun was not slow to react, and the underground struck even more heavily at the British. Military targets were attacked throughout the country, and in Jerusalem plans were completed for an assault on the Officers' Club at Goldschmidt House on King George Street.

On Saturday, March 1, 1947, some 15 members of the Jerusalem Fighting Force assembled at the Alliance girls' school. The school janitor, who was collaborating with the underground, left the gate open and made all necessary arrangements so that the Irgun fighters could hold their meeting uninterrupted. The attack had been scheduled for Saturday, at a time when the streets would be empty, in order to avoid civilian casualties. After the briefing, the fighters were given weapons and the combat unit received British army uniforms as a disguise.

After the preparations were completed, the convoy set out, headed by a taxi with three fighters. It was followed by a van carrying the five-man combat unit, headed by Dov Salomon (Yishai). It had been agreed in advance that if the road was open, the taxi would halt briefly, and this would be the signal to start the operation. If, however, the taxi drove on without halting, this would mean that the road to the Officers' Club was not clear. When the taxi reached the location, several army trucks were parked outside the club, and it drove on without stopping, followed by the van. The combat unit was forced to circle the area three times. Finally Yitzhak Avinoam (the District Commander, who was waiting nearby) gave the order to attack. One unit took up position beside the Yeshurun synagogue, opposite the Officers' Club, and aimed a Bren gun at the neighboring building to prevent the British soldiers stationed there from disrupting the operation. An additional unit took up position on King George Street with the task of maintaining a fusillade which would prevent passage of vehicles.

The van drove rapidly, broke through the barbed wire which surrounded Goldschmidt House and halted in the courtyard close to the entrance. The guards went over to the car and asked for an entry permit. In response, the fighters opened fire and all the units went into action.

The three sappers entered the building under cover of the gunfire, carrying with them three rucksacks containing 30 kilograms of explosives each. Salomon placed the rucksacks beside the building's supporting pillars, and after igniting the fuse, gave the order to retreat. The sappers ran towards the door, but one of them suddenly remembered he had left his revolver on the rucksack and started back to fetch it. His comrade pulled him by the sleeve, and together they managed to exit the building in time. They continued to run towards the Ratisbonne monastery (which lies behind the Yeshurun synagogue), and slipped through an opening in the fence which had been prepared in advance. In the Ratisbonne courtyard the weapons were thrown into a sack brought by the Irgun girls, and the fighters took off the British uniforms. They made for the Nahlaot quarters where they dispersed. At 3:30 PM, there was a loud blown up, and the Goldschmidt House collapsed.



The British Officers' Club in Jerusalem
Seventeen British officers were killed in the explosion - among them several senior intelligence officers - and 27 injured.

The reaction in Britain was reported by the Haaretz correspondent in London:


SHOCK IN LONDON

The attack in Jerusalem came as a shock to London at the weekend. The evening papers produced special editions with banner headlines as each new item of information was received. The attack reminds everyone of the King David affair. The press stresses that this is the first time the terrorists have perpetrated an attack on a Saturday, and emphasize that it took place inside the security zone. 


The 'Sunday Express' printed a banner headline:

"Govern or Get out". 


The blowing up of the Officers Club in Jerusalem was the culmination of a series of attacks on British targets all over the country. A number of military vehicles were mined on interurban roads; army depots at Hadera, Pardes Hanna and Beit Lyd came under mortar and machine-gun fire; and in Haifa, an army vehicle lot was attacked and 15 vehicles were destroyed. In the course of these operations, dozens of British soldiers were killed and injured.

OPERATIONS 'ELEPHANT' AND 'HIPPO'
The reaction to the March 1 operations was swift. The same evening, Kol Yerushalayim (The voice of Jerusalem) broadcast an official announcement, stating that the High Commissioner had decided to impose martial law on the Jewish quarters of northern Jerusalem and on the districts of Tel Aviv, Ramat Gan, Bnei Barak and Petah Tikva. In Jerusalem, the operation was code-named 'Hippo' and in Tel Aviv 'Elephant'. The operation had been planned meticulously several months before, and the High Commissioner had been empowered to put it into effect at his discretion. More than 20,000 British troops took part.

The introduction of martial law came as no surprise; the High Commissioner had told the leaders of the Yishuv several times that if they did not resume full collaboration with the authorities in the fight against the underground organizations (as they had done during the Season), he would introduce draconian restrictions, and even proclaim martial law in Jewish areas. Although the heads of the Jewish Agency feared the destruction of the Zionist endeavor in Eretz Israel, they did not accede to the High Commissioner's demand. Betrayal of Irgun fighters to the British was now carried out on a more limited basis, subject to the decision of the highest echelons of the Jewish Agency.

Under martial law, all the powers of civilian government were transferred to the military. Civilian courts were replaced by military tribunals, empowered to hold rapid trials; post offices were closed and public and private transport immobilized. Use of telephones was restricted, and special permission was required for opening banks. Soldiers were granted policing powers, and were authorized to arrest suspicious individuals, and to shoot curfew breakers. Indeed, immediately after martial law was proclaimed, two Jews were shot and killed, one of them a four-year-old girl standing on the balcony of her home in the Mea Shearim quarter. The entire zone was closed to traffic and special permits were required for entry or exit.

The British set themselves two objectives in proclaiming martial law: firstly, to bring underground activity to a halt, since they believed that it was focused in the closed areas, and secondly, to undermine the economy of the Yishuv and thereby force the leaders of the Jewish Agency to resume their cooperation with the British against the Irgun and Lehi.

It was soon manifest that the population was adjusting rapidly to the new situation. Improvisation skills were brought into full play; in the absence of buses, horse-drawn carts carried passengers to their destinations. Many people rode bicycles, while others simply walked. As time passed, the British were forced to permit the supply of foodstuffs to the areas under siege, and the number of transit permits was extended. From time to time, the curfew was lifted in the areas under martial law, and the population was permitted to purchase food. At these times, crowds assembled on both sides of the barbed wire, and soldiers helped to pass parcels from one side to the other. Yosef Avni, who was in charge of the Irgun's arsenals in Jerusalem, relates that in order to prepare the attack on the Schneller camp, it was necessary to bring weapons out of the closed area. He instructed the storeman to load grenades and revolvers into a sack. One of the soldiers on guard then helped lift the sack over the barbed wire fence and handed it to Avni, who was waiting on the other side.

The Irgun General Headquarters decided to step up onslaughts against the centers of British government. All district commanders were ordered to take action within their areas of jurisdiction without awaiting special permission from the General Headquarters. In the first week of martial law, various targets were attacked outside the closed areas; mines were laid daily on interurban roads to damage military vehicles; army depots came under mortar and rifle fire. In the second week, the Irgun and Lehi began to raid military targets inside the closed areas. The Lehi attacked Hadar House in Tel Aviv (one of the headquarters of the British forces), and the mobile police camp at Sarona. The strikes against military transport continued and the British-Iraqi petroleum pipeline was blown up.

THE ATTACK ON SCHNELLER CAMP
The Irgun's military activity during the period of martial law culminated in the attack on Schneller camp in Jerusalem.

The Schneller Syrian Orphanage was founded in 1860 by Father Johannes Ludwig Schneller, who came to Jerusalem from Germany as a Protestant missionary. At first, the institution took in children orphaned by the Druze massacre of Christians in Lebanon and Syria. In time, the compound grew and was walled in, and after the Second World War it became a closed army camp.

Schneller camp was located in the area under martial law. The camp was, in fact, at the heart of one of the security zones, and its surrounding wall had firing positions at its corners. All access roads to the camp were surrounded by barbed wire fences, and a large number of troops guarded the entire area.

On the evening of Wednesday, March 12, members of the Fighting Force assembled at an apartment in Haturim Street, which had been placed at the disposal of the underground. Yehoshua Goldschmid (Gal), who was commanding the operation, briefed them, and the fighters split up into four squads. Two-man squads were ordered to set up road-blocks; they placed barrels in the middle of the road, with a notice on each in Hebrew and English:


'Beware, mines!' 

Because of the shortage of explosives, not all the barrels were full. It was assumed that the warning notices alone would deter the British troops from taking unnecessary risks. In fact, the gamble succeeded and they did not dare risk shifting the barrels. Having completed their task, the two squads rapidly left the scene.

A third squad, under Gal, was assigned to security. The squad took up positions in a building which overlooked the entrance to Schneller camp, with the task of preventing soldiers from coming out of the camp by firing automatic weapons at the gate.

The fourth squad, under Yosef Avni, consisted of five fighters, each carrying a rucksack containing 30 kilograms of explosives. Under cover of darkness, they reached the stone wall surrounding Schneller camp and hid behind a nearby fence. They then broke through the camp wall, and crawled through the opening into the camp. After breaking into the first building under cover of tommy-gun fire, Avni lit the fuses of the mines and retreated. While he was crawling back, there was a loud explosion. The blast hurled him against the wall, stunning him momentarily. As soon as he reached the rest of the unit, the group withdrew to the area outside martial law, hid their weapons and dispersed to their homes.



The Attack on Schneller Camp
One British soldier was killed in the attack and eight were wounded, three seriously.

The incident was reported in Ha'aretz :



GREAT CONFUSION

After the explosions, warning sirens went off in Jerusalem and there was a volley of gunfire. Almost all the soldiers in the military zone fired repeatedly. There was considerable confusion and the shooting was random. While this was going on, the attackers slipped away. The firing continued for more than half an hour. There was no loss of life in the civilian population inside the military zone. 

The explosion in Schneller camp made a strong impression on the local and world press, and severely undermined the prestige of the British administration. It offered resounding proof that the British were unable to check the Jewish underground, which was operating in small units and effectively exploiting the element of surprise.

On the night of the Irgun raid on Schneller, several additional targets came under attack throughout the country: an army camp near Karkur was raided, shots were fired at the Sarona camp and a landmine exploded near Rishon Lezion.



 
A poster published by the Irgun
Martial law, which lasted 16 days, was revoked on March 17 (four days after the attack on Schneller). In all, 78 persons 'suspected of membership of terror organizations' were arrested throughout the country - a tiny number in view of the scope of the operation. Martial law was a total failure; the British did not succeed in suppressing the underground organizations. The Government Information Service announced that during the period of martial law, 68 'terrorist acts' had been committed, 4 per day on average.

The leaders of the Jewish Agency did not revert to widescale informing on Irgun and Lehi fighters. The threat which had hovered over the Yishuv for so long had now receded. The most drastic weapon the British could wield had proven ineffective, since the Yishuv had easily adapted itself to the new situation. The underground movements emerged from the crisis stronger than before and with enhanced prestige.

The attack on the British Officers' Club and the debacle of martial law motivated the opposition in Great Britain, under Winston Churchill, to re-double its denunciations of government policy. In one of his speeches, Churchill declared:


 How long does the Secretary of State for Colonies expect that this state of squalid warfare will go on, at a cost of 30 or 40 million pounds a year, keeping 100,000 Englishmen away with the military force? 

The Sunday Express wrote that:



the Palestine problem has to be solved and solved at once. British lives are being sacrificed with no objective, and terror was undermining British prestige throughout the world. 

As a result of underground activities in Palestine, His Majesty's Government was forced to bring forward the debate on Palestine at the United Nations. A special session of the UN was scheduled for April 28, 1947, instead of the later original date, in September.

http://www.etzel.org.il/english/ac12.htm

[Ultra Requete]

Acre was conquered by the Ottomans at the beginning of the 16th century. The governor of Galilee, Ahmed al-Jazzar, developed the town, building a fortress and markets and turning it into the 'main gateway' to Eretz Israel (Palestine). Under the British Mandate, the fortress served as a jail, where underground fighters were imprisoned and where eight Irgun fighters went to the gallows. Acre prison was the most highly-guarded fortress in the country; surrounded by walls and encircled to the east and north by a deep moat; the sea to the west. It was located in the heart of an Arab town with no Jewish inhabitants.



Acre Prison

Eitan Livni
 
Despite these factors, the underground never ceased to plan their escape. The turning point came when an Arab inmate, in charge of supplying oil to the kitchen, related that while working in the oil storeroom (in the south wall of the fortress), he had heard women's voices. This was reported to Eitan Livni, the most senior Irgun prisoner, who deduced that the south wall of the prison bordered on a street or alley in the Old City. The information was conveyed by underground post to the Irgun General Headquarters, with a proposal that the wall of the oil storehouse be exploited for a break-in to rescue the Irgun inmates.

Amichai Paglin (Gidi), chief operations officer, toured Acre disguised as an Arab, and after thorough scrutiny of the area, concluded that a break-in was indeed possible. After discussions at headquarters, Livni received a letter stating that it was possible to breach the wall from outside, but that the success of the operation depended on the ability of the prisoners to reach the south wall on their own. To that end, explosives, detonators and a fuse were smuggled into the jail by the parents of prisoners, who were permitted to bring their sons delicacies, such as jam, oil, and fruit. The explosives were smuggled in inside a can, under a thick layer of jam. A British sergeant opened the can and examined its contents. When he poked inside, he felt hard lumps (in fact gelignite), but accepted the story that the jam had not gelled properly. The detonators and the fuse were concealed in the false bottom of a container of oil, which was also thoroughly examined. The sergeant poked in a long stick to examine the level of the oil, but since the fuse and the detonators were less than one centimeter thick, he did not notice the false bottom.

At that time, 163 Jews were being held in Acre prison (60 of them Irgun members, 22 Lehi and 5 Haganah, the remainder felons) and 400 Arabs. The Irgun General Headquarters decided that only 41 could be freed (30 Irgun members and 11 Lehi members) because it was technically impossible to find hiding places for a larger number of fugitives. Eitan Livni was given the task of deciding who was to be freed and who would remain in jail (the Lehi prisoners chose their own candidates for escape).


Dov Cohen (Shimshon)
 
The break-in was planned for Sunday, May 4, 1947 at 4 pm. The day before, the fighters met at a diamond factory in Netanya. A map was pinned up and the briefing began. The first speaker was Amichai Paglin, who explained the plan in detail. He was followed by Dov Cohen (Shimshon), who had been appointed commander of the operation. He revealed that the fighters would be disguised as British soldiers and instructed them to conduct themselves in Acre like 'His Majesty's troops'.



