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The Revolt is Proclaimed.

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Ultra Requete:

--- Quote ---ACTIVITIES IN EUROPE BEFORE WORLD WAR TWO
More than three million Jews, concentrated mainly in the large towns, lived in Poland in the 1930s. In Warsaw, for example, Jews constituted one-third of the population. The Polish government, worried by the increase in Jewish influence in the country, not only did nothing to hinder the illegal immigration movement which the Revisionists organized in Poland, but actively assisted it.

In 1936, Jabotinsky met with the Foreign Minister, Josef Beck, and created the infrastructure for collaboration. The Polish government hoped that the establishment of a Jewish state would lead to mass emigration of Jews, thus solving the Jewish problem in Poland. In November 1937, Avraham Stern (Yair), then secretary of the Irgun General Headquarters, arrived in the Polish capital armed with a letter of recommendation from Jabotinsky. He met with senior government officials and laid the practical foundations for cooperation between the Polish army and the Irgun Zvai Le'umi. Within the framework of this cooperation, Polish army representatives handed over to Irgun representatives weapons and ammunition which had been kept in special ammunition depots. The weapons remained under Polish army supervision until they were despatched to Eretz Israel. Some of the weapons were concealed in the false bottoms of crates in which the furniture of prospective immigrants was transported, or in the drums of electrical machines. When the consignments reached Eretz Israel, they were taken to a safe place, and the weapons were removed from their hiding place.

When in Warsaw Avraham Stern was much helped by Dr. Henryk Strasman, a well known lawyer and an officer in the Polish Reserve force. His wife Alicja (Lilka) was also of great help. The Strasmans introduced Stern to the Polish intellectuals and high officials. It was in their home that the preparations for the publication of the Polish periodical "Jerozolima Wyzwolona" (Free Jerusalem) were begun. It was Lilka who designed the cover - A map of Eretz Israel with the background of an arm holding a gun and the words in Hebrew: "" (This Way Only). This became later the symbol of the Irgun.

In March 25,1939, senior Irgun commanders from Eretz Israel participated in a course held in the Carpathian mountains, instructed by Polish army officers. The course took place under conditions of great secrecy, and the instructors wore civilian clothing. The participants were not permitted to establish contact with local Jews, and the letters they wrote home were sent to Switzerland, inserted in new envelopes, re-addressed to France, and finally posted from there to Palestine. The trainees received military training and were taught tactics of guerilla warfare.


Yaakov Meridor
 
When the course ended, they returned to Eretz Israel, apart from three who remained in Poland: Yaakov Meridor, who was responsible for despatching the weapons received from the Polish army; Shlomo Ben Shlomo, who organized a commanders course for selected members of Irgun cells in Poland (Isaac Raviv was one of the participants), and Zvi Meltzer, who organized a similar course in Lithuania.

The organization of clandestine Irgun cells in Europe had begun a year previously, and was mainly conducted among members of Betar. The plan was to train a cadre of fighters, who would immigrate to Eretz Israel illegally, bringing arms with them, to become a kind of commando corps. Avraham Stern was involved in organizing the Polish cells, and was assisted by Nathan Friedman-Yellin (member of the Irgun commission in Poland) and Shmuel Merlin (General Secretary of the New Zionist Organization in Poland).

The first course for Irgun commanders in Poland was held in the fall of 1938 and was headed by Aharon Heichman (a member of the Irgun General Headquarters), who was sent specially from Palestine for this assignment. Twenty four members of Polish "cells" took part in the course, which was conducted in complete secrecy. The Polish police, whilst aware of what was going on, did not intervene nor did they ask questions about the gunfire heard in the area.

POST-WAR ACTIVITY IN EUROPE
The outbreak of the Second World War, on September 1, 1939, cut short the extensive activity of the Irgun in Poland and Lithuania. Most of the arms which the Irgun had received were returned to the Polish army and Irgun activity ceased.

After the war, the Irgun General Headquarters decided to renew activity in Europe and to launch a "second front". The task was assigned to Yaakov Tavin, who was smuggled there aboard an Italian oil-tanker. The first base was established in Italy, where there were more than a thousand organized Betarites (Betar members), who had arrived with the flood of Jewish refugees from Eastern Europe, Germany and Austria. Among the Betarites were several members of the "cells" the Irgun had established in Poland and Lithuania in the late 1930s, and they formed the nucleus of the Italian branch of the Irgun. Irgun cells were also organized in the British zone in Germany, under Isaac Raviv.

After organization and consolidation, it was decided to commence operational activity, and the first target selected was the British Embassy in Rome. Preparations were protracted, and the planners made every effort to prevent civilian casualties. On the night of October 31, 1946, three young men set out from a pension in the city with two suitcases. They entered a waiting taxi, and drove to the Embassy, which they reached after midnight and unloaded the cases. After setting the time fuse, they propped the two suitcases against the main door of the building and left the area. At 2:46 am, there was a loud explosion and the central section of the building was destroyed. The explosion was heard throughout the city and windows were broken within a radius of one kilometer. The sole casualties were two Italians who had been passing by on their way home from a nearby night club.

The incident made a strong impression throughout the world. The British press reported the incident in detail, and the public was greatly shocked. Emergency measures were adopted in London; security was increased around government ministries, senior politicians were guarded, and orders were given to tighten security in British embassies in European capitals.

As a result of British pressure, the Italian police conducted widespread arrests among Betar members, including Yisrael Epstein, who had arrived several days previously from Palestine on a mission from the Irgun General Headquarters. Some of those arrested were released after interrogation, but others remained in custody for months. Epstein feared that the Italians would hand him over to the British and decided to escape. He used bribes to get drugs smuggled into his cell with which to drug the guards before escaping by rope.

On December 27, 1946, when Epstein believed his guards to be unconscious, he tied a rope to the central heating pipes and dropped the other end out of the window. As he began to climb down, one of the guards woke up and shot him. Severely wounded in the stomach, Epstein died of his injuries the following day.

As a result of the arrests in Italy, Irgun Headquarters in Europe were transferred to Paris. Meanwhile, branches had been set up in various parts of Europe, and attempts were made to strike at British targets, such as the Sacher Hotel in Vienna, the regional British army headquarters. The explosion there caused light damage to the building, but the propaganda impact was considerable. A train transporting British troops was sabotaged, and an explosion occurred in the hotel in Vienna which housed the offices of the British occupation force. However, the blowing up of the British embassy in Rome remained the pinnacle of Irgun operational activity in Europe.

In January, 1947, Eliyahu Lankin reached Paris after his successful escape from internment in Africa. Lankin was a member of the Irgun General Headquarters before his arrest and had also served as commander of the Jerusalem district. The French government, which knew of his escape from British custody, gave him an entry visa, and when he reached Paris he was appointed Commander of the Irgun in Europe.

 Although most of the illegal immigration activity was carried out by the Haganah's Mossad Le'aliyah Bet, Irgun representatives played central roles in several places. Yosef Klarman, who had organized illegal immigration in the 1930s, was sent by the Irgun to Rumania in September, 1944. He succeeded in establishing close contact with the Rumanian authorities, and was even received officially by King Michael and Queen Helena. He became the liaison officer between the Haganah and the authorities, and the central figure in immigration activities. In August, 1947, for example, the Rumanian authorities, under Soviet pressure, prevented the two immigrant vessels, Pan York and Pan Crescent, from leaving Constanza port. It was thanks to Klarman's contacts with the relevant persons in the Rumanian government that the ships were eventually permitted to sail.

Shmuel Ariel, sent to Paris by the Irgun in early 1946, was in charge of immigration. Ariel established good contacts with the French authorities, and the Haganah called on his services extensively in connection with sailings from France. Thus, for example, Ariel succeeded in negotiating with the French Ministry of Interior the granting of 3,000 entry visas to Jewish refugees arriving in France en route to Palestine. Some 650 of them left aboard the Ben Hecht, 940 on the arms vessel Altalena, and the remainder were transferred to a ship organized by the Haganah. Thanks to Ariel's close contacts with the French authorities, the Irgun General Headquarters was permitted to operate in Paris without interruption, and to supervise activity in the many branches all over Europe.

ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
As noted above, the Second World War halted Irgun activity in Europe. Several of the Irgun's emissaries left Europe for the United States and joined the activities of the "American Friends for a Jewish Palestine". The mission in the United States was headed by Hillel Kook (who had been a member of the Irgun General Headquarters in Palestine); the other members were Aryeh Ben-Eliezer, Yitzhak Ben-Ami, Eri Jabotinsky, Alexander Rafaeli and Shmuel Merlin. They launched independent political efforts, initiated a propaganda and information campaign and undertook fundraising activities until the State of Israel was established.

When information on the extent of the Holocaust began to arrive, the mission initiated an information campaign to bring the facts to the knowledge of the public. Full-page advertisements in the leading newspapers appealed for the rescue of European Jewry before it was too late. An "Emergency Committee for the Rescue of European Jewry" was established, with the participation of senators and congressmen, writers and public figures, both Jewish and non-Jewish. The Emergency Committee launched widespread information activities, and initiated an appeal to the President by Congress and the Senate that immediate action be taken to rescue the remnants of European Jewry. The proposal was ratified by the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Senate, and President Roosevelt subsequently issued an administrative order for the establishment of a special national authority to deal with war refugees. An official emissary sent to Turkey was of considerable assistance in the rescue of Rumanian Jewry.

As the Second World War approached its end and a revolt was proclaimed against the British rulers of Palestine, the Irgun mission in the United States announced the establishment of the "Hebrew Committee for National Liberation". The committee engaged in diplomatic efforts and informed the US public of the Irgun's war against the British. The establishment of the committee was announced by Peter Bergson (Hillel Kook) at a press conference in Washington in a building which the mission had purchased from the Iranian Embassy. A Hebrew standard and the US flag were raised with a sign reading "Hebrew Embassy". After the establishment of the State of Israel, the building was donated to the Israeli Embassy in Washington.
--- End quote ---

http://www.etzel.org.il/english/ac16.htm

Ultra Requete:

--- Quote ---The day after the UN resolution of November 29, 1947, seven Jews were killed, including four passengers on a bus attacked by Arabs on the road to Jerusalem. The acts of hostility grew more frequent, and in December 1947, 184 Jews were killed throughout the country. In January 1948, the situation was particularly difficult. On February 1, a car bomb exploded in Hasolel Street (present-day Hahavatzelet Street) near the Palestine Post building. Three weeks later there was another catastrophe in Jerusalem. Three booby-trapped trucks positioned in Ben-Yehuda Street exploded, destroying four large buildings, killing 50 and injuring more than 100. On March 11, a car bomb exploded in the courtyard of the Jewish Agency building, killing 12 people, injuring 44, and causing great damage.

Arab acts of hostility had reached their peak by March, moreover, Arabs now controlled all the inter-urban routes. The road to Jerusalem was blocked, settlements in the Galilee and the Negev were also cut off and daily attacks were perpetrated on convoys. In the four months since the UN resolution, some 850 Jews had been killed throughout the country, most of them in Jerusalem or on the road to the city.

Operation Nachshon was launched on April 6, 1948, with the aim of opening up the road to Jerusalem. The village of Deir Yassin was included on the list of Arab villages to be occupied as part of that operation. Indeed, while fierce fighting was going on at Kastel, Arab reinforcements flooded onto the battlefield through Deir Yassin, which helped to drive back the Jewish occupying force.