Irgun Fighters in British Uniform
After the fighters had been assigned to their units, they were all given an 'English' haircut. The next day, they were taken to Shuni, a former Crusader fortress (between Binyamina and Zichron Yaakov), then serving as a settlement for the Irgun supporters. Twenty of them wore British Engineering Corps uniforms, while three were dressed as Arabs. After they had been briefed and armed, they set out in a convoy of vehicles including a 3-ton military truck, two military vans with British camouflage colors, and two civilian vans. The convoy was headed by the command jeep, and Shimshon, dressed as a be-medalled British captain, sat beside the driver.

When the convoy reached Acre, the two military vans entered the market, while the truck waited at the gate. Ladders were removed from one of the vehicles and the 'engineering unit' went into the Turkish bath-house in order to 'mend' the telephone lines. They climbed the ladders to the roof adjacent to the fortress wall, and Dov Salomon, the unit commander, helped his deputy, Yehuda Apiryon, to haul up the explosive charges and to hook them to the windows of the prison.


Avshalom Haviv
 
At the same time, the two blocking squads had scattered mines along the routes leading to the site of the break-in. One three-man squad was commanded by Avshalom Haviv and the second consisted of two fighters, Michaeli and Ostrowicz.

An additional three-man squad, disguised as Arabs, was positioned north of Acre, and when the operation began they fired a mortar at the nearby army camp. The command jeep halted at the gas station at the entrance to the new town, laid anti-vehicle mines and set fire to the station.



Affter-noon walk of Acre prisnors
While these units were taking up positions outside the fortress, the plan was being put into effect inside the prison. At 3pm, the doors of the cells were opened for afternoon exercise. Those prisoners who were not scheduled to escape went down to the courtyard to create a diversion, while the escapees remained in their cells. They were divided into three groups, each in a separate cell.

At 4:22 pm. a loud explosion shook the entire area, as the wall of the fortress was blasted open.



Acre prison's wall after the blowing up
The first group of escapees leapt out of their cell and ran down the corridor towards the breach in the wall. They had to push their way through a crowd of Arab prisoners who ran out of their cells in panic and blocked their path. The first escapee, Michael Ashbel, attached explosive charges to the locks barring the gate of the corridor, and lit the fuse. There was an explosion, and the gate blew open. The second gate was blown open in the same way, opening the route to freedom. At that moment, the second group went into action; they created an obstruction by igniting kerosene mixed with oil. The ensuing fire blocked the escape route, so that the guards could not reach it. The third group threw grenades at the guards on the roof, who fled. In the confusion created by the explosion, the gunfire and the fire, 41 prisoners made their way to freedom.

The first group of escapees boarded a van and drove off, but the driver mistakenly drove towards Haifa, instead of Mount Napoleon. On the shore, a group of British soldiers who had been bathing in the sea opened fire on them. The driver tried to turn back, but hit the wall of the cemetery and the van overturned. The escapees ran towards a gas station, the soldiers pursuing them. Dov Cohen fired his Bren at them, but was mowed down by a volley of 17 bullets. Zalman Lifshitz, at his side, was also killed. When the firing stopped, five of the first group of 13 escapees were dead, six injured and only two were unscathed. The survivors were returned to jail.


Yaakov Weiss
 
The blocking unit, consisting of Avshalom Haviv, Meir Nakar and Yaakov Weiss, also suffered a mishap. They did not hear the bugle signal to withdraw and stayed put when the other units had already left Acre. After a protracted battle with British soldiers, they were caught and arrested. The second blocking unit, consisting of Amnon Michaeli and Menahem Ostrowicz, also failed to hear the bugle (which signalled withdrawal) and were likewise caught by the British.

The remaining escapees and members of the strike force in the truck and the second van escaped safely. They reached Kibbutz Dalia, abandoned their vehicles, and made their way on foot to Binyamina. There they were given refuge in the Nahlat Jabotinsky quarter and the following morning were dispersed throughout the country to pre-designated hiding places.

Haim Appelbaum of Lehi, wounded during the retreat, succeeded in boarding the last van, but died soon after. His body was left in the vehicle, and members of Kibbutz Dalia conveyed it to the burial society in Haifa the following day.

To conclude, 27 inmates succeeded in escaping (20 from the Irgun and seven from Lehi). Nine fighters were killed in clashes with the British army; six escapees and three members of the Fighting Force. Eight escapees, some of them injured, were caught and returned to jail. Also arrested were five of the attackers who did not make it back to base. The Arab prisoners took advantage of the commotion, and 182 of them escaped as well.

Despite the heavy toll in human lives, the action was described by foreign journalists as 'the greatest jail break in history'. The London Ha'aretz correspondent wrote on May 5:



The attack on Acre jail has been seen here as a serious blow to British prestige... Military circles described the attack as a strategic masterpiece. 

The New York Herald Tribune wrote that the underground had carried out 'an ambitious mission, their most challenging so far, in perfect fashion'.

In the House of Commons, Oliver Stanley asked what action His Majesty's Government was planning to take 'in light of the events at Acre prison which had reduced British prestige to a nadir'.

Shortly after the Acre jail break, Andrei Gromyko, USSR representative to the UN, caused a sensation when he informed the stunned delegates that his country took a favorable view of the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine.


Meir Nakar
 
Three weeks after the jail break, the five Irgun fighters who had been captured after the operation were put on trial. Three of the defendants - Avshalom Haviv, Yaakov Weiss and Meir Nakar - were carrying weapons when they were caught close to the jail wall. They challenged the authority of the court and, after making political statements, were all sentenced to death.

The other two, Michaeli and Ostrowicz, were captured, unarmed, at some distance from the jail. Since there was a chance of saving them from the death penalty, the Irgun General Headquarters decided to conduct a proper defence procedure. The counsel for the defence succeeded in producing documents proving that the two were minors, and the court sentenced them to life imprisonment.

http://www.etzel.org.il/english/ac13.htm

[Ultra Requete]

SHLOMO BEN-YOSEF

Shlomo Ben-Yosef
 
As previously mentioned, on April 21, 1938, three members of the Beitar labor company at Rosh Pina (Avraham Shein, Shalom Jurabin and Shlomo Ben-Yosef) fired on an Arab bus on the Safed Rosh-Pina road in reprisal for Arab violence. None of the passengers were hit. The three men fled, hid in an abandoned building nearby and were arrested some time later by the police. They were tried by a military tribunal in Haifa and charged with illegal possession of arms and with 'intent to kill or cause other harm to a large number of people.' Under the Emergency Regulations, each of the charges was a capital offence. The three defendants announced that they intended to exploit the trial for political purposes.

The court pronounced Jurabin mentally unstable, and he was sentenced to incarceration in a mental hospital 'at the discretion of the High Commissioner'. Shein and Ben-Yosef were sentenced to death by hanging and accepted the sentence with exceptional stoicism. The Commander in Chief of British forces in Palestine confirmed Ben-Yosef's sentence, and later commuted Shein's sentence to life imprisonment on account of his youth.

 On the morning of June 29, 1938, Shlomo Ben-Yosef prepared for his final hour. He stripped off the scarlet garments of the condemned man, and dressed in shorts, a shirt and work-boots. After breakfast, he brushed his teeth and awaited the police guard. He walked erect to the gallows, singing the Beitar anthem. On the wall of his death cell, Ben-Yosef had written in his poor Hebrew: 



What is a homeland?
It is something worth living for, fighting for and dying for.
I was a slave to Beitar to the day of my death 

ELIYAHU HAKIM AND ELIYAHU BEIT-ZURI

Eliyahu Bet Zuri
 
Lord Moyne, who was known to be an anti-Zionist, had been appointed Minister of State for the Middle East, and from his place of residence in Cairo, was responsible for implementing the White Paper policy. Lehi, which considered Lord Moyne to be responsible for the deportation of the immigrant ships, decided to assassinate him. Two members of Lehi - Eliyahu Hakim and Eliyahu Bet Zuri - were dispatched to Cairo, and on November 6, 1944, they carried out the assassination, but were caught shortly afterwards. On January 10, 1945 they were charged with murder. Hakim and Beit-Zuri, manacled, stood calmly beside their Egyptian guards with red fezzes. Both were, and had been since their capture, completely self-possessed. They did not take part in the proceedings, and when the testimony was completed, Eliyahu Hakim rose to his feet and said:

 We accuse Lord Moyne and the government he represents, with murdering hundreds and thousands of our brethren; we accuse him of seizing our country and looting our possessions...
We were forced to do justice and to fight. 




Eliyahu Hakim
 
After being sentenced to death, they rose to their feet and sang the national anthem. On March 23, 1945, they were dressed in the traditional, ill-fitting red burlap suit of condemned men, marched barefoot to the gallows, were blindfolded at the scaffold, and hanged.

DOV GRUNER
On Tuesday, April 23, 1946, a military vehicle approached the Ramat Gan police station, and let off about a dozen 'Arab prisoners' , escorted by 'British soldiers'. The 'prisoners' were taken into the station, and the 'British sergeant' in charge of the convoy informed the desk sergeant that the Arabs had been caught stealing at the Tel Litvinsky army camp (present-day Tel Hashomer) and were to be detained. While the desk sergeant was deciding what to do with them, the 'prisoners' and their escorts took out revolvers and ordered the policemen to put up their hands and file into the detention cell. Within moments, the unit had taken over the police station, and then moved towards the armory, blasting open the door. Meanwhile the 'porters', led by Dov Gruner, had entered the building. They removed the weapons from the armory and loaded them onto a waiting truck. A policeman on the upper storey noticed the activity, and directed machine-gun fire at the attackers. He shot the Irgun Bren gunner, who had taken up position on the balcony of the building opposite the police station, and then fired at the 'porters', who continued to load weapons while bullets whistled around them. When they had completed their task, the truck drove off to an orange grove near Ramat Gan.


Dov Gruner
 
The commander of the operation, Eliezer Pedatzur (Gad), counted his men and discovered that three were missing: the Bren gunner Yisrael Feinerman, who had been shot and killed while covering the 'porters' from the balcony of the building opposite the police station; Yaakov Zlotnik, who was fatally wounded while running to the truck (his body was discovered hanging on the barbed wire) and Dov Gruner, who had sustained jaw injury, had fallen into the trench beside the fence and was taken captive. The British took Gruner to Hadassah hospital in Tel Aviv, where he was operated by Professor Marcus. Gruner spent twelve days at Hadassah, with an armed guard posted outside his room around the clock. From there, he was transferred to the government hospital in Jaffa, and then to the medical division of the central jail in Jerusalem.

On January 1, 1947, seven months after his arrest, Gruner's trial opened at the military court in Jerusalem. He was charged with firing on policemen, and setting explosive charges with the intent of killing personnel 'on His Majesty's service'. When asked if he admitted his guilt, Gruner replied that he did not recognize the authority of the court to try him, had no intention of taking part in the proceedings, which he did not want translated into Hebrew for his benefit. Instead, he read a statement to the judges:

 I do not recognize your authority to try me. This court has no legal foundation, since it was appointed by a regime without legal foundation.
You came to Palestine because of the commitment you undertook at the behest of all the nations of the world to rectify the greatest wrong caused to any nation in the history of mankind, namely the expulsion of Israel from their land, which transformed them into victims of persecution and incessant slaughter throughout the world. It was this commitment - and this commitment alone - which constituted the legal and moral basis for your presence in this country. But you betrayed it wilfully, brutally and with satanic cunning. You turned your commitment into a mere scrap of paper...
When the prevailing government in any country is not legal, when it becomes a regime of oppression and tyranny, it is the right of its citizens - more than that, it is their duty - to fight this regime and to topple it. This is what Jewish youth are doing and will continue to do until you quit this land, and hand it over to its rightful owners: the Jewish people. For you should know this: there is no power in the world which can sever the tie between the Jewish people and their one and only land. Whosoever tries to sever it - his hand will be cut off and the curse of God will rest on him for ever. 


There was a silence in the courtroom after Gruner's statement. The prosecutor delivered his address and summoned witnesses .In an unusual move, the prosecutor pointed out several factors in favor of the accused: his five years' service in the British army, his good conduct during his service, his participation in fighting on the Italian front and the severe injury he suffered, which left him disabled. This statement had no effect on the judges, and after a brief consultation, the president of the court announced that Gruner had been found guilty on two charges. On the first charge, he was sentenced to be hung by the neck. The court reserved the right to determine the punishment for the second charge. Immediately after the reading of the sentence , Gruner rose to his feet and declared:


"In blood and fire Judea fell, in blood and fire Judea will rise again"
- a quotation from a poem written by the poet Yaakov Cohen after the 1903 Kishinev pogroms, which became the slogan of the Hashomer organization.



 
A poster published by the Irgun
Dov Gruner was taken to the death cell under heavy guard, and dressed in scarlet garments. He spent 105 days in the cell, alternating between hope and despair, while leaders and public figures in Palestine and abroad interceded with the British government to commute the death sentence to life imprisonment. Heavy pressure was also exerted on Gruner to plead for clemency, but he insisted on being treated as a prisoner of war and refused to sign the request.

Forty eight hours before the date fixed for the execution, Gruner wrote a letter from his cell to the Irgun commander, which he concluded with the following words:



I am writing these lines 48 hours before our oppressors are due to carry out the murder, and at such times one cannot lie. I swear that if I had the choice of starting again, I would choose the same path I have followed regardless of the possible consequences for me. 


MORDECHAI ALKAHI, YEHIEL DRESNER AND ELIEZER KASHANI
Benyamin Kimchi, who was arrested after the Irgun attack on the Ottoman Bank in Jaffa, was sentenced in December 1946 to 18 years imprisonment and 18 lashes. It was the first time that an underground fighter had been given this humiliating sentence. The Irgun General Headquarters took a very severe view of the sentence, and cautioned the British against carrying it out. "If it is implemented," they wrote in a leaflet which was widely distributed, "the same punishment will be inflicted on British army officers. Each of them will be liable to receive 18 lashes."

The British ignored the Irgun warnings, and on Friday, December 27, 1946, Kimchi received 18 lashes in the Jerusalem jail. Immediately afterwards, a unit of Irgun fighters was sent into action. A captain from the Sixth Airborne Division was whipped in Netanya, two British sergeants in Tel Aviv, and another sergeant in Rishon Lezion.

Another unit (composed of Yehiel Dresner, Mordechai Alkahi, Eliezer Kashani, Haim Golovsky and Avraham Mizrahi) set out by car from Petah Tikva on a similar mission. Not far from Wilhelma, they encountered a road-block and came under heavy fire. Mizrahi, the driver, was hit and died later. The other four were dragged out of the vehicle and taken to a nearby army camp, where they were stripped, beaten and humiliated. After five days of torture they were taken to the central prison in Jerusalem.