When the Haganah command learned of the plan of the Irgun and Lehi to conquer Deir Yassin, David Shaltiel, Haganah Commander in Jerusalem, asked them to coordinate the timing of the operation with the scheduled renewed assault on Kastel. He despatched identical letters to Mordechai Raanan (Irgun Commander in Jerusalem) and Yehoshua Zetler (Lehi Commander in Jerusalem), in which he gave their operation his approval:



To: Shapira (code-name of Zetler)
From: District Commander
I have learned that you intend to carry out an operation against Deir Yassin. I would like to call your attention to the fact that the conquest and continued occupation of Deir Yassin is one of the stages in our overall plan. I have no objection to your carrying out the operation on condition that you are capable of holding on to it. If you are incapable of doing so, I caution you against blowing up the village, since this will lead to the flight of the inhabitants and subsequent occupation of the ruins and the abandoned homes by enemy forces. This will make things difficult rather than contributing to the general campaign, and reoccupation of the site will entail heavy casualties for our men. An additional argument I would like to cite is that if enemy forces are drawn to the place, this will disrupt the plan to establish an aerodrome there.
 


On April 2, 1948, the inhabitants of Deir Yassin began sniping at the Jewish Quarters of Bet Hakerem and Yefe Nof. According to reports by the Shai (Haganah Intelligence), fortifications were being constructed in the village and a large quantity of arms being stockpiled. Several days before the attack on Deir Yassin, the presence of foreign fighters was reported, including Iraqi soldiers and irregular forces. An Arab research study conducted at Bir Zeit University (near Ramallah) relates that the men of Deir Yassin took an active part in violent acts against Jewish targets and that many of the men of the village fought in the battle for Kastel, together with Abd-el-Kadr el-Husseini. The report also stated that trenches had been dug at the entry to the village, and that more than 100 men had been trained and equipped with rifles and Bren guns. A local guard force had been set up and 40 inhabitants guarded the village every night. (Knaana Sherif, The Palestinian villages destroyed in 1948 - Deir Yassin. Bir Zeit University, Documentation and Research Department 1987).

GOING INTO BATTLE
On Thursday, April 8, about 70 Irgun fighters assembled at the Etz Hayim base (at the entrance to Jerusalem). This was the first time that so large a number of underground fighters had gathered openly, without fear of British policemen or soldiers. The atmosphere was optimistic - after four months of attack, retaliation was finally in sight. The fact that two underground movements were acting together enhanced the sense of security and solidarity, and the password chosen was 'Fighting Solidarity' (Ahdut Lohemet).

Raanan, Commander of the Irgun in Jerusalem, opened the meeting and explained that the conquest of Deir Yassin had both military and political objectives. From the military viewpoint, the aim was not only to liberate the western quarters of Jerusalem from the threat of Deir Yassin, but finally to seize the initiative. It was essential to move from defence to attack and to transfer the fighting to enemy territory. The conquest would also raise the morale of the Jewish population of Jerusalem and restore their self-confidence.

Politically speaking, it would represent a change of approach and constitute a turning point in the war: no further retaliation operations, but from that point on conquest with the aim of holding on to an area. The Jewish people and the entire world would realize that the Jews were not going to give up Jerusalem and, if necessary, would take it by force. (It will be recalled that, according to the UN resolution, Jerusalem was to come under international rule). Raanan added that since the operation was an act of conquest and not of reprisal, the fighters had to avoid inflicting needless injury on Arabs. In particular, he cautioned against harming old people, women and children. Moreover, any Arab who surrendered, including combatants, was to be taken prisoner and not harmed in any way.

In order to prevent unnecessary casualties, it had been decided that the strike force would be preceded by an armored car equipped with a loudspeaker, which would enter the village ahead of the troops. The villagers would be informed that the village was surrounded by Irgun and Lehi fighters, and would be exhorted to leave for Ein Karem or to surrender. They would also be informed that the road to Ein Karem was open and safe.

At 2 a.m. the Irgun fighters, commanded by Ben-Zion Cohen (Giora), were driven from the Etz Hayim base to Bet Hakerem. The force moved into the wadi (riverbed), where the squads split up, each squad climbing up the terraced slope to its allotted field of action.

The Lehi unit assembled at Givat Shaul and proceeded from there towards the target. Some of the force advanced behind the armored car which was proceeding along the path towards the center of the village.

Close to 4:45 am, the village guards spotted suspicious movements. One of them called out in Arabic: 'Mahmoud'; an Irgun fighter, mishearing the cry, thought that someone had shouted the password 'Ahdut' (Solidarity) and responded with the second half of the password in Hebrew: 'Lohemet'. The Arabs opened fire and shooting commenced from all sides.

The armored car advanced along the path and, on reaching the outskirts of the village, encountered a trench and was forced to come to a halt. The loudspeaker was switched on and the message was read out. Heavy fire was directed at the armored car from the adjacent houses and the fighters trapped inside had to be rescued. Injuries were reported, and a first-aid unit set out from Givat Shaul towards the armored car.

The other units began their attack, but Arab resistance was strong, and every house became an armed fortress. Fierce fighting was conducted from house to house. Many of the attackers were injured in the first onslaught, including a number of commanders who had been advancing ahead of their units.

After the center of the village had been occupied, all the wounded were concentrated in one of the courtyards and ways were sought to evacuate them. It turned out that the road to Givat Shaul was impassable because of gunfire from the mukhtar's (local leader) house, which stood on a hilltop overlooking the area.

Since the fighting was taking place in a built-up area, the pace was slow, and both sides suffered heavy losses. In order to silence the source of gunfire, the fighters were forced to use hand-grenades, and in some cases even to blow up houses. There was firing from all sides and half the attackers were put out of action. On top of this, the remaining fighters suffered a shortage of ammunition.

A report on the course of the battle was transmitted by courier to headquarters at Givat Shaul. When word started coming in about the number of casualties and ammunition shortage, several Lehi people went to the Schneller camp and asked a Palmach unit to come to the attackers aid. After receiving the consent of the brigade HQ, the Palmach troops set out in an armored car, equipped with a machine-gun and a two-inch mortar. On arrival in the village, they fired several shells and machine-gun rounds at the mukhtar's house. At that very moment, without prior co-ordination with the Palmach, Yosef Avni charged and captured the mukhtar's house. With the mukhtar's house occupied, firing ceased and the occupation of the village was completed.