Yehiel Dresner
 
On February 10, 1947, 43 days after their capture and arrest, their trial opened at a military court in Jerusalem. The defendants did not take part in the proceedings, refused to answer questions and did not cross-examine prosecution witnesses. When the testimony was completed, Dresner and Golovsky rose to their feet and declared that they did not recognize the authority of the court; they considered themselves to be prisoners of war and hence the authorities were empowered to detain them, but not to try them.

Yehiel Dresner, the first to speak, said:

 We set out to prove to you that a new Hebrew generation has arisen in this country, which will not tolerate humiliation, will not accept slavery and will fight for its honor at all costs. We will break your whip...
No longer will you whip the citizens of this country, whether Jews or Arabs, for we, the soldiers of Israel, have rebelled against your rule and its despicable methods. 


Golovsky's statement was also directed at 'the officers of the occupation army' and was devoted mainly to a description of the persecution, torture and humiliation to which the four defendants had been subjected. His aim was to inform the world, through the foreign journalists present in court, of the degrading treatment they had received at the hands of the British.


Eliezer Kashani
 
The trial was brief and the sentence was handed down on the same day: death by hanging for Alkahi, Dresner and Kashani, and life imprisonment for Golovsky on account of his youth (he was 17). After hearing the sentence, the four rose to their feet and sang the Hatikva anthem. They were taken to the central jail, where Dov Gruner was in the death cell. Forty-eight hours later, General Barker, who left the country the same day, confirmed the sentences.

Public figures and institutions tried hard to have the sentence commuted. A petition was submitted, signed by 800 residents of Petah Tikva (three of the defendants lived there), and an appeal was submitted to the Supreme Court, claiming errors in legal procedure, but to no avail. It should be stressed that all these steps were taken on the initiative of public figures and relatives of the defendants. They themselves authorized nobody to act on their behalf and, like Dov Gruner, refused to sign an appeal for clemency. They even issued a public statement in which they said:



Do you not understand that your requests for clemency are an affront to your honor and the honor of the entire people? It represents servility towards the authorities reminiscent of the Diaspora. We are war prisoners and we demand that they treat us as war prisoners...
At present we are in their hands... We cannot resist them, and they can treat us as they choose... But they cannot break our spirit. We know how to die with honor as befits Hebrews. 


Mordechai Alkahi
 
On April 15, the British transferred the four condemned men: Gruner, Alkahi, Dresner and Kashani from Jerusalem jail to Acre prison. The move was carried out clandestinely, and the authorities hinted that they had no intention of carrying out the sentence in the near future. When their lawyer, Max Critchman, approached the Acre prison authorities, and asked why they were being moved, he was told that "...the governor has received no instructions regarding preparations for executions, and the procedure is that the jail administration receives such instructions several days before the executions."

The next day, at 2.45 am, three British policemen and one Arab policeman came to the apartment of Nehemiah Katriel Magril, the only Jew living in Acre. Magril was a scholar, who acted as emissary to the Jewish inmates of the jail and led the prayers there on the Sabbath and festivals. He had never been ordained as a rabbi, and was known among the Arabs as 'Hakham Abu Mussa'. Ha'aretz, Sapril 17, 1947, describes the visit:

 The policemen awakened Magril and asked him to accompany them to the jail. They refused to reveal the reason for their request and urged him to hurry, saying that they had no time. When Magril asked them how long they needed him for, they replied: 'About two hours'. Then he understood the meaning of the request and replied: 'I refuse to go with you. You must contact the chief rabbinate in Haifa'. 


The policemen left without him. Magril learned of the execution of Dov Gruner and his comrades only a few hours later, from a Jerusalem radio broadcast.

At 4 am, Dov Gruner was roused from his sleep, and taken to the gallows. Present in the cell were the head of the prison service in Palestine, the governor of Acre jail, a physician and six British officers. As was the custom in Britain and the colonies, the governor served as hangman, but, in violation of custom - no rabbi was present. Dov Gruner went to the gallows without confession, as so did Yehiel Dresner, Eliezer Kashani and Mordechai Alkahi. All four were hanged within half an hour, and each of them, as his turn arrived, sang Hatikva until he died. Each was joined in his singing by those awaiting their turn.

As the condemned men walked through the jail, all the Jewish prisoners rose to their feet and sang the national anthem.

MOSHE BARAZANI
In March 17, 1947, the day on which martial law was lifted, the military court in Jerusalem sentenced Moshe Barazani to death by hanging. Barazani, a member of Lehi, had been arrested eight days previously in the Makor Baruch quarter of Jerusalem, not far from Schneller camp. In a body search, a grenade was found, and he was tried on a charge of bearing arms and intent to assassinate Brigadier A.P. Davis, who was in charge of implementing martial law in the city. Barazani declared that he did not recognise the authority of the court to try him, and would not take part in the proceedings. He made a political statement, in which he said that the Jewish people regarded the British as alien rulers of their country:

 In this war, I have fallen captive to you, and you have no right to try me. You will not intimidate us by hangings nor will you succeed in destroying us. My people and all the people you have enslaved will fight your empire to the death. 



Moshe Barazani
 
The trial was brief; ninety minutes after it began, the judge read out the death sentence. Barazani rose to his feet and sang Hatikva, but the police guard interrupted him and dragged him away. He was chained hand and foot and taken to the condemned man's cell, where he joined Dov Gruner and his three comrades - Eliezer Kashani, Yehiel Dresner and Mordechai Alkahi, whose death sentences had already been confirmed by the British Commander in Chief in Palestine.

MEIR FEINSTEIN
A week after Barazani's trial, on March 25, 1947, the military court convened again - this time to try the four Irgun fighters who had been caught after the explosion at the Jerusalem railway station. Two of the defendants, Mas'ud Biton and Moshe Horovitz, were apprehended at some distance from the station, and the Irgun General Headquarters decided that they should deny any involvement in the deed. Horovitz was arrested with a bullet wound, but one of the traders at the commercial center agreed to testify that Horovitz had been in his store, had heard shots fired and had gone out to see what was happening and been wounded. The other two, Meir Feinstein and Daniel Azulay, announced that they did not recognize the authority of the court to try them, and would not take part in the proceedings. Before sentence was passed, the two made political statements. Feinstein said:

 A gallows regime, that is what you are trying to impose on this country, which was intended to serve as a beacon of light for all mankind. And in your foolishness and malice, you assume that by means of this regime you will succeed in breaking the spirit of our people, the people for whom the whole country has become a gallows. You are wrong. You will discover that you have met up with steel, steel forged in the flame of love and hatred, love of the homeland and of freedom and hatred of slavery and of the invader. It is burning steel, and you cannot shatter it. You will burn your own hands. 



Meir Feinstein
 
The court accepted the alibi of Horovitz and Biton and released them. Meir Feinstein and Daniel Azulay were sentenced to death by hanging. They were removed from court and taken to the death cell in the central prison in Jerusalem, where they joined Gruner, Alkahi, Dresner, Kashani and Barazani.

On April 17, 1947, the day after the hanging of Gruner, Alkahi, Dresner and Kashani, the British Commander in Chief in Palestine confirmed the sentences of Feinstein and Barazani. Daniel Azulay's sentence was commuted to life imprisonment.

A GRENADE BETWEEN HEARTS
In the death cell in the central prison in Jerusalem, Feinstein and Barazani resolved to blow themselves and their executioners up. They wrote to their comrades in adjacent cells:



Brethren, greetings.
You have not done well in failing to send it to us. Who knows if by morning it will not be too late. Do not allow time to lapse. Send it to us as soon as possible. All you have been told was merely an emotional storm which passed swiftly. We are fully resolved. Our greetings to all. Be strong and so will we.

M.F., M. B. 

"It" referred to the two grenades which Feinstein and Barazani planned to hurl at the executioners when they came to escort them to the gallows. The idea was not new; it had been broached when Dov Gruner was in the death cell awaiting execution. The explosives were smuggled into the prison in parcels of food earmarked for prisoners who received "special treatment". When Dov Gruner was moved with his comrades to Acre prison, the explosives were left behind in the Jerusalem jail.

It was not easy for the Irgun and Lehi prisoners to carry out the wishes of their condemned comrades, but each of them knew that if he had been in their place, he would have asked the same. On the day on which they received confirmation of their request from the Irgun and Lehi headquarters, the prisoners started to prepare the grenades. They sliced off the top of an orange, scooped out the fruit and filled the space with gelignite and small metal strips. Into this they inserted detonators connected to a fuse. Finally, the top of the orange was replaced with thin toothpicks, so that it appeared intact.

Three times a day, the condemned men were handed food prepared by inmates who worked in the kitchen. The prison guards, who examined the food carefully, were accustomed to the sight of oranges, and passed them through without particular scrutiny. A basket of fruit was prepared, which included two 'special' oranges. The food was taken into the cell by one of the non-political prisoners, and a note on a tiny scrap of paper hidden in the leftovers was removed from the cell:



Greetings, dear friends.
We have received the "press". Everything is clear to us, and we rejoice at this last opportunity to take part in avenging our four comrades. As for us, we are convinced that our organizations will avenge us to the proper degree and in the proper fashion. But they may take us by surprise and move us to Acre, and therefore please ask outside that they prepare the same thing for us in Acre, so that we can be sure of doing it.
We are strong.

Shalom.
M. Feinstein and M. Barazani. 

On Monday, April 21, 1947, about a week after the hangings at Acre, curfew was imposed on Jerusalem and it was rumored that Feinstein and Barazani were about to be executed. At 9:15 in the evening, British officers arrived at the home of Rabbi Yaakov Goldman, chief rabbi of the prison, and asked him to accompany them to the central prison. They did not give reasons, but it was clear to all that Feinstein and Barazani were about to be hanged. Rabbi Goldman was taken into the death cell, and tried to hearten the two fighters. He read the Viduy (confession) and, at the request of Feinstein, they sang the Adon Olam (the most hail and praise to God prayer). Then the two condemned men sang Hatikva, and the rabbi left with the prison governor, promising to return to be with them in their final hour.

Feinstein and Barazani did not reveal their secret to the rabbi, but urged him not to return for the execution. The rabbi was adamant, and in order not to hurt him, the two decided to change their original plan and to blow themselves up before the hangman arrived. About half an hour after the rabbi's departure, two explosions were heard from the cell:  Moshe and Meir stood embraced. The grenades were held between them, at the height of their hearts. Meir lit a cigarette, with which he ignited the fuses that Moshe held, and they died together as heroes. 


On the instructions of the chief rabbi, Rabbi Yitzhak Halevi Herzog, the two men were buried on the Mount of Olives in the section of the martyrs of the 1929 and 1936-38 riots. Rabbi Aryeh Levin (the prisoners' rabbi) and Benyamin Feinstein, Meir's brother, eulogized them at the graveside.

The courageous stand of the underground fighters in their final hour won them great esteem in Eretz Israel and throughout the world. A new generation had emerged in Palestine, ready to sacrifice itself for the noble objective of liberating its people and country. The poet, Nathan Alterman, who was an opponent of the Irgun and Lehi, published a poem in praise of Feinstein and Barazani in 'Davar', the Histadrut newspaper.

AVSHALOM HAVIV, YAAKOV WEISS AND MEIR NAKAR

Avshalom Haviv
 
On May 28, some three weeks after the Acre prison break, the British tried Avshalom Haviv, Yaakov Weiss and Meir Nakar, who had been caught just outside the prison wall carrying weapons. Haviv and his comrades did not acknowledge the right of the court to try them, and chose to exploit the forum in order to make political statements. They did not take part in the trial, which lasted nearly three weeks, with more than 35 prosecution witnesses being called. After the prosecutor's summing up, the defendants made their statements.

The first speaker was Avshalom Haviv, who compared the struggle of the Jewish underground to that of the Irish, and said, among other things:

 When the fighters of the Irish underground took up arms against you, you tried to drown the uprising against tyranny in rivers of blood. You built gallows; you murdered people in the streets; you banished some into distant lands. You thought, in your great folly, that by force of persecution, you could break the spirit of resistance of the free Irish, but you were wrong. The Irish rebellion grew until a free Ireland came into being...You wonder how it came to pass that those Jews whom you thought to be cowards, who were the victims of massacre for generations, have risen up against your rule, are fighting your armies, and when they stand in the shadow of death, they scorn it... Their courage and spiritual force are drawn from two sources: the renewed contact of Hebrew youth with the land of their fathers, which has restored to them the tradition of courage of the heroes of the past, and the lesson of the Holocaust, which taught us that we are conducting a struggle not only for our liberty but also for our very survival. 



Meir Nakar
 
Meir Nakar, in his statement, also spoke of the 'bankruptcy' of British policy in Palestine and the collapse of a regime "whose officials are forced to live in ghettoes" (an allusion to the security zones in which the British enclosed themselves).


Yaakov Weiss
 
Yaakov Weiss attacked the anti-Zionist policy of the British government and denied the legitimacy of British presence in Palestine:

 Your very presence here, against which everyone protests, is illegal. This land is ours from time immemorial and for ever more. What do you, British officers, have to do with our homeland? Who appointed you rulers of an ancient and freedom-loving nation? 


On June 16, the sentence was passed: death by hanging for all three.

The Irgun General Headquarters ordered its Fighting Force to take hostages so as to save the lives of the condemned men, but the British ignored the warnings of the Irgun, and the pleas of leaders of the Yishuv and of many prominent people throughout the world. On July 8, the governor of the British military forces in Palestine confirmed the death sentence handed down three weeks previously. Several days later, an Irgun unit seized two British sergeants in Netanya as they were leaving a cafe. The sergeants were pushed into a waiting car and taken to a pre-arranged hiding place.

The kidnapping of the sergeants stunned not only the British, but also the leaders of the Yishuv. They knew only too well that the Irgun would carry out its threat, and feared the reaction of the British army.