When the fighting was over, it was discovered that hundreds of villagers had retreated to Ein Karem, taking advantage of the fact that the road was open. Those who remained in the village surrendered and were taken prisoner. The prisoners, mostly women and children, were loaded onto trucks and taken to East Jerusalem, where they were handed over to their Arab brethren.



Deir Yassin - The Village After the Attack
Word of the occupation of Deir Yassin spread through the city, and was viewed positively by the Jews of Jerusalem. Not only could the Jewish residents of the western quarters now breath freely, but they felt proud to have finally taken the initiative. The capture of the village marked the completion of the breakthrough of Operation Nachshon, and instilled new hope in the hearts of Jerusalemites. The slogan 'Ahdut Lohemet', which had grabbed the attention of the Jewish community in Jerusalem, reflected the turning point in the response to Arab aggression. In the days that followed, crowds flocked to the Etz Hayim base to express their solidarity with the Irgun fighters.

FACTS AND COMMENTARIES
So much has been written and said about what happened at Deir Yassin that the battle waged on the morning of April 9 has become known as the 'Deir Yassin Massacre'. It is important to analyze the events and to distinguish between fact and fiction.

Massacre means the killing of defenceless people. The 1929 slaughter of the Jews of Hebron by Arabs in the middle of the night was a massacre. When Arab workers at the Haifa refinieries assailed their Jewish co-workers in February 1948, murdering more than 40 of them, a massacre can be said to have taken place. In both cases, the killings were premeditated. The brutal murder of settlers at Kfar Etzion by Arab Legion soldiers in May 1948, after the defenders had surrendered and were defenceless, was also a massacre.

But Deir Yassin?
Firstly, strict orders were given in advance to the fighters not to harm the elderly, women and children. It was also stated explicitly that any Arab who surrendered was to be taken prisoner.

Secondly, an unprecedented action took place at Deir Yassin - a loudspeaker was installed on an armored car to inform the population that the road to Ein Karem was open and safe, and that whoever left the village would not be harmed. The strike force was actually prepared to forfeit the surprise element of battle in order to issue these instructions and thus to prevent Arab civilian casualty.

The Arabs do not deny the use of a loudspeaker; indeed, an Arab League publication entitled "Israeli Aggression" states, inter alia:


"On the night of April 9, 1948, the peaceful Arab village of Deir Yassin was surprised by a loudspeaker, which called on the population to evacuate it immediately." 


Thirdly, it is universally agreed that there was bitter fighting at Deir Yassin. More than 100 Arab fighters were well equipped and had large amounts of ammunition. The Arabs occupied fortified positions in stone buildings, while the attackers were exposed to enemy fire. The fierce gunfire directed from the houses forced the attackers to charge, throw grenades and, in several cases, to blow up houses. As a consequence, women and children were among the dead.

According to all the documents and testimonies, it is clear today that fewer than one hundred Arabs were killed at Deir Yassin, and not the 240 as published. Moreover, this was the first instance in the War of Independence where battle had taken place in a built-up area, and such fighting typically claims numerous victims. For the same reason, the number of Irgun and Lehi members injured by Arab fire was 35% of the force (5 dead and 35 wounded).

All the Arab casualties were killed in the course of the fighting. Villagers - men, women and children - who surrendered, were taken prisoner and came to no harm. When the firing ceased, they were transported by truck to East Jerusalem and handed over to their Arab brethren.

The Deir Yassin affair had a strong impact on the course of the War of Independence; the battle was summed up as follows in the "History of the War of Independence", prepared by the History Division of the IDF General Staff:

 The Deir Yassin affair was publicized throughout the world as the 'Deir Yassin Massacre', causing great harm to the reputation of the Yishuv. All the Arab propaganda channels disseminated the story at the time, and continue to do so to the present day. But the battle indubitably served to expedite the collapse of the Arab hinterland in the period which followed. More than the deed itself, this was achieved by the publicity it received from Arab spokesmen. They wanted to demonstrate to their people the savagery of the Jews and to instill in them a spirit of religious fervor. In fact, however, they intimidated and alarmed them. They themselves now admit their mistake. 


Hazen Nusseibeh, an editor of the Palestine Broadcasting Service's Arabic news in 1948, was interviewed for the BBC television series "Israel and the Arabs: the 50-year conflict." He describes an encounter with Deir Yassin survivors and Palestinian leaders, including Hussein Khalidi, the secretary of the Arab Higher Committee, at the Jaffa Gate of Jerusalem's Old City.

 "I asked Dr. Khalidi how we should cover the story," recalled Nusseibeh, now living in Amman. He said, "We must make the most of this". So we wrote a press release stating that at Deir Yassin children were murdered, pregnant women were raped. All sorts of atrocities." 



A Deir Yassin survivor, identified as Abu Mahmud, said the villagers protested at the time. 
"We said, 'there was no rape.' Khalidi said, 'We have to say this, so the Arab armies will come to liberate Palestine from the Jews'." 


In an arlicle "Deir Yassin a casualty of guns and propaganda", by Paul Holmes (Reuters) (http://www.metimes.com/issue98-16/reg/deir.html) he interviewing Mohammed Radwan, who was a resident of Deir Yassi in 1948, and fought for several hours before ruing out of bullets.

 "I know when I speak that God is up there and God knows the truth and God will not forgive the liars", said Radwan, who puts the number of villagers killed at 93, listed in his own handwriting. "There were no rapes. It's all lies. There were no pregnant women who were slit open. It was propaganda that... Arabs put out so Arab the armies would invade" he said. "They ended up expelling people from all of Palestine on the rumor of Deir Yassin." 