As soon as the kidnapping became known, curfew was imposed on Netanya and the surrounding area, and a house to house search began. Haganah forces joined in the search, but without success. The two sergeants were held in a bunker which had been dug in a diamond factory on the outskirts of the town, with enough food and oxygen for a lengthy period. The taking of hostages by the Irgun did not deter the British government, and in the early morning hours of July 29, the three Irgun fighters - Avshalom Haviv, Yaakov Weiss and Meir Nakar - were hanged at Acre prison. It should be noted that the decision to carry out the sentence was taken at a special session of the Cabinet in London, despite the knowledge that the decision would seal the fate of the two sergeants. Rabbi Nissim Ohana of Haifa, who was asked to accompany the three condemned men in their final hour, wrote of their conduct:

 They showed no sign of fear or shock. They were very brave...
I stayed with them about an hour, and when I left, they asked me to send their greetings to the Yishuv, and expressed the wish for redemption for the Jewish people. I said to them: be blessed, heroes of the nation. 


The British left the Irgun no alternative, and the following day, July 30, the two sergeants were found hanged in a wood near Netanya. The Irgun hoped that this action would bring to a halt the spate of executions meted out by the British. Indeed, after the hanging of the two sergeants, no more death sentences were carried out in Eretz Israel.

The hanging of the sergeants shocked the British government and people. The press denounced the act which, more than any other, caused the government to re-think its attitude towards the future of Palestine. Begin writes in his book "The Revolt" that the "cruel act" was one of the events which tipped the balance in the British withdrawal from Palestine. Colonel Archer Cassett,.one of the senior British Mandatory officials, said in a lecture in 1949 that "the hanging of the sergeants did more than anything else to get us out of Palestine".

http://www.etzel.org.il/english/ac14.htm
Some time the terror is best weapon; especialy against those who don't fallow reason or morality.

[Ultra Requete]

THE DEPORTATION OF THE 251
On Thursday, October 19, 1944, at 4:30 am, a large British military force surrounded the Latrun internment camp. At 6 am, a list of 239 internees was read out. They were handcuffed, searched, and taken out of the camp without being permitted to take anything with them. Loaded onto trucks which formed a convoy, they were escorted by armored cars to the Wilhelma airfield. There they were joined by 12 inmates from Acre prison, who had arrived an hour earlier.

 The 251 detainees were divided into 12 groups, and each group boarded an aircraft, accompanied by armed guards. When it became clear to the prisoners that they were being deported, they burst into a mighty rendering of Hatikva. The 12 planes flew to Asmara, capital of Eritrea; the following day the internees were taken from the airfield to their first place of exile in Africa - Sambel camp, two kilometers north of Asmara.

The Mandatory government continued to exile persons suspected of terrorist affiliation. In all, 439 people were deported by the end of the Mandate.

The Yishuv reacted with restraint to news of the deportation. The Jewish Agency Executive kept silent and the Vaad Le'umi responded with quiet protest. The Hebrew press did not take up arms, and 'Davar' (the Histadrut newspaper) wrote that if the underground was unwilling to abandon its separate path "it should not wonder at the fact that the Yishuv is reacting in this way". It will be recalled that in May 1944, about six months before the deportation, the Jewish Agency had resumed its collaboration with the Mandatory government and was once again informing on underground fighters and foiling Irgun and Lehi operations. Eight days after the deportation of the 251 fighters, the Yishuv was shocked by the assassination of Lord Moyne in Cairo, and cooperation with the British police, the so-called Season, was now overt and extensive.



 
A poster published by the Irgun


SAMBEL CAMP IN ERITREA
Sambel camp in Erritrea had served in the past as a recreation center for Italian fascist youth and the living conditions were no worse than in Latrun. But, despite the good conditions and comfortable climate, the internees suffered in the first few months from lack of clothing and everyday necessities, from the absence of books and religious articles. Two months after their arrival at Sambel, food rations were cut drastically. The move apparently stemmed from the general wartime shortage of food, but this fact did not appease the prisoners, who launched a partial hunger strike. Several weeks later, the rations were restored to their former size.

On January 21, 1945, three months after their arrival in Eritrea, the internees made their first escape attempt. The weak spot was the sports ground outside the camp, which was open to the internees all day, but locked in the evening and unguarded all night. The rain had created a trench in one corner of the sport ground, which was the inmates excavated further. On the day of the escape, Benyamin Zeroni, Haggai Lev and Shimon Sheiba hid in the trench and covered themselves with soil. When the sports ground had been locked and darkness fell, they emerged from their "tomb", climbed the fence and headed for Asmara. They spent the first night in a field near the town and the next day boarded a bus and asked the driver to let them off at the synagogue (there was a Jewish community in Asmara, consisting of fifty families of Yemenite origin). There they met Haim Gamliel, who gave them money, and hid them in his house. The aim of the three fugitives was to reach Ethiopia. Near the border, a local patrol checked the identity of the passengers; the three came under suspicion, and were handed over to the British, who returned them to the camp and imposed a month's solitary confinement on them.

Three days after the escape the internees were evacuated from Sambel and taken to Massawa port. There they were put aboard an Italian vessel and, under intolerably crowded conditions, transferred to Carthage in the Sudan.



 
A poster published by the Irgun
THE INTERNMENT CAMP AT CARTHAGE, SUDAN,
The internment camp at carthage was located in the heart of the desert and endured a harsh climate. Water was in short supply - drinking water was transported in scant quantities by car from dozens of kilometers away. The piped water was salty, and its consumption restricted. Khartoum, the nearest town with a military hospital, was 600 kilometers away. Carthage was much tougher than Sambel in terms of accommodation, sanitation and climate.

In addition to the problem of poor nutrition, a controversy raged on the issue of kosher food. At the beginning of November, 1944, the authorities cancelled the supply of kosher meat which they had been purchasing from the Jewish community in Asmara, and offered instead canned non-kosher meat from British army rations. The internees launched a protest against this change, which offended both the religious and secular alike. Echoes of the protest reached Palestine, and the chief rabbinate, with the aid of the Jewish Agency, appealed to the High Commissioner to send a rabbi and a ritual slaughterer (shohet) to the camp. On March 15, Rabbi Yaakov Shraibom and the shohet, Rabbi Rosenberg, reached the camp. They were housed outside the fence and were permitted to come and go at will. Their free movement was exploited by the interneess to get information from, and establish contact with, the outside world, which was vital to their escape plans.


Yaakov Meridor
 
On September 26, 1945, three Irgun members (Yaakov Yundof, Yaakov Meridor and Shimon Sheiba) left the camp concealed in a tanker which had brought in water. The driver, who had been bribed, brought them to a spot close to the railroad station, and left them there. They spent the night in a field, and the next day boarded a train for Port Sudan, where they planned to rent a boat to take them to Aqaba. They posed as Polish intelligence officers working for the British, and were equipped with wooden revolvers (which looked just like the real thing) and forged documents. Their comrades in the camp covered their escape and hindered the search after their absence was discovered. As was customary in internment camps, all the inmates were counted every evening. The count was not conducted simultaneously in all the huts, but consecutively. The interval between the counts enabled three inmates to slip out of a hut which had already been inspected, and to be counted again in other huts. They moved from hut to hut through windows whose bars had been sawn through in such a way that they could be lifted out and replaced without detection.

The escapees reached Port Sudan as planned, and spent three days searching for a vessel which would transport them to Aqaba (the Irgun General Headquarters had sent them a considerable sum of money). However, they aroused the suspicion of the hotel owner where they were staying, and were forced to leave. They contacted a Jewish merchant, but he was unwilling to risk helping them. They had no alternative but to travel to Khartoum by train. At one of the stations, British officers boarded the train and recognized them. On September 26, six days after their escape, they were handed back to the authorities.

BACK TO SAMBEL CAMP, ERITREA
The internees spent nine months in the Sudan; on October 9, 1945, they were evacuated from Carthage and, after a four-day journey by train and truck, found themselves back at Sambel. Two months later, 35 new internees joined them and were housed in a special camp several hundred meters from the veterans. On January 17, 1946, a dispute broke out between one of the internees, Eliyahu Ezra, and a Sudanese sentinel, resulting in Ezra being shot and wounded. The injured man was carried to the gate for transfer to the first aid station outside the camp. When the guards refused to let them out, the internees began banging on the gate, and fire was opened on them from all sides. Eliyahu Ezra and Shaul Haglili were killed, and 12 others were injured. Only then was the gate opened. The medical officer and several medical orderlies hastened to the aid of the injured, who were then taken to a military hospital. Ezra and Haglili were buried in the cemetery of the Jewish community in Asmara.

The incident caused great agitation among the prisoners, who demanded that an external committee of enquiry be set up to investigate the events. The Yishuv, which was united at that time within the framework of the United Resistance, was in uproar. In contrast to previous occasions, the Hebrew press was unanimous in its demand for an investigation into the murder, and the return of the internees to Eretz Israel. The Irgun, as well as Lehi, refrained from initiating reprisals in order to avoid undermining the solidarity of the United Resistance.

A month after the return to Sambel, on November 10, 1945, four internees (Yaakov Gurevitz, Benyamin Zeroni, Eliyahu Lankin and Rahamim Mizrahi) escaped at night via the unguarded sports ground. Their objective was to seek out escape routes for a larger group, which would break out by digging a tunnel.

 Two months after their escape, on January 13, 1946, Gurevitz and Zeroni set out by bus for Ethiopia. They were disguised as veiled Arab women, and were accompanied by a Jew who lived in Asmara and posed as an Arab travelling with his two wives. At one of the Ethiopian border towns, the three entered a hotel to rest, but aroused the suspicion of the bellboy, who summoned the police. The three men were arrested and interrogation revealed their true identity. The British asked the Ethiopian authorities to extradite them, but encountered objections. After seven months of negotiations, they were finally handed over and sent back to Sambel.

Eliyahu Lankin, who set out in mid-June (about six months after the escape) from Asmara to Addis Ababa, was more fortunate. After five adventurous months he reached Djibouti by plane and on January 7, 1947, sailed aboard a French boat to Marseille and from there travelled to Paris. Lankin was the first escapee to succeed in reaching his destination.

Rahamim Mizrahi remained in Asmara, where he tried to create suitable conditions for the absorption of the large group scheduled to escape via the tunnel.



 
A poster published by the Irgun
THE ESCAPE OF THE 54
The inmates spent five months digging two tunnels: the first 32 meters and the second 70 meters long. Both had a diameter of 45 cm, sufficient for a man to crawl through. The work was carried out in three shifts, and two-thirds of the internees took part. The problem of disposing of the sand was solved by packing it in cloth bags and scattering it during the exercise walk in the sports ground. The excavation created numerous technical problems, such as introducing an electrical wire for illumination, supports for the roof to prevent a cave-in, ventilation etc. However, the main problem was how to conceal the work in the tunnel from the camp guards, who conducted routine checks of the huts.

The internees managed to overcome all these obstacles and on Saturday night, June 29, 1946, they were ready for action. That evening, 54 inmates escaped from the camp in two groups: 30 through the large tunnel, and 24 through the smaller one. The two groups emerged from the tunnels equipped with maps, and knapsacks packed with food and first aid kits. The larger group was disguised in British army uniform - sewn by the inmates, who scrupulously copied every detail, from insignia to rank. The "soldiers" took over an Italian bus which was returning soldiers to the camp, and drove off towards the Ethiopian border. An engine problem forced them to continue their journey on foot, and the following day they were discovered by armed villagers and handed over to the authorities. The second group, in civilian clothing, succeeded in reaching a pre-designated hiding place in Asmara. For three months they sought further escape routes, but all their attempts to leave Asmara were unsuccessful. Finally, on September 24, their hiding place was surrounded by British security forces, and the last escapees were returned to the internment camp.

The prisoners made further escape attempts, but all ended in failure. As a result of these attempts, which greatly embarrassed the camp command and army headquarters in Eritrea, the British government decided to transfer the prisoners to Kenya.



THE INTERNMENT CAMP AT GILGIL, KENYA
On March 2, 1947, all the internees were evacuated from Sambel, loaded onto trucks and transferred under heavy guard to Massawa port. There they boarded a ship and sailed to Mombasa, Kenya, under conditions of intolerable heat and overcrowding. From the port they were taken on a twenty-hour train journey in freight cars to the internment camp at Gilgil.



The internment camp at Gilgil
Gilgil camp had been used in the past as a jail for soldiers serving sentences for criminal offences and the living conditions and sanitation were very poor. There were no windows in the dormitories, apart from a tiny barred aperture under the roof, and the sewage conduits were open and crisscrossed the camp. The climate was harsh and mosquitoes swarmed everywhere. The internees refused to accept the situation and some two weeks after arriving, they rebelled. They tore openings in the walls and covered the sewage conduits with stones which they had removed from the walls. The camp commander subsequently improved conditions and the camp became tolerable.

The British authorities hoped, vainly, that the remote location of the camp would preclude escape attempts. Shortly after their move to Gilgil, however, the prisoners began to excavate a tunnel and made various further attempts.

The last successful escape took place on March 29, 1948. During the evening, six inmates (Yaakov Meridor, Nathan Germant, Reuven Franco and Yaakov Hillel of the Irgun, and Shlomo Ben Shlomo and David Yanai of Lehi) crawled through an eighty-meter tunnel and emerged on the other side of the camp fence. They proceeded towards their meeting place with "Wilson" (one of the two emissaries who had come specially from South Africa to help them), who was waiting for them in a rented car. They crossed the border to Uganda with passports brought from South Africa and, after a short rest, approached the Belgian consul for visas to Belgian Congo. From there they flew to Brussels, arriving two days later.

Lengthy imprisonment anywhere, but especially in a remote location, can cause physical and emotional illness. In order to preclude these, the internees began, from the very first days of exile, to organize social and cultural activities. A library was set up, which in Gilgil contained some three thousand volumes. A daily newspaper and a philosophical and literary journal were produced. Various courses were held, and lectures given on literature, the natural sciences and contemporary affairs. Many of the internees took correspondence courses at secondary and university levels, most of them at British institutions, and studied economics, law, accountancy and even architecture and engineering. In addition to their academic pursuits, the detainees played sport and exercised.

In one of his letters, Aryeh Ben-Eliezer (a member of the Irgun General Headquarters before his arrest) described the cultural and social activities in the camp, but concluded as follows:



From the diverse activities mentioned in my letter, you could gain the impression that we are living in a paradise. Nonetheless, I pray to the Lord above to take pity on me and send me Eve, so that I can sin and be banished from Eden. 