In the book "War Without End", by Anton La Guardia (Thomas Dunne Books, N.Y. 2000) we find the following: "Just before Israel's 50th anniversary celebration, I went to Deir Yassin with Ayish Zeidan, known as Haj Ayish, who had lived in the village as a teenager.

 'We heard shooting. My mother did not want us to look out of the window. I fled with my sister, but my mother and my other sisters could not make it. They hid in the cellar for four days and then ran away.' 


He said he never believed that more than 110 people had died at Deir Yassin, and accused Arab leaders of exaggerating the atrocities.

 'There had been no rape', he said. 'The Arab radio at the time talked of women being killed and raped, but this is not true. I believe that most of those who were killed were among the fighters and the women and children who helped the fighters.' " 
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http://www.etzel.org.il/english/ac17.htm
 

Ultra Requete:

--- Quote ---Jaffa, with a population of 90,000, was the largest Arab town in Palestine, and had a long and twisting border with its neighbor, Tel Aviv. When hostilities broke out on the morning of November 29, 1947, Arab snipers fired repeatedly at the Jewish quarters along the border, and succeeded in immobilizing considerable sections of the Jewish city. In the first five months following the UN resolution, the number of Jewish mortalities amounted to dozens, with hundreds injured. Thousands of Jewish refugees, forced to abandon their homes, were billetted in schools and public buildings. The sniping and the bombardments not only led to the evacuation of the population of the southern suburbs, but also required the deployment of large forces in the defence of Tel Aviv.



 
By April, 1948, it was clear that once the British left the country, Egypt would join the struggle against the emergent Jewish State. According to the partition scheme, Jaffa was to be part of the Arab state, and could be used by the Egyptian army as their base. In view of its proximity to Tel Aviv and the possibility of attack, the Haganah drew up a plan for the encirclement of Jaffa by occupying Arab villages to the south of the town (Abu Kabir, Jebeliyeh and Tel Arish). It was assumed that this strategy would lead to the surrender of Jaffa, but there was still the potentiality of Egyptian infiltrating Jaffa from the sea. To foil this possibility, and to free up forces for other battle-fronts, the Irgun General Headquarters decided to capture Jaffa prior to the British evacuation.

The decision also made political sense. By incorporating Jaffa into the State of Israel, its political independence would thus be precluded. The British, for their part, left a military force in Jaffa which was supposed to hand the town over to the Arabs at the appointed time.

On Saturday, April 24, 1948, 600 Irgun fighters assembled at Dov Camp in Ramat Gan. It was the first time that so large a force had gathered openly, and it was evident that a large-scale operation was afoot. After the weapons and equipment had been allocated a parade was held at which the Irgun Commander, Menachem Begin, appeared publicly for the first time. In a brief speech, he said:


[...] Soldiers of the Irgun!
We are going to conquer Jaffa. We are setting out on one of the decisive battles in the struggle for Israel's independence.
Know who stands before you, remember who you have left behind. You face a cruel foe, who wishes to destroy us. Behind you are our parents, our brethren, our children.
Strike at the foe! Aim well! Spare ammunition! In this battle, show no mercy to the enemy, as he knows none towards our people. Spare women and children. Spare the life of anyone who raises his hands in surrender. He is your captive. Do not harm him... 

He was followed by Amichai Paglin (Gidi), operations officer of the Irgun, and commander of the entire operation. He outlined the operation strategy and explained that before the strike, mortar gunners would fire thousands of 3" shells. The company commanders commenced the detailed briefing, and the fighters boarded the vehicles in an elated mood.


Amichai Paglin (Gidi)
 
The operation was due to begin at night, but since deployment of forces was still continuing, the attack began in the early hours of April 25. The mortar gunners commenced heavy shelling of the center of Jaffa and the port area, and shortly afterwards two companies moved towards the pre-designated targets: one towards the railway tracks and the other towards the sea. The two forces encountered heavy fire from Arab fighters entrenched in the ruined buildings. After bitter fighting, in which the Arabs had superior firing power, the two companies retreated to their base. A debriefing at operational headquarters revealed that the size and strength of the enemy force had been underestimated. It was decided to send out sappers to blow up enemy positions, whereupon an infantry unit would occupy the liberated positions.

The units set out again the following morning, but this time too they failed to achieve their objective. They encountered fierce machine-gun fire, supported this time by anti-tank weapons brought in by the British. The sappers succeeded in blowing up several enemy positions, but the infantry units failed to take them. Meanwhile, the bombardment continued and, in an atmosphere of terror and chaos, there was a mass exodus of the town's inhabitants by land and sea.

That day, April 26, 1948, an agreement was signed between the Irgun and the Haganah, according to which the Irgun would implement only such actions as had been previously approved by the Haganah, and would carry out operations assigned to it by the Haganah's supreme command.

The senior command held discussions at the end of the second day of the fighting where it was reported that the growing number of casualties was a direct result of the intervention of the British. Begin summed up by saying:

Were it not for the British tanks and armored cars, we could have achieved the full objective of the attack. But the tanks are there, and we cannot ignore their presence. Under these conditions, it is no disgrace to halt the attack. We will hold on to the line we have reached, and leave a strong vanguard force there in anticipation of future action. The other units will be withdrawn from this front, where they can do no good. 



Menachem Begin
 
Several of the commanders who took part in the discussion supported this proposal. Others, headed by Gidi, argued that the enemy was about to collapse, and that fighting should continue. Begin's opinion was nevertheless taken as an order to halt the fighting, but it encountered fierce resistance when it reached the fighters, who insisted on another attempt. Begin subsequently "surrendered" to the wishes of the troops, and the order to retreat was revoked.

On the third day of fighting, Gidi changed his tactics. Since it was clear that the fighters could not advance along the roads and alleyways exposed to enemy fire, it was decided to advance through the interior of houses by breaching their outside walls. A decision was taken to blow up large buildings to check the progress of the British, who had joined in the combat. To facilitate advance through open terrain, barriers made of sandbags were constructed. During the morning, thousands of sandbags were brought to the front, as well as drills and pick-axes to break down walls. The mortar gunners launched a heavy bombardment, and in the afternoon the onslaught began. The objective of the fighting, which lasted all day and night, was to cross the Arab quarter of Manshiyeh and cut it off from the town. The force captured position after position, and once Manshiyeh police station had been taken, Arab resistance collapsed. The fighters then encountered the British, who attempted to block their advance. Despite this unexpected intervention, the force managed to advance within Manshiyeh and by 7 am. the first fighters had reached the sea. This marked the end of the battle for Manshiyeh.



Comming back from Manshiyeh after the battle
Once Manshiyeh had been taken, total chaos reigned throughout the town. The mass exodus was at its height now and the British army assumed full responsibility for the defence of Jaffa. Reinforcements from Cyprus and Malta arrived, and British vessels were ready in waiting off the Tel Aviv shore. The British governor of Lydda district informed Israel Rokach, Mayor of Tel Aviv, that if the Irgun did not stop the fighting, the city would be shelled by tanks on land, and bombarded by ships offshore and by RAF aircraft. The ultimatum was ignored by the Irgun command, and the following morning the British began to shell the Alliance school area, where the Irgun headquarters were located. At the same time, British tanks and armored cars moved towards Manshiyeh, and directed heavy fire at the newly-occupied area.

This was the first occasion on which the Irgun fought the British directly. Despite the clear superiority of the British artillery and armor, the Irgun fighters battled courageously and refused to retreat. Senior commanders went into battle at the head of their troops, and held up the British armored force by blowing up houses and scattering the debris on the roads and alleys.

While the battle was raging, the Irgun command announced that if the British bombardment did not cease, the Irgun would direct its mortar fire at the German Colony in Jaffa, where the British garrison was located. In addition, the command announced that it was capable of shelling the remaining British army camps and inflicting casualties on the British on the eve of their departure from the country.

Hasan Bek
 
The Lydda district governor then informed Rokach that the British were no longer insisting on total evacuation of Manshiyeh by Jewish forces, and demanded that the police station be cleared of Irgun fighters and restored to them, that Hassan Bek Street be evacuated to ensure free movement for British vehicles, and that the Irgun handed over to the Haganah the positions it had occupied in Manshiyeh.

Instead of responding to British demands to withdraw from the police station, the Irgun command sent sappers to blow it up. Blocks of houses were also demolished, and the resulting debris obstructed the road to Tel Aviv. The Irgun then announced that it agreed to hand the positions over to the Haganah forces.

On Tuesday night, after the fall of Manshiyeh, the Haganah launched Operation Hametz, with the objective of occupying villages south of Jaffa. In one of these villages, Tel Arish, the Arabs counter-attacked and the Haganah was forced to retreat after suffering heavy losses (33 dead and some 100 wounded). The next day, the Haganah requested that Irgun mortars shell Tel Arish so that the wounded could be brought out under cover of fire. Having completed this task, the Irgun went on to despatch another of its mortar units to shell the village of Salameh, which it then occupied.

On May 12, a deputation of Arab notables from Jaffa arrived at Haganah headquarters in Tel Aviv and, after negotiations, signed a surrender agreement. The next morning, May 13, 1948, the last British troops left Jaffa. The same afternoon, a convoy of Haganah and Irgun fighters advanced towards Jaffa, led by an Irgun armored car requisitioned from the British. At the entrance to Jaffa they were greeted by the "Emergency Committee", accompanied by Arab notables who had remained in the town. Martial law was proclaimed in Jaffa, and a joint Haganah-Irgun command was established.

The human cost of conquering Jaffa was heavy: 32 dead (half in battle against the British) and 77 wounded. In addition, 9 Irgun fighters were killed in the defence of Tel Aviv.

THE IRGUN-HAGANAH AGREEMENT
Shortly after the UN resolution of November 29, 1947, the Jewish Agency Executive decided to respond to the Irgun proposal and to conduct negotiations on co-operation. The discussions were difficult and exhausting, particularly in light of the resistance of David Ben-Gurion and his labor party Mapai to any form of agreement. At a press conference he held shortly before the Jewish Agency decision, Ben-Gurion said:

There are no negotiations with dissidents nor will there be. If the dissidents disband their organizations and hand over their weapons, each of them individually can volunteer for the defence of the Yishuv like any other Jew, and if he is found suitable, he will be accepted into the ranks. 


Even before the negotiations were concluded, local arrangements for co-operation were being made between Irgun and Haganah combatants in response to the upsurge of Arab aggression.

At the beginning of April, 1948, the Zionist Organization Executive convened to discuss, among other items, an agreement with the Irgun. After a bitter debate, it ratified the agreement. The following are the details of the agreement:


a. Irgun positions will be subject to the authority of the Haganah officer commanding the front, who will convey his instructions to them through a commander appointed by the Irgun.
b. Plans for assault on Front A (Arab) and plans for reprisals on Front B (British) will require prior approval. Details, as regards object and time, will be clarified at personal meetings between representatives and experts. The Irgun will also be ready to carry out operations assigned to it.

c. Irgun members will be bound by the principle of resistance to British attempts to disarm them. Under special circumstances, Irgun members in defensive positions will take into consideration the situation of nearby Haganah positions.

d. The Irgun will be free to raise funds, both in Israel and in the Diaspora, and the Jewish Agency will confirm that they do not allocate funds to the Irgun

e. Plans for arms acquisition will be drawn up after joint consultation and will be implemented by mutual agreement.

f. Before this basic arrangement becomes operative, certain details remain to be clarified. This will be done by representatives and experts from the Irgun and from the Haganah.
 

The meeting between the experts was delayed, and took place only on April 26, the second day of the assault on Jaffa. The agreement was binding from then on.