 On the morning of July 12, 1948, the drama of African exile ended, when the British ship Ocean Vigour, with 262 exiles aboard, reached Israeli territorial waters. An Israeli Navy vessel came out of Tel Aviv port to greet them, and the captain, Mila Brenner, hailed them:  "This is the captain speaking.
Welcome home!
We have been sent to greet the exiles who are returning home.
From now on, you are free citizens of the State of Israel". 

http://www.etzel.org.il/english/ac15.htm

[Ultra Requete]

ACTIVITIES IN EUROPE BEFORE WORLD WAR TWO
More than three million Jews, concentrated mainly in the large towns, lived in Poland in the 1930s. In Warsaw, for example, Jews constituted one-third of the population. The Polish government, worried by the increase in Jewish influence in the country, not only did nothing to hinder the illegal immigration movement which the Revisionists organized in Poland, but actively assisted it.

In 1936, Jabotinsky met with the Foreign Minister, Josef Beck, and created the infrastructure for collaboration. The Polish government hoped that the establishment of a Jewish state would lead to mass emigration of Jews, thus solving the Jewish problem in Poland. In November 1937, Avraham Stern (Yair), then secretary of the Irgun General Headquarters, arrived in the Polish capital armed with a letter of recommendation from Jabotinsky. He met with senior government officials and laid the practical foundations for cooperation between the Polish army and the Irgun Zvai Le'umi. Within the framework of this cooperation, Polish army representatives handed over to Irgun representatives weapons and ammunition which had been kept in special ammunition depots. The weapons remained under Polish army supervision until they were despatched to Eretz Israel. Some of the weapons were concealed in the false bottoms of crates in which the furniture of prospective immigrants was transported, or in the drums of electrical machines. When the consignments reached Eretz Israel, they were taken to a safe place, and the weapons were removed from their hiding place.

When in Warsaw Avraham Stern was much helped by Dr. Henryk Strasman, a well known lawyer and an officer in the Polish Reserve force. His wife Alicja (Lilka) was also of great help. The Strasmans introduced Stern to the Polish intellectuals and high officials. It was in their home that the preparations for the publication of the Polish periodical "Jerozolima Wyzwolona" (Free Jerusalem) were begun. It was Lilka who designed the cover - A map of Eretz Israel with the background of an arm holding a gun and the words in Hebrew: "" (This Way Only). This became later the symbol of the Irgun.

In March 25,1939, senior Irgun commanders from Eretz Israel participated in a course held in the Carpathian mountains, instructed by Polish army officers. The course took place under conditions of great secrecy, and the instructors wore civilian clothing. The participants were not permitted to establish contact with local Jews, and the letters they wrote home were sent to Switzerland, inserted in new envelopes, re-addressed to France, and finally posted from there to Palestine. The trainees received military training and were taught tactics of guerilla warfare.


Yaakov Meridor
 
When the course ended, they returned to Eretz Israel, apart from three who remained in Poland: Yaakov Meridor, who was responsible for despatching the weapons received from the Polish army; Shlomo Ben Shlomo, who organized a commanders course for selected members of Irgun cells in Poland (Isaac Raviv was one of the participants), and Zvi Meltzer, who organized a similar course in Lithuania.

The organization of clandestine Irgun cells in Europe had begun a year previously, and was mainly conducted among members of Betar. The plan was to train a cadre of fighters, who would immigrate to Eretz Israel illegally, bringing arms with them, to become a kind of commando corps. Avraham Stern was involved in organizing the Polish cells, and was assisted by Nathan Friedman-Yellin (member of the Irgun commission in Poland) and Shmuel Merlin (General Secretary of the New Zionist Organization in Poland).

The first course for Irgun commanders in Poland was held in the fall of 1938 and was headed by Aharon Heichman (a member of the Irgun General Headquarters), who was sent specially from Palestine for this assignment. Twenty four members of Polish "cells" took part in the course, which was conducted in complete secrecy. The Polish police, whilst aware of what was going on, did not intervene nor did they ask questions about the gunfire heard in the area.

POST-WAR ACTIVITY IN EUROPE
The outbreak of the Second World War, on September 1, 1939, cut short the extensive activity of the Irgun in Poland and Lithuania. Most of the arms which the Irgun had received were returned to the Polish army and Irgun activity ceased.

After the war, the Irgun General Headquarters decided to renew activity in Europe and to launch a "second front". The task was assigned to Yaakov Tavin, who was smuggled there aboard an Italian oil-tanker. The first base was established in Italy, where there were more than a thousand organized Betarites (Betar members), who had arrived with the flood of Jewish refugees from Eastern Europe, Germany and Austria. Among the Betarites were several members of the "cells" the Irgun had established in Poland and Lithuania in the late 1930s, and they formed the nucleus of the Italian branch of the Irgun. Irgun cells were also organized in the British zone in Germany, under Isaac Raviv.

After organization and consolidation, it was decided to commence operational activity, and the first target selected was the British Embassy in Rome. Preparations were protracted, and the planners made every effort to prevent civilian casualties. On the night of October 31, 1946, three young men set out from a pension in the city with two suitcases. They entered a waiting taxi, and drove to the Embassy, which they reached after midnight and unloaded the cases. After setting the time fuse, they propped the two suitcases against the main door of the building and left the area. At 2:46 am, there was a loud explosion and the central section of the building was destroyed. The explosion was heard throughout the city and windows were broken within a radius of one kilometer. The sole casualties were two Italians who had been passing by on their way home from a nearby night club.

The incident made a strong impression throughout the world. The British press reported the incident in detail, and the public was greatly shocked. Emergency measures were adopted in London; security was increased around government ministries, senior politicians were guarded, and orders were given to tighten security in British embassies in European capitals.

As a result of British pressure, the Italian police conducted widespread arrests among Betar members, including Yisrael Epstein, who had arrived several days previously from Palestine on a mission from the Irgun General Headquarters. Some of those arrested were released after interrogation, but others remained in custody for months. Epstein feared that the Italians would hand him over to the British and decided to escape. He used bribes to get drugs smuggled into his cell with which to drug the guards before escaping by rope.

On December 27, 1946, when Epstein believed his guards to be unconscious, he tied a rope to the central heating pipes and dropped the other end out of the window. As he began to climb down, one of the guards woke up and shot him. Severely wounded in the stomach, Epstein died of his injuries the following day.

As a result of the arrests in Italy, Irgun Headquarters in Europe were transferred to Paris. Meanwhile, branches had been set up in various parts of Europe, and attempts were made to strike at British targets, such as the Sacher Hotel in Vienna, the regional British army headquarters. The explosion there caused light damage to the building, but the propaganda impact was considerable. A train transporting British troops was sabotaged, and an explosion occurred in the hotel in Vienna which housed the offices of the British occupation force. However, the blowing up of the British embassy in Rome remained the pinnacle of Irgun operational activity in Europe.

In January, 1947, Eliyahu Lankin reached Paris after his successful escape from internment in Africa. Lankin was a member of the Irgun General Headquarters before his arrest and had also served as commander of the Jerusalem district. The French government, which knew of his escape from British custody, gave him an entry visa, and when he reached Paris he was appointed Commander of the Irgun in Europe.

 Although most of the illegal immigration activity was carried out by the Haganah's Mossad Le'aliyah Bet, Irgun representatives played central roles in several places. Yosef Klarman, who had organized illegal immigration in the 1930s, was sent by the Irgun to Rumania in September, 1944. He succeeded in establishing close contact with the Rumanian authorities, and was even received officially by King Michael and Queen Helena. He became the liaison officer between the Haganah and the authorities, and the central figure in immigration activities. In August, 1947, for example, the Rumanian authorities, under Soviet pressure, prevented the two immigrant vessels, Pan York and Pan Crescent, from leaving Constanza port. It was thanks to Klarman's contacts with the relevant persons in the Rumanian government that the ships were eventually permitted to sail.

Shmuel Ariel, sent to Paris by the Irgun in early 1946, was in charge of immigration. Ariel established good contacts with the French authorities, and the Haganah called on his services extensively in connection with sailings from France. Thus, for example, Ariel succeeded in negotiating with the French Ministry of Interior the granting of 3,000 entry visas to Jewish refugees arriving in France en route to Palestine. Some 650 of them left aboard the Ben Hecht, 940 on the arms vessel Altalena, and the remainder were transferred to a ship organized by the Haganah. Thanks to Ariel's close contacts with the French authorities, the Irgun General Headquarters was permitted to operate in Paris without interruption, and to supervise activity in the many branches all over Europe.

ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
As noted above, the Second World War halted Irgun activity in Europe. Several of the Irgun's emissaries left Europe for the United States and joined the activities of the "American Friends for a Jewish Palestine". The mission in the United States was headed by Hillel Kook (who had been a member of the Irgun General Headquarters in Palestine); the other members were Aryeh Ben-Eliezer, Yitzhak Ben-Ami, Eri Jabotinsky, Alexander Rafaeli and Shmuel Merlin. They launched independent political efforts, initiated a propaganda and information campaign and undertook fundraising activities until the State of Israel was established.

When information on the extent of the Holocaust began to arrive, the mission initiated an information campaign to bring the facts to the knowledge of the public. Full-page advertisements in the leading newspapers appealed for the rescue of European Jewry before it was too late. An "Emergency Committee for the Rescue of European Jewry" was established, with the participation of senators and congressmen, writers and public figures, both Jewish and non-Jewish. The Emergency Committee launched widespread information activities, and initiated an appeal to the President by Congress and the Senate that immediate action be taken to rescue the remnants of European Jewry. The proposal was ratified by the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Senate, and President Roosevelt subsequently issued an administrative order for the establishment of a special national authority to deal with war refugees. An official emissary sent to Turkey was of considerable assistance in the rescue of Rumanian Jewry.

As the Second World War approached its end and a revolt was proclaimed against the British rulers of Palestine, the Irgun mission in the United States announced the establishment of the "Hebrew Committee for National Liberation". The committee engaged in diplomatic efforts and informed the US public of the Irgun's war against the British. The establishment of the committee was announced by Peter Bergson (Hillel Kook) at a press conference in Washington in a building which the mission had purchased from the Iranian Embassy. A Hebrew standard and the US flag were raised with a sign reading "Hebrew Embassy". After the establishment of the State of Israel, the building was donated to the Israeli Embassy in Washington.

http://www.etzel.org.il/english/ac16.htm

[Ultra Requete]

The day after the UN resolution of November 29, 1947, seven Jews were killed, including four passengers on a bus attacked by Arabs on the road to Jerusalem. The acts of hostility grew more frequent, and in December 1947, 184 Jews were killed throughout the country. In January 1948, the situation was particularly difficult. On February 1, a car bomb exploded in Hasolel Street (present-day Hahavatzelet Street) near the Palestine Post building. Three weeks later there was another catastrophe in Jerusalem. Three booby-trapped trucks positioned in Ben-Yehuda Street exploded, destroying four large buildings, killing 50 and injuring more than 100. On March 11, a car bomb exploded in the courtyard of the Jewish Agency building, killing 12 people, injuring 44, and causing great damage.

Arab acts of hostility had reached their peak by March, moreover, Arabs now controlled all the inter-urban routes. The road to Jerusalem was blocked, settlements in the Galilee and the Negev were also cut off and daily attacks were perpetrated on convoys. In the four months since the UN resolution, some 850 Jews had been killed throughout the country, most of them in Jerusalem or on the road to the city.

Operation Nachshon was launched on April 6, 1948, with the aim of opening up the road to Jerusalem. The village of Deir Yassin was included on the list of Arab villages to be occupied as part of that operation. Indeed, while fierce fighting was going on at Kastel, Arab reinforcements flooded onto the battlefield through Deir Yassin, which helped to drive back the Jewish occupying force.

When the Haganah command learned of the plan of the Irgun and Lehi to conquer Deir Yassin, David Shaltiel, Haganah Commander in Jerusalem, asked them to coordinate the timing of the operation with the scheduled renewed assault on Kastel. He despatched identical letters to Mordechai Raanan (Irgun Commander in Jerusalem) and Yehoshua Zetler (Lehi Commander in Jerusalem), in which he gave their operation his approval:



To: Shapira (code-name of Zetler)
From: District Commander
I have learned that you intend to carry out an operation against Deir Yassin. I would like to call your attention to the fact that the conquest and continued occupation of Deir Yassin is one of the stages in our overall plan. I have no objection to your carrying out the operation on condition that you are capable of holding on to it. If you are incapable of doing so, I caution you against blowing up the village, since this will lead to the flight of the inhabitants and subsequent occupation of the ruins and the abandoned homes by enemy forces. This will make things difficult rather than contributing to the general campaign, and reoccupation of the site will entail heavy casualties for our men. An additional argument I would like to cite is that if enemy forces are drawn to the place, this will disrupt the plan to establish an aerodrome there.
 


On April 2, 1948, the inhabitants of Deir Yassin began sniping at the Jewish Quarters of Bet Hakerem and Yefe Nof. According to reports by the Shai (Haganah Intelligence), fortifications were being constructed in the village and a large quantity of arms being stockpiled. Several days before the attack on Deir Yassin, the presence of foreign fighters was reported, including Iraqi soldiers and irregular forces. An Arab research study conducted at Bir Zeit University (near Ramallah) relates that the men of Deir Yassin took an active part in violent acts against Jewish targets and that many of the men of the village fought in the battle for Kastel, together with Abd-el-Kadr el-Husseini. The report also stated that trenches had been dug at the entry to the village, and that more than 100 men had been trained and equipped with rifles and Bren guns. A local guard force had been set up and 40 inhabitants guarded the village every night. (Knaana Sherif, The Palestinian villages destroyed in 1948 - Deir Yassin. Bir Zeit University, Documentation and Research Department 1987).

GOING INTO BATTLE
On Thursday, April 8, about 70 Irgun fighters assembled at the Etz Hayim base (at the entrance to Jerusalem). This was the first time that so large a number of underground fighters had gathered openly, without fear of British policemen or soldiers. The atmosphere was optimistic - after four months of attack, retaliation was finally in sight. The fact that two underground movements were acting together enhanced the sense of security and solidarity, and the password chosen was 'Fighting Solidarity' (Ahdut Lohemet).

Raanan, Commander of the Irgun in Jerusalem, opened the meeting and explained that the conquest of Deir Yassin had both military and political objectives. From the military viewpoint, the aim was not only to liberate the western quarters of Jerusalem from the threat of Deir Yassin, but finally to seize the initiative. It was essential to move from defence to attack and to transfer the fighting to enemy territory. The conquest would also raise the morale of the Jewish population of Jerusalem and restore their self-confidence.

Politically speaking, it would represent a change of approach and constitute a turning point in the war: no further retaliation operations, but from that point on conquest with the aim of holding on to an area. The Jewish people and the entire world would realize that the Jews were not going to give up Jerusalem and, if necessary, would take it by force. (It will be recalled that, according to the UN resolution, Jerusalem was to come under international rule). Raanan added that since the operation was an act of conquest and not of reprisal, the fighters had to avoid inflicting needless injury on Arabs. In particular, he cautioned against harming old people, women and children. Moreover, any Arab who surrendered, including combatants, was to be taken prisoner and not harmed in any way.

In order to prevent unnecessary casualties, it had been decided that the strike force would be preceded by an armored car equipped with a loudspeaker, which would enter the village ahead of the troops. The villagers would be informed that the village was surrounded by Irgun and Lehi fighters, and would be exhorted to leave for Ein Karem or to surrender. They would also be informed that the road to Ein Karem was open and safe.

At 2 a.m. the Irgun fighters, commanded by Ben-Zion Cohen (Giora), were driven from the Etz Hayim base to Bet Hakerem. The force moved into the wadi (riverbed), where the squads split up, each squad climbing up the terraced slope to its allotted field of action.

The Lehi unit assembled at Givat Shaul and proceeded from there towards the target. Some of the force advanced behind the armored car which was proceeding along the path towards the center of the village.

Close to 4:45 am, the village guards spotted suspicious movements. One of them called out in Arabic: 'Mahmoud'; an Irgun fighter, mishearing the cry, thought that someone had shouted the password 'Ahdut' (Solidarity) and responded with the second half of the password in Hebrew: 'Lohemet'. The Arabs opened fire and shooting commenced from all sides.

The armored car advanced along the path and, on reaching the outskirts of the village, encountered a trench and was forced to come to a halt. The loudspeaker was switched on and the message was read out. Heavy fire was directed at the armored car from the adjacent houses and the fighters trapped inside had to be rescued. Injuries were reported, and a first-aid unit set out from Givat Shaul towards the armored car.

The other units began their attack, but Arab resistance was strong, and every house became an armed fortress. Fierce fighting was conducted from house to house. Many of the attackers were injured in the first onslaught, including a number of commanders who had been advancing ahead of their units.

After the center of the village had been occupied, all the wounded were concentrated in one of the courtyards and ways were sought to evacuate them. It turned out that the road to Givat Shaul was impassable because of gunfire from the mukhtar's (local leader) house, which stood on a hilltop overlooking the area.

Since the fighting was taking place in a built-up area, the pace was slow, and both sides suffered heavy losses. In order to silence the source of gunfire, the fighters were forced to use hand-grenades, and in some cases even to blow up houses. There was firing from all sides and half the attackers were put out of action. On top of this, the remaining fighters suffered a shortage of ammunition.

A report on the course of the battle was transmitted by courier to headquarters at Givat Shaul. When word started coming in about the number of casualties and ammunition shortage, several Lehi people went to the Schneller camp and asked a Palmach unit to come to the attackers aid. After receiving the consent of the brigade HQ, the Palmach troops set out in an armored car, equipped with a machine-gun and a two-inch mortar. On arrival in the village, they fired several shells and machine-gun rounds at the mukhtar's house. At that very moment, without prior co-ordination with the Palmach, Yosef Avni charged and captured the mukhtar's house. With the mukhtar's house occupied, firing ceased and the occupation of the village was completed.

When the fighting was over, it was discovered that hundreds of villagers had retreated to Ein Karem, taking advantage of the fact that the road was open. Those who remained in the village surrendered and were taken prisoner. The prisoners, mostly women and children, were loaded onto trucks and taken to East Jerusalem, where they were handed over to their Arab brethren.



Deir Yassin - The Village After the Attack
Word of the occupation of Deir Yassin spread through the city, and was viewed positively by the Jews of Jerusalem. Not only could the Jewish residents of the western quarters now breath freely, but they felt proud to have finally taken the initiative. The capture of the village marked the completion of the breakthrough of Operation Nachshon, and instilled new hope in the hearts of Jerusalemites. The slogan 'Ahdut Lohemet', which had grabbed the attention of the Jewish community in Jerusalem, reflected the turning point in the response to Arab aggression. In the days that followed, crowds flocked to the Etz Hayim base to express their solidarity with the Irgun fighters.

FACTS AND COMMENTARIES
So much has been written and said about what happened at Deir Yassin that the battle waged on the morning of April 9 has become known as the 'Deir Yassin Massacre'. It is important to analyze the events and to distinguish between fact and fiction.

Massacre means the killing of defenceless people. The 1929 slaughter of the Jews of Hebron by Arabs in the middle of the night was a massacre. When Arab workers at the Haifa refinieries assailed their Jewish co-workers in February 1948, murdering more than 40 of them, a massacre can be said to have taken place. In both cases, the killings were premeditated. The brutal murder of settlers at Kfar Etzion by Arab Legion soldiers in May 1948, after the defenders had surrendered and were defenceless, was also a massacre.

But Deir Yassin?
Firstly, strict orders were given in advance to the fighters not to harm the elderly, women and children. It was also stated explicitly that any Arab who surrendered was to be taken prisoner.

Secondly, an unprecedented action took place at Deir Yassin - a loudspeaker was installed on an armored car to inform the population that the road to Ein Karem was open and safe, and that whoever left the village would not be harmed. The strike force was actually prepared to forfeit the surprise element of battle in order to issue these instructions and thus to prevent Arab civilian casualty.

The Arabs do not deny the use of a loudspeaker; indeed, an Arab League publication entitled "Israeli Aggression" states, inter alia:


"On the night of April 9, 1948, the peaceful Arab village of Deir Yassin was surprised by a loudspeaker, which called on the population to evacuate it immediately." 


Thirdly, it is universally agreed that there was bitter fighting at Deir Yassin. More than 100 Arab fighters were well equipped and had large amounts of ammunition. The Arabs occupied fortified positions in stone buildings, while the attackers were exposed to enemy fire. The fierce gunfire directed from the houses forced the attackers to charge, throw grenades and, in several cases, to blow up houses. As a consequence, women and children were among the dead.

According to all the documents and testimonies, it is clear today that fewer than one hundred Arabs were killed at Deir Yassin, and not the 240 as published. Moreover, this was the first instance in the War of Independence where battle had taken place in a built-up area, and such fighting typically claims numerous victims. For the same reason, the number of Irgun and Lehi members injured by Arab fire was 35% of the force (5 dead and 35 wounded).

All the Arab casualties were killed in the course of the fighting. Villagers - men, women and children - who surrendered, were taken prisoner and came to no harm. When the firing ceased, they were transported by truck to East Jerusalem and handed over to their Arab brethren.

The Deir Yassin affair had a strong impact on the course of the War of Independence; the battle was summed up as follows in the "History of the War of Independence", prepared by the History Division of the IDF General Staff:

 The Deir Yassin affair was publicized throughout the world as the 'Deir Yassin Massacre', causing great harm to the reputation of the Yishuv. All the Arab propaganda channels disseminated the story at the time, and continue to do so to the present day. But the battle indubitably served to expedite the collapse of the Arab hinterland in the period which followed. More than the deed itself, this was achieved by the publicity it received from Arab spokesmen. They wanted to demonstrate to their people the savagery of the Jews and to instill in them a spirit of religious fervor. In fact, however, they intimidated and alarmed them. They themselves now admit their mistake. 


Hazen Nusseibeh, an editor of the Palestine Broadcasting Service's Arabic news in 1948, was interviewed for the BBC television series "Israel and the Arabs: the 50-year conflict." He describes an encounter with Deir Yassin survivors and Palestinian leaders, including Hussein Khalidi, the secretary of the Arab Higher Committee, at the Jaffa Gate of Jerusalem's Old City.

 "I asked Dr. Khalidi how we should cover the story," recalled Nusseibeh, now living in Amman. He said, "We must make the most of this". So we wrote a press release stating that at Deir Yassin children were murdered, pregnant women were raped. All sorts of atrocities." 



A Deir Yassin survivor, identified as Abu Mahmud, said the villagers protested at the time. 
"We said, 'there was no rape.' Khalidi said, 'We have to say this, so the Arab armies will come to liberate Palestine from the Jews'." 


In an arlicle "Deir Yassin a casualty of guns and propaganda", by Paul Holmes (Reuters) (http://www.metimes.com/issue98-16/reg/deir.html) he interviewing Mohammed Radwan, who was a resident of Deir Yassi in 1948, and fought for several hours before ruing out of bullets.

 "I know when I speak that God is up there and God knows the truth and God will not forgive the liars", said Radwan, who puts the number of villagers killed at 93, listed in his own handwriting. "There were no rapes. It's all lies. There were no pregnant women who were slit open. It was propaganda that... Arabs put out so Arab the armies would invade" he said. "They ended up expelling people from all of Palestine on the rumor of Deir Yassin." 


In the book "War Without End", by Anton La Guardia (Thomas Dunne Books, N.Y. 2000) we find the following: "Just before Israel's 50th anniversary celebration, I went to Deir Yassin with Ayish Zeidan, known as Haj Ayish, who had lived in the village as a teenager.

 'We heard shooting. My mother did not want us to look out of the window. I fled with my sister, but my mother and my other sisters could not make it. They hid in the cellar for four days and then ran away.' 


He said he never believed that more than 110 people had died at Deir Yassin, and accused Arab leaders of exaggerating the atrocities.

 'There had been no rape', he said. 'The Arab radio at the time talked of women being killed and raped, but this is not true. I believe that most of those who were killed were among the fighters and the women and children who helped the fighters.' " 

http://www.etzel.org.il/english/ac17.htm
 

[Ultra Requete]

Jaffa, with a population of 90,000, was the largest Arab town in Palestine, and had a long and twisting border with its neighbor, Tel Aviv. When hostilities broke out on the morning of November 29, 1947, Arab snipers fired repeatedly at the Jewish quarters along the border, and succeeded in immobilizing considerable sections of the Jewish city. In the first five months following the UN resolution, the number of Jewish mortalities amounted to dozens, with hundreds injured. Thousands of Jewish refugees, forced to abandon their homes, were billetted in schools and public buildings. The sniping and the bombardments not only led to the evacuation of the population of the southern suburbs, but also required the deployment of large forces in the defence of Tel Aviv.



 
By April, 1948, it was clear that once the British left the country, Egypt would join the struggle against the emergent Jewish State. According to the partition scheme, Jaffa was to be part of the Arab state, and could be used by the Egyptian army as their base. In view of its proximity to Tel Aviv and the possibility of attack, the Haganah drew up a plan for the encirclement of Jaffa by occupying Arab villages to the south of the town (Abu Kabir, Jebeliyeh and Tel Arish). It was assumed that this strategy would lead to the surrender of Jaffa, but there was still the potentiality of Egyptian infiltrating Jaffa from the sea. To foil this possibility, and to free up forces for other battle-fronts, the Irgun General Headquarters decided to capture Jaffa prior to the British evacuation.

The decision also made political sense. By incorporating Jaffa into the State of Israel, its political independence would thus be precluded. The British, for their part, left a military force in Jaffa which was supposed to hand the town over to the Arabs at the appointed time.

On Saturday, April 24, 1948, 600 Irgun fighters assembled at Dov Camp in Ramat Gan. It was the first time that so large a force had gathered openly, and it was evident that a large-scale operation was afoot. After the weapons and equipment had been allocated a parade was held at which the Irgun Commander, Menachem Begin, appeared publicly for the first time. In a brief speech, he said:


[...] Soldiers of the Irgun!
We are going to conquer Jaffa. We are setting out on one of the decisive battles in the struggle for Israel's independence.
Know who stands before you, remember who you have left behind. You face a cruel foe, who wishes to destroy us. Behind you are our parents, our brethren, our children.
Strike at the foe! Aim well! Spare ammunition! In this battle, show no mercy to the enemy, as he knows none towards our people. Spare women and children. Spare the life of anyone who raises his hands in surrender. He is your captive. Do not harm him... 

He was followed by Amichai Paglin (Gidi), operations officer of the Irgun, and commander of the entire operation. He outlined the operation strategy and explained that before the strike, mortar gunners would fire thousands of 3" shells. The company commanders commenced the detailed briefing, and the fighters boarded the vehicles in an elated mood.


Amichai Paglin (Gidi)
 
The operation was due to begin at night, but since deployment of forces was still continuing, the attack began in the early hours of April 25. The mortar gunners commenced heavy shelling of the center of Jaffa and the port area, and shortly afterwards two companies moved towards the pre-designated targets: one towards the railway tracks and the other towards the sea. The two forces encountered heavy fire from Arab fighters entrenched in the ruined buildings. After bitter fighting, in which the Arabs had superior firing power, the two companies retreated to their base. A debriefing at operational headquarters revealed that the size and strength of the enemy force had been underestimated. It was decided to send out sappers to blow up enemy positions, whereupon an infantry unit would occupy the liberated positions.

The units set out again the following morning, but this time too they failed to achieve their objective. They encountered fierce machine-gun fire, supported this time by anti-tank weapons brought in by the British. The sappers succeeded in blowing up several enemy positions, but the infantry units failed to take them. Meanwhile, the bombardment continued and, in an atmosphere of terror and chaos, there was a mass exodus of the town's inhabitants by land and sea.

That day, April 26, 1948, an agreement was signed between the Irgun and the Haganah, according to which the Irgun would implement only such actions as had been previously approved by the Haganah, and would carry out operations assigned to it by the Haganah's supreme command.

The senior command held discussions at the end of the second day of the fighting where it was reported that the growing number of casualties was a direct result of the intervention of the British. Begin summed up by saying:

Were it not for the British tanks and armored cars, we could have achieved the full objective of the attack. But the tanks are there, and we cannot ignore their presence. Under these conditions, it is no disgrace to halt the attack. We will hold on to the line we have reached, and leave a strong vanguard force there in anticipation of future action. The other units will be withdrawn from this front, where they can do no good. 



Menachem Begin
 
Several of the commanders who took part in the discussion supported this proposal. Others, headed by Gidi, argued that the enemy was about to collapse, and that fighting should continue. Begin's opinion was nevertheless taken as an order to halt the fighting, but it encountered fierce resistance when it reached the fighters, who insisted on another attempt. Begin subsequently "surrendered" to the wishes of the troops, and the order to retreat was revoked.