The agreement was intended to establish a working relationship between the two organisations in the period leading up to the establishment of the Jewish state. The Irgun had proclaimed earlier that once the state came into being, it would lay down its weapons within state territory, and its members would join the national armed forces. Jerusalem, which was to come under international rule under the auspices of the United Nations, was a different matter. The Irgun would continue to exist in Jerusalem as an independent organization until the city became a part of the State of Israel.
--- End quote ---
http://www.etzel.org.il/english/ac18.htm
 

Ultra Requete:

--- Quote ---According to the UN resolution of November 29, 1947, Jerusalem was not to be included in the Jewish state, but was to come under international rule under UN auspices. The Irgun General Headquarters, which objected strongly to the internationalization of Jerusalem, decided that it would continue to exist there even after it had disarmed within the borders of the Jewish state. The role of the Irgun would be to fight any foreign force which ruled Jerusalem, and to take part in the defence of the Jewish community against Arab attack.

On April 13, 1948, a day before the British left Jerusalem, Mordechai Raanan (Irgun district commander) initiated a meeting with David Shaltiel (Haganah district commander). At that meeting, Raanan told Shaltiel that his sense of responsibility for the fate of Jerusalem had motivated him to place the Irgun units under the Haganah's unified command, whilst retaining organizational autonomy. Shaltiel went on to outline "Operation Kilshon" (Pitchfork), the military action planned to take place after the British departure.


Security zone
 
The operation had two objectives: the first, to seize buildings belonging to Jews, which had been commandeered by the British in order to establish security zones (known as Bevingrads). The second objective was to create territorial continuity with the isolated Jewish suburbs. The plan, essentially defensive, was intended to preserve existing gains and to defend the Jewish community in Jerusalem.

On the morning of Friday, May 14, 1948, the British evacuated Jerusalem in two convoys: the first moved north towards Haifa, while the second moved south towards Bethlehem, Hebron and Rafiah. The departure of the two convoys marked the end of thirty years of British rule in Jerusalem.

OPERATION KILSHON
Immediately after the last British soldiers had left the city, Irgun fighters took over the vacant Generali building on the corner of Jaffa and Shlomzion Hamalka streets. After raising the national flag above the statue of the winged lion on the roof of the building, they turned towards the Russian Compound, where the CID (the British intelligence) and central prison were located. Several members of the Irgun force had been incarcerated there as members of the underground and felt particular satisfaction in returning there as victors.

The next assignment was to seize the Police Academy north of the city, overlooking the road to Mount Scopus. The camp was attacked by three spearheads, the barbed wire fence cut, and the fighters entered the camp where they uncovered an arsenal of ammunition and considerable quantities of fuel. Immediately after taking the camp, the force continued its advance towards the Arab quarter of Upper Sheikh Jarrah. Several hours later, this too was occupied and the road to Mount Scopus was opened to traffic.

While the Irgun was operating in the Police Academy and in Sheikh Jarrah, Haganah units were active in establishing contact with the isolated Jewish quarters in the south of Jerusalem.

Five days later, in May 19, 1948, the Arab Legion (the army of Jordan) attacked Jerusalem and took over the Police Academy and Sheikh Jarrah.



Irgun soldiers marching
THE BATTLE FOR RAMAT RACHEL
The Egyptian army invaded the country shortly after the British departure, reaching the Arab town of Ashdod unimpeded. A branch of the column turned towards Be'er Sheva, and continued from there to Hebron, halting at Bethlehem. At the time, an Arab Legion unit which had guarded the British withdrawal from Jerusalem was also stationed in the Hebron area. In addition to the Egyptian and Legion units, there were also irregular forces in the area, trained and armed by Arab Legion officers. The Egyptian army intended to attack Jerusalem from the south, but first had to capture Kibbutz Ramat Rachel, which commanded the road linking Bethlehem to Jerusalem.

The first attack on Ramat Rachel took place on May 22. The kibbutz members could not withstand the heavy shelling, and after several attacks retreated to the nearby suburb of Talpiot. The Arabs then entered the kibbutz and began looting. Towards evening, a unit from the Moriah battalion of the Haganah arrived, liberated the kibbutz and returned to its base, leaving the newly-returned kibbutz members to defend their home.

The story was repeated the following day. After heavy shelling and automatic weapon fire, the kibbutzniks again retreated. The Arabs entered the kibbutz and continued their looting. In the evening, Haganah reinforcements again arrived, stormed the area and recaptured it from the Arabs. When they left, they were replaced by two Irgun platoons, under Yehuda Lapidot (Nimrod), and a reinforced Haganah squad.

The large-scale military offensive took place the next day, May 24th. In the morning hours, the kibbutz was shelled by mortar and cannon, and then the onslaught began. An Egyptian armed column, consisting of 9 armored cars and one tank, advanced from the west (from the direction of Mar Elias monastery), while a company of the Arab Legion attacked from the east (from the direction of Zur Baher). The Egyptian armored column advanced close to the kibbutz, commanding the road linking Ramat Rachel to the suburbs of Arnona and Talpiot. The defenders were besieged and totally surrounded by enemy forces. Fighting was fierce and the number of casualties grew, but the defenders fought courageously and refused to surrender even after fifty percent of their force had been injured. The battle raged until the evening. When night fell, the armored column withdrew, and a Haganah force arrived to an emotional welcome.



Ramat Rachel
It should be noted that the fighters who defended Ramat Rachel had no anti-tank weapons and were equipped only with Sten guns and rifles. Their heaviest weapon was a Lewis machine-gun, which had been in British service during the First World War.

The next day, the Jewish Agency spokesman announced that the Egyptian onslaught on south Jerusalem had been checked, and that "the Irgun had displayed great heroism". David Shaltiel went further and noted that, by checking the Egyptian attack, the Irgun had saved southern Jerusalem. The heroism of the Irgun fighters at Ramat Rachel was also noted in a special order of the day of the Irgun commander in chief and the district commander.

THE JEWISH QUARTER OF THE OLD CITY
 The heroic struggle of the defenders of the Jewish Quarter, who fought against a superior enemy force, will not be discussed in the present context. (For a detailed account, see Aharon Liron: 'The Old City of Jerusalem in Siege and Battle'; Yehuda Lapidot: 'Upon Thy Walls').

The following is a brief description of the role of the Irgun in the battle for the Jewish Quarter.

The fighting in the Old City began immediately after the UN resolution of November 29, 1947. The Jewish Quarter was placed under siege and provisions were brought in by convoys escorted by the British army. In order to restore calm, the British brought a company of troops into the Old City to keep Jews and Arabs apart. After several months of fighting, the Irgun commander of the Jewish Quarter, Isser Nathanson (Gideon), initiated contact with the Haganah commander to discuss combining forces and drawing up a formal agreement between the two organizations.

On May 4 an agreement was signed in Jerusalem, according to which the Irgun force in the Old City accepted the authority of the Haganah commander and agreed to carry out his orders. After the signing, 44 Irgun and Lehi fighters joined with some 70 Haganah fighters to form the joint fighting force of the Jewish Quarter. It should be recalled that, in addition to the fighters, there were some 1,700 civilians in the Old City (most of them old people, women and children).

Arab pressure on the Quarter increased subsequent to the British departure. The number of casualties among the defenders grew and ammunition was seriously depleted. When the stock of grenades began to run out, Gideon decided to manufacture grenades in the Quarter itself. He approached Yitzhak Aharonov, an Irgun commander in charge of the improvised arms factory. He recruited the aid of several of the teachers who had arrived in the Quarter with the last convoy, and who had been left in the rear because there were no weapons left for them. A group of young boys went from house to house collecting cans, and the teachers filled them with nails and gelignite. A detonator ending in a match-head, and attached to a time fuse, was then inserted into the gelignite. In the course of the combat in the Old City, the factory manufactured more than 2,500 of these grenades, enabling the fighters to hold out much longer than they would otherwise have been able.

When the Arab Legion force entered the Old City, the situation deteriorated. Several fruitless attempts were made to bring in reinforcements. On May 28, 1948, when all hope had been lost, the two rabbis of the Quarter went out to negotiate the conditions of surrender.

One hundred and eighty fighters and civilians lay wounded in hospital when the Legion captured the Jewish Quarter. Abdullah el Tel (Commander of the Legion force) ordered that the remaining fighters be rounded up and held apart from the civilians. In all, thirty five lined up in front of him. An amazed el Tel was prompted to remark: "You deceived me. If I had known your numbers, I would have fought you with sticks".

On the evening of the same day, the inhabitants of the Jewish Quarter were transferred to the new sector of the city. The fighters were taken prisoner and sent to a camp in Transjordan.

This marked the end of the heroic struggle of the defenders of the Jewish Quarter of the Old City.

THE FIRST TRUCE
A four-week truce proclaimed on June 11th was greeted with relief by the people of Jerusalem, both civilians and soldiers. The soldiers, particularly those serving in combat units, were exhausted by the heavy fighting and traumatized by the deaths of comrades. Their situation had been made all the more stressful by the constant shortage of weapons and fighters. Civilians emerged from their shelters and enthusiastically greeted the convoys loaded with food. The shelling, which had exacted so heavy a toll on civilian life, was finally over, and there was a general sense of optimism that life in Jerusalem would return to normal.

During the four weeks of truce, weapons, medical equipment, manpower and food flooded into Jerusalem. The Irgun also received weapons and ammunition from the coastal plain. Military bases, dispersed throughout the city, were now united and concentrated in the Katamon quarter of Jerusalem. The battalion was re-organized and its troops underwent intensive training, in readiness for a resumption of hostilities.

The battalion, known as Battalion 6, was commanded by Nathan Germant (Shimshon), who had recently returned from African exile. His deputy was Yehoshua Brandeis-Cohen (Elitzur). Menahem Shiff (Zeev) was operations officer and Yehiel Ohev-Ami (Ido) the adjutant. The battalion consisted of three combat companies: No. 1, under Yehuda Lapidot (Nimrod); No. 2, under Zvi Koenig (Yishai), and No. 3, under Eliezer Sodit-Sharon (Kabtzan). There was also a mortar company under David Brisk (Baruch or Chunky), a company of women commanded by Emma Germant (Avigail), and a junior company commanded by Pinchas Tuchman (Ron).



OPERATION KEDEM
After the first truce, which lasted four weeks, the balance of power in Jerusalem shifted drastically. The Jews had received reinforcements of weapons and fighters, whilst the opposite had occurred in the Arab forces. The Jewish force was now much stronger than the Arab force, morale was high and an onslaught was scheduled to begin on July 8, 1948.

Irgun representatives met with David Shaltiel and proposed that the attack on the Old City be launched forthwith. Shaltiel, eager to delay an attack, asked that the Irgun first capture the Arab village of Malha, promising an operation to liberate the Old City thereafter. In the early morning hours of July 14, Malha was duly attacked. By dawn, the village was occupied, but several hours later the Arabs launched a counter-attack, seizing one of the fortified positions and inflicting numerous casualties. When Irgun reinforcements arrived, the Arabs retreated and Malha was restored to Jewish control. The Irgun had lost 17 of its fighters and many more were wounded.

Several days later, Shaltiel summoned the Irgun representatives and outlined his plan to attack the Old City from three directions: the Beit Horon battalion of the Israel Defence Forces would strike from Mount Zion; an Irgun battalion would break through the New Gate (opposite Notre Dame), and a Lehi unit would break through the wall between the New Gate and Jaffa Gate. The attack was scheduled for Friday, July 16 at 8pm, and was to be completed by 5:45 the next morning, when the second truce was due to begin. Shaltiel added that if the exchange of fire continued, the battle would go on and there would be no truce.

The plan went awry from the outset. The