On the third day of fighting, Gidi changed his tactics. Since it was clear that the fighters could not advance along the roads and alleyways exposed to enemy fire, it was decided to advance through the interior of houses by breaching their outside walls. A decision was taken to blow up large buildings to check the progress of the British, who had joined in the combat. To facilitate advance through open terrain, barriers made of sandbags were constructed. During the morning, thousands of sandbags were brought to the front, as well as drills and pick-axes to break down walls. The mortar gunners launched a heavy bombardment, and in the afternoon the onslaught began. The objective of the fighting, which lasted all day and night, was to cross the Arab quarter of Manshiyeh and cut it off from the town. The force captured position after position, and once Manshiyeh police station had been taken, Arab resistance collapsed. The fighters then encountered the British, who attempted to block their advance. Despite this unexpected intervention, the force managed to advance within Manshiyeh and by 7 am. the first fighters had reached the sea. This marked the end of the battle for Manshiyeh.



Comming back from Manshiyeh after the battle
Once Manshiyeh had been taken, total chaos reigned throughout the town. The mass exodus was at its height now and the British army assumed full responsibility for the defence of Jaffa. Reinforcements from Cyprus and Malta arrived, and British vessels were ready in waiting off the Tel Aviv shore. The British governor of Lydda district informed Israel Rokach, Mayor of Tel Aviv, that if the Irgun did not stop the fighting, the city would be shelled by tanks on land, and bombarded by ships offshore and by RAF aircraft. The ultimatum was ignored by the Irgun command, and the following morning the British began to shell the Alliance school area, where the Irgun headquarters were located. At the same time, British tanks and armored cars moved towards Manshiyeh, and directed heavy fire at the newly-occupied area.

This was the first occasion on which the Irgun fought the British directly. Despite the clear superiority of the British artillery and armor, the Irgun fighters battled courageously and refused to retreat. Senior commanders went into battle at the head of their troops, and held up the British armored force by blowing up houses and scattering the debris on the roads and alleys.

While the battle was raging, the Irgun command announced that if the British bombardment did not cease, the Irgun would direct its mortar fire at the German Colony in Jaffa, where the British garrison was located. In addition, the command announced that it was capable of shelling the remaining British army camps and inflicting casualties on the British on the eve of their departure from the country.

Hasan Bek
 
The Lydda district governor then informed Rokach that the British were no longer insisting on total evacuation of Manshiyeh by Jewish forces, and demanded that the police station be cleared of Irgun fighters and restored to them, that Hassan Bek Street be evacuated to ensure free movement for British vehicles, and that the Irgun handed over to the Haganah the positions it had occupied in Manshiyeh.

Instead of responding to British demands to withdraw from the police station, the Irgun command sent sappers to blow it up. Blocks of houses were also demolished, and the resulting debris obstructed the road to Tel Aviv. The Irgun then announced that it agreed to hand the positions over to the Haganah forces.

On Tuesday night, after the fall of Manshiyeh, the Haganah launched Operation Hametz, with the objective of occupying villages south of Jaffa. In one of these villages, Tel Arish, the Arabs counter-attacked and the Haganah was forced to retreat after suffering heavy losses (33 dead and some 100 wounded). The next day, the Haganah requested that Irgun mortars shell Tel Arish so that the wounded could be brought out under cover of fire. Having completed this task, the Irgun went on to despatch another of its mortar units to shell the village of Salameh, which it then occupied.

On May 12, a deputation of Arab notables from Jaffa arrived at Haganah headquarters in Tel Aviv and, after negotiations, signed a surrender agreement. The next morning, May 13, 1948, the last British troops left Jaffa. The same afternoon, a convoy of Haganah and Irgun fighters advanced towards Jaffa, led by an Irgun armored car requisitioned from the British. At the entrance to Jaffa they were greeted by the "Emergency Committee", accompanied by Arab notables who had remained in the town. Martial law was proclaimed in Jaffa, and a joint Haganah-Irgun command was established.

The human cost of conquering Jaffa was heavy: 32 dead (half in battle against the British) and 77 wounded. In addition, 9 Irgun fighters were killed in the defence of Tel Aviv.

THE IRGUN-HAGANAH AGREEMENT
Shortly after the UN resolution of November 29, 1947, the Jewish Agency Executive decided to respond to the Irgun proposal and to conduct negotiations on co-operation. The discussions were difficult and exhausting, particularly in light of the resistance of David Ben-Gurion and his labor party Mapai to any form of agreement. At a press conference he held shortly before the Jewish Agency decision, Ben-Gurion said:

There are no negotiations with dissidents nor will there be. If the dissidents disband their organizations and hand over their weapons, each of them individually can volunteer for the defence of the Yishuv like any other Jew, and if he is found suitable, he will be accepted into the ranks. 


Even before the negotiations were concluded, local arrangements for co-operation were being made between Irgun and Haganah combatants in response to the upsurge of Arab aggression.

At the beginning of April, 1948, the Zionist Organization Executive convened to discuss, among other items, an agreement with the Irgun. After a bitter debate, it ratified the agreement. The following are the details of the agreement:


a. Irgun positions will be subject to the authority of the Haganah officer commanding the front, who will convey his instructions to them through a commander appointed by the Irgun.
b. Plans for assault on Front A (Arab) and plans for reprisals on Front B (British) will require prior approval. Details, as regards object and time, will be clarified at personal meetings between representatives and experts. The Irgun will also be ready to carry out operations assigned to it.

c. Irgun members will be bound by the principle of resistance to British attempts to disarm them. Under special circumstances, Irgun members in defensive positions will take into consideration the situation of nearby Haganah positions.

d. The Irgun will be free to raise funds, both in Israel and in the Diaspora, and the Jewish Agency will confirm that they do not allocate funds to the Irgun

e. Plans for arms acquisition will be drawn up after joint consultation and will be implemented by mutual agreement.

f. Before this basic arrangement becomes operative, certain details remain to be clarified. This will be done by representatives and experts from the Irgun and from the Haganah.
 

The meeting between the experts was delayed, and took place only on April 26, the second day of the assault on Jaffa. The agreement was binding from then on.

The agreement was intended to establish a working relationship between the two organisations in the period leading up to the establishment of the Jewish state. The Irgun had proclaimed earlier that once the state came into being, it would lay down its weapons within state territory, and its members would join the national armed forces. Jerusalem, which was to come under international rule under the auspices of the United Nations, was a different matter. The Irgun would continue to exist in Jerusalem as an independent organization until the city became a part of the State of Israel.

http://www.etzel.org.il/english/ac18.htm
 

[Ultra Requete]

According to the UN resolution of November 29, 1947, Jerusalem was not to be included in the Jewish state, but was to come under international rule under UN auspices. The Irgun General Headquarters, which objected strongly to the internationalization of Jerusalem, decided that it would continue to exist there even after it had disarmed within the borders of the Jewish state. The role of the Irgun would be to fight any foreign force which ruled Jerusalem, and to take part in the defence of the Jewish community against Arab attack.

On April 13, 1948, a day before the British left Jerusalem, Mordechai Raanan (Irgun district commander) initiated a meeting with David Shaltiel (Haganah district commander). At that meeting, Raanan told Shaltiel that his sense of responsibility for the fate of Jerusalem had motivated him to place the Irgun units under the Haganah's unified command, whilst retaining organizational autonomy. Shaltiel went on to outline "Operation Kilshon" (Pitchfork), the military action planned to take place after the British departure.


Security zone
 
The operation had two objectives: the first, to seize buildings belonging to Jews, which had been commandeered by the British in order to establish security zones (known as Bevingrads). The second objective was to create territorial continuity with the isolated Jewish suburbs. The plan, essentially defensive, was intended to preserve existing gains and to defend the Jewish community in Jerusalem.

On the morning of Friday, May 14, 1948, the British evacuated Jerusalem in two convoys: the first moved north towards Haifa, while the second moved south towards Bethlehem, Hebron and Rafiah. The departure of the two convoys marked the end of thirty years of British rule in Jerusalem.

OPERATION KILSHON
Immediately after the last British soldiers had left the city, Irgun fighters took over the vacant Generali building on the corner of Jaffa and Shlomzion Hamalka streets. After raising the national flag above the statue of the winged lion on the roof of the building, they turned towards the Russian Compound, where the CID (the British intelligence) and central prison were located. Several members of the Irgun force had been incarcerated there as members of the underground and felt particular satisfaction in returning there as victors.

The next assignment was to seize the Police Academy north of the city, overlooking the road to Mount Scopus. The camp was attacked by three spearheads, the barbed wire fence cut, and the fighters entered the camp where they uncovered an arsenal of ammunition and considerable quantities of fuel. Immediately after taking the camp, the force continued its advance towards the Arab quarter of Upper Sheikh Jarrah. Several hours later, this too was occupied and the road to Mount Scopus was opened to traffic.

While the Irgun was operating in the Police Academy and in Sheikh Jarrah, Haganah units were active in establishing contact with the isolated Jewish quarters in the south of Jerusalem.

Five days later, in May 19, 1948, the Arab Legion (the army of Jordan) attacked Jerusalem and took over the Police Academy and Sheikh Jarrah.



Irgun soldiers marching
THE BATTLE FOR RAMAT RACHEL
The Egyptian army invaded the country shortly after the British departure, reaching the Arab town of Ashdod unimpeded. A branch of the column turned towards Be'er Sheva, and continued from there to Hebron, halting at Bethlehem. At the time, an Arab Legion unit which had guarded the British withdrawal from Jerusalem was also stationed in the Hebron area. In addition to the Egyptian and Legion units, there were also irregular forces in the area, trained and armed by Arab Legion officers. The Egyptian army intended to attack Jerusalem from the south, but first had to capture Kibbutz Ramat Rachel, which commanded the road linking Bethlehem to Jerusalem.

The first attack on Ramat Rachel took place on May 22. The kibbutz members could not withstand the heavy shelling, and after several attacks retreated to the nearby suburb of Talpiot. The Arabs then entered the kibbutz and began looting. Towards evening, a unit from the Moriah battalion of the Haganah arrived, liberated the kibbutz and returned to its base, leaving the newly-returned kibbutz members to defend their home.

The story was repeated the following day. After heavy shelling and automatic weapon fire, the kibbutzniks again retreated. The Arabs entered the kibbutz and continued their looting. In the evening, Haganah reinforcements again arrived, stormed the area and recaptured it from the Arabs. When they left, they were replaced by two Irgun platoons, under Yehuda Lapidot (Nimrod), and a reinforced Haganah squad.

The large-scale military offensive took place the next day, May 24th. In the morning hours, the kibbutz was shelled by mortar and cannon, and then the onslaught began. An Egyptian armed column, consisting of 9 armored cars and one tank, advanced from the west (from the direction of Mar Elias monastery), while a company of the Arab Legion attacked from the east (from the direction of Zur Baher). The Egyptian armored column advanced close to the kibbutz, commanding the road linking Ramat Rachel to the suburbs of Arnona and Talpiot. The defenders were besieged and totally surrounded by enemy forces. Fighting was fierce and the number of casualties grew, but the defenders fought courageously and refused to surrender even after fifty percent of their force had been injured. The battle raged until the evening. When night fell, the armored column withdrew, and a Haganah force arrived to an emotional welcome.



Ramat Rachel
It should be noted that the fighters who defended Ramat Rachel had no anti-tank weapons and were equipped only with Sten guns and rifles. Their heaviest weapon was a Lewis machine-gun, which had been in British service during the First World War.

The next day, the Jewish Agency spokesman announced that the Egyptian onslaught on south Jerusalem had been checked, and that "the Irgun had displayed great heroism". David Shaltiel went further and noted that, by checking the Egyptian attack, the Irgun had saved southern Jerusalem. The heroism of the Irgun fighters at Ramat Rachel was also noted in a special order of the day of the Irgun commander in chief and the district commander.

THE JEWISH QUARTER OF THE OLD CITY
 The heroic struggle of the defenders of the Jewish Quarter, who fought against a superior enemy force, will not be discussed in the present context. (For a detailed account, see Aharon Liron: 'The Old City of Jerusalem in Siege and Battle'; Yehuda Lapidot: 'Upon Thy Walls').

The following is a brief description of the role of the Irgun in the battle for the Jewish Quarter.

The fighting in the Old City began immediately after the UN resolution of November 29, 1947. The Jewish Quarter was placed under siege and provisions were brought in by convoys escorted by the British army. In order to restore calm, the British brought a company of troops into the Old City to keep Jews and Arabs apart. After several months of fighting, the Irgun commander of the Jewish Quarter, Isser Nathanson (Gideon), initiated contact with the Haganah commander to discuss combining forces and drawing up a formal agreement between the two organizations.

On May 4 an agreement was signed in Jerusalem, according to which the Irgun force in the Old City accepted the authority of the Haganah commander and agreed to carry out his orders. After the signing, 44 Irgun and Lehi fighters joined with some 70 Haganah fighters to form the joint fighting force of the Jewish Quarter. It should be recalled that, in addition to the fighters, there were some 1,700 civilians in the Old City (most of them old people, women and children).

Arab pressure on the Quarter increased subsequent to the British departure. The number of casualties among the defenders grew and ammunition was seriously depleted. When the stock of grenades began to run out, Gideon decided to manufacture grenades in the Quarter itself. He approached Yitzhak Aharonov, an Irgun commander in charge of the improvised arms factory. He recruited the aid of several of the teachers who had arrived in the Quarter with the last convoy, and who had been left in the rear because there were no weapons left for them. A group of young boys went from house to house collecting cans, and the teachers filled them with nails and gelignite. A detonator ending in a match-head, and attached to a time fuse, was then inserted into the gelignite. In the course of the combat in the Old City, the factory manufactured more than 2,500 of these grenades, enabling the fighters to hold out much longer than they would otherwise have been able.

When the Arab Legion force entered the Old City, the situation deteriorated. Several fruitless attempts were made to bring in reinforcements. On May 28, 1948, when all hope had been lost, the two rabbis of the Quarter went out to negotiate the conditions of surrender.

One hundred and eighty fighters and civilians lay wounded in hospital when the Legion captured the Jewish Quarter. Abdullah el Tel (Commander of the Legion force) ordered that the remaining fighters be rounded up and held apart from the civilians. In all, thirty five lined up in front of him. An amazed el Tel was prompted to remark: "You deceived me. If I had known your numbers, I would have fought you with sticks".

On the evening of the same day, the inhabitants of the Jewish Quarter were transferred to the new sector of the city. The fighters were taken prisoner and sent to a camp in Transjordan.

This marked the end of the heroic struggle of the defenders of the Jewish Quarter of the Old City.

THE FIRST TRUCE
A four-week truce proclaimed on June 11th was greeted with relief by the people of Jerusalem, both civilians and soldiers. The soldiers, particularly those serving in combat units, were exhausted by the heavy fighting and traumatized by the deaths of comrades. Their situation had been made all the more stressful by the constant shortage of weapons and fighters. Civilians emerged from their shelters and enthusiastically greeted the convoys loaded with food. The shelling, which had exacted so heavy a toll on civilian life, was finally over, and there was a general sense of optimism that life in Jerusalem would return to normal.

During the four weeks of truce, weapons, medical equipment, manpower and food flooded into Jerusalem. The Irgun also received weapons and ammunition from the coastal plain. Military bases, dispersed throughout the city, were now united and concentrated in the Katamon quarter of Jerusalem. The battalion was re-organized and its troops underwent intensive training, in readiness for a resumption of hostilities.

The battalion, known as Battalion 6, was commanded by Nathan Germant (Shimshon), who had recently returned from African exile. His deputy was Yehoshua Brandeis-Cohen (Elitzur). Menahem Shiff (Zeev) was operations officer and Yehiel Ohev-Ami (Ido) the adjutant. The battalion consisted of three combat companies: No. 1, under Yehuda Lapidot (Nimrod); No. 2, under Zvi Koenig (Yishai), and No. 3, under Eliezer Sodit-Sharon (Kabtzan). There was also a mortar company under David Brisk (Baruch or Chunky), a company of women commanded by Emma Germant (Avigail), and a junior company commanded by Pinchas Tuchman (Ron).



OPERATION KEDEM
After the first truce, which lasted four weeks, the balance of power in Jerusalem shifted drastically. The Jews had received reinforcements of weapons and fighters, whilst the opposite had occurred in the Arab forces. The Jewish force was now much stronger than the Arab force, morale was high and an onslaught was scheduled to begin on July 8, 1948.

Irgun representatives met with David Shaltiel and proposed that the attack on the Old City be launched forthwith. Shaltiel, eager to delay an attack, asked that the Irgun first capture the Arab village of Malha, promising an operation to liberate the Old City thereafter. In the early morning hours of July 14, Malha was duly attacked. By dawn, the village was occupied, but several hours later the Arabs launched a counter-attack, seizing one of the fortified positions and inflicting numerous casualties. When Irgun reinforcements arrived, the Arabs retreated and Malha was restored to Jewish control. The Irgun had lost 17 of its fighters and many more were wounded.

Several days later, Shaltiel summoned the Irgun representatives and outlined his plan to attack the Old City from three directions: the Beit Horon battalion of the Israel Defence Forces would strike from Mount Zion; an Irgun battalion would break through the New Gate (opposite Notre Dame), and a Lehi unit would break through the wall between the New Gate and Jaffa Gate. The attack was scheduled for Friday, July 16 at 8pm, and was to be completed by 5:45 the next morning, when the second truce was due to begin. Shaltiel added that if the exchange of fire continued, the battle would go on and there would be no truce.

The plan went awry from the outset. The zero hour was postponed, first to 11pm, then to midnight and then indefinitely. Finally, at 2:30am, the order was given to set out. The Irgun unit succeeded in breaking through the New Gate, but the other forces failed in their missions. At 5:45am Shaltiel's headquarters gave the order to retreat and the forces were ordered to cease hostilities.

CONCLUSION
With the beginning of the 'second truce', the war in Jerusalem effectively came to an end. A new situation prevailed in the city - the western section was now in Jewish hands, while eastern Jerusalem was under Arab rule. The plan for the internationalization of Jerusalem had come to nothing; it was clear that incorporation of the western sector of the city into the State of Israel was only a question of time. Irgun leaders consequently started negotiations with Yitzhak Greenboim (Minister of the Interior in the Provisional Government) for the co-opting of the Jerusalem Battalion into the IDF. It was agreed that the Irgun in Jerusalem would disband and its fighters would enlist in the IDF.

Count Bernadotte, the UN emissary, had meanwhile arrived in the country in an attempt to find a solution to the Jewish-Arab dispute. He did not consider himself bound by the UN resolution of November 29, and proposed a scheme of his own, each clause of which was unacceptable to the Jews. Among other things, the scheme proposed that unlimited immigration be permitted for only two years, whereafter it would become conditional on Arab consent. It also proposed that the Negev, in part or in its entirety, be included in the Arab state, and that, in exchange, western Galilee be part of the Jewish state.

Bernadotte's proposals aroused a storm of protest amongst the Jewish public in Israel. The Lehi, which considered him a national threat, planned and duly carried out his assassination on Friday, September 17, 1948. Ben-Gurion decided to exploit public outrage at this act and the following day an IDF force raided Lehi camps in Jerusalem. Lehi was proclaimed an illegal organization and many of its members were arrested by the security forces.

Several days later, on September 20, an ultimatum was issued to the Irgun to the effect that:


All members of the Irgun eligible for enlistment must enlist in the IDF.
All weapons must be handed over to the IDF.
[...]
If, in the specified period (twenty four hours) you do not respond to the demands of the government, the army will take action with all the means at its disposal. 

Two hours before the ultimatum lapsed, the Irgun heads convened a press conference, where they gave details of the negotiations with Greenboim. They explained that the Irgun was strong enough to repel any attack on its bases, but for reasons of patriotism, would not do so. They concluded:


In response to the ultimatum submitted to us yesterday, we hereby announce that, taking into consideration the threat of the use of force, and our desire to avoid shedding Jewish blood as a result of the execution of this threat, we accept the ultimatum. The Irgun Zvai Le'umi will disband in accordance with the Provisional Government's demands in a manner which will be determined between us and the commander of the IDF brigade in Jerusalem. 

From the day the British evacuated Jerusalem, the Irgun's fighting units were active in the defence of the city. The Irgun non fighting unit (Otzaron) built fortifications and the junior company carried out liaison missions and sometimes took part in combat. Dozens of Irgun fighters were killed in battle and more than one hundred were injured. The Irgun's contribution to the defence of Jerusalem far exceeded its relative proportion of the fighting force.

http://www.etzel.org.il/english/ac19.htm

[Ultra Requete]

The Altalena, purchased by Irgun members abroad, was originally intended to reach Israel on May 15, 1948, loaded with fighters and military equipment. Weapons purchase and organizational matters took longer than expected, however, and the sailing was postponed for several weeks. Meanwhile, on June 1st, an agreement had been signed for the absorption of the Irgun into the IDF and one of the clauses stated that the Irgun had to cease all independent arms acquisition activities. Consequently, representatives of the Israel Government were informed about the ship and its sailing schedule.

The Irgun headquarters in Paris did their best to keep the Altalena's preparations for departure a secret, but it was difficult to conceal the movement of 940 fighters and the loading of a large quantity of arms and ammunition. It was feared that if the plans were discovered, attempts might be made to sabotage the Altalena at sea. For this reason, when it raised anchor on June 11th, no cable was sent to the Irgun command in Israel, for fear that it would fall into the wrong hands. These precautionary measures proved fruitless, however, and the following day Radio London reported that the Altalena had sailed from Port-de-Bouc (France) in the direction of Israel with 1,000 Jewish volunteers and a large quantity of weapons on board.

It should be recalled that the first truce had begun on June 11th. When the Irgun leaders in Israel learned through the broadcast of the embarkation of the vessel, they feared that this breach of the truce conditions (i.e. the ban on bringing military equipment and fighters into the country) would be revealed. Menahem Begin decided therefore to postpone the arrival of the ship, and the Irgun staff secretary, Zippora Levi-Kessel, sent a wireless message to the Altalena to stay put and await orders. A similar cable was sent to Shmuel Katz (member of the General Headquarters), who was then in Paris, but contact with the ship was poor and the message was not understood.

On June 15th, Begin and his comrades held a meeting with government representatives, at which Begin announced that the ship had sailed without his knowledge and that he wanted to hold consultations on how to proceed. In his diary for June 16th, Ben-Gurion wrote the following about the meeting:



Yisrael [Galili] and Skolnik [Levi Eshkol] met yesterday with Begin. Tomorrow or the next day their ship is due to arrive: 4,500 tons, bringing 800-900 men, 5,000 rifles, 250 Bren guns, 5 million bullets, 50 Bazoukas, 10 Bren carriers. Zipstein (director of Tel Aviv port) assumes that at night it will be possible to unload it all. I believe we should not endanger Tel Aviv port. They should not be sent back. They should be disembarked at an unknown shore. 

Galili informed Begin of Ben-Gurion's consent to the landing of the ship, adding a request that it be done as fast as possible. Zippora Levi-Kessel then wirelessed the vessel to come in at full speed. The following day, a working meeting was held between Irgun representatives and Ministry of Defence personnel. While the Irgun proposed directing the Altalena to Tel Aviv beach, Ministry of Defence representatives claimed that the Kfar Vitkin beach was preferable, since it would be easier to evade UN observers there. The ship was therefore instructed to make for Kfar Vitkin.

Whilst there was agreement on the anchoring place of the Altalena, there were differences of opinion about the allocation of the cargo. Ben-Gurion agreed to Begin's initial request that 20% of the weapons be despatched to the Jerusalem Battalion. His second request, however, that the remainder be transferred to the IDF to equip the newly-incorporated Irgun battalions, was rejected by the Government representatives, who interpreted the request as a demand to reinforce an 'army within an army'. This was far from Begin's intention; rather, he saw it as a question of honor that the fighters enlist in the IDF fully-equipped.

The Altalena reached Kfar Vitkin in the late afternoon of Sunday, June 20th. Among the Irgun members waiting on the shore was Menahem Begin, who greeted the arrivals with great emotion. After the passengers had disembarked, members of the fishing village of Michmoret helped unload the cargo of military equipment. Concomitantly with the events at Kfar Vitkin, the government had convened in Tel Aviv for its weekly meeting. Ben-Gurion reported on the meetings which had preceded the arrival of the Altalena, and was adamant in his demand that Begin surrender and hand over of all the weapons:

 We must decide whether to hand over power to Begin or to order him to cease his separate activities. If he does not do so, we will open fire! Otherwise, we must decide to disperse our own army. 


The debate ended in a resolution to empower the army to use force if necessary to overcome the Irgun and to confiscate the ship and its cargo. Implementation of this decision was assigned to the Alexandroni Brigade, commanded by Dan Even (Epstein), which the following day surrounded the Kfar Vitkin area. Dan Even issued the following ultimatum:



To: M. Begin
By special order from the Chief of the General Staff of the Israel Defence Forces, I am empowered to confiscate the weapons and military materials which have arrived on the Israeli coast in the area of my jurisdiction in the name of the Israel Government. I have been authorized to demand that you hand over the weapons to me for safekeeping and to inform you that you should establish contact with the supreme command. You are required to carry out this order immediately.
If you do not agree to carry out this order, I shall use all the means at my disposal in order to implement the order and to requisition the weapons which have reached shore and transfer them from private possession into the possession of the Israel government.
I wish to inform you that the entire area is surrounded by fully armed military units and armored cars, and all roads are blocked.
I hold you fully responsible for any consequences in the event of your refusal to carry out this order.
The immigrants - unarmed - will be permitted to travel to the camps in accordance with your arrangements. You have ten minutes to give me your answer.

D.E.,Brigade Commander 

The ultimatum, and in particular the demand for an answer within ten minutes, was insulting and unrealistic. It was made, according to Even "in order not to give the Irgun commander time for lengthy considerations and to gain the advantage of surprise." Begin refused to respond to the ultimatum, and all attempts at mediation failed. Begin's failure to respond was a blow to Even's prestige, and a clash was now inevitable. Fighting ensued and there were a number of casualties. In order to prevent further bloodshed, the Kfar Vitkin settlers initiated negotiations between Yaakov Meridor (Begin's deputy) and Dan Even, which ended in a general ceasefire and the transfer of the weapons on shore to the local IDF commander.

Begin had meanwhile boarded the Altalena, which was now heading for Tel Aviv. He hoped that it would be possible to enter into a dialogue with the Provisional Government and to unload the remaining weapons peacefully. But this was not the case. Ben-Gurion ordered Yigael Yadin (acting Chief of Staff) to concentrate large forces on the Tel Aviv beach and to take the ship by force. Heavy guns were transferred to the area and at four in the afternoon, Ben-Gurion ordered the shelling of the Altalena . One of the shells hit the ship, which began to burn. There was danger that the fire would spread to the holds which contained explosives, and the captain ordered all aboard to abandon ship. People jumped into the water, whilst their comrades on shore set out to meet them on rafts. Although the captain flew the white flag of surrender, automatic fire continued to be directed at the unarmed survivors. Begin, who was on deck, agreed to leave the ship only after the last of the wounded had been evacuated.



Altelena on fire
Sixteen Irgun fighters were killed in the confrontation with the army; six were killed in the Kfar Vitkin area and ten on Tel Aviv beach. Three IDF soldiers were killed: two at Kfar Vitkin and one in Tel Aviv.

After the shelling of the Altalena, more than 200 Irgun fighters were arrested on Ben-Gurion's orders. Most of them were released several weeks later, with the exception of five senior commanders (Moshe Hason, Eliyahu Lankin, Yaakov Meridor, Bezalel Amitzur and Hillel Kook), who were detained for more than two months. (They were released, thanks to public pressure, on August 27, 1948).



Years later, on the eve of the Six Day War, in June 1967 (after Ben-Gurion had retired from political activity and Levi Eshkol was Prime Minister), Menahem Begin joined a delegation which visited Sede Boqer in order to ask David Ben-Gurion to return and accept the premiership again. After that meeting, Ben-Gurion said that if he had then known Begin as he did now, the face of history would have been different.

http://www.etzel.org.il/english/ac20.htm

So the history of the Irgun and Lehi fight for Israel ends here. This is my tribute for Chaim and other Jewish heroes. Shalom!

[MassuhDGoodName]

Thank you for a fantastic website link!

Years ago, I read The Struggle by Menachem Begin.

It remains one of the best books I ever read.

Should be required reading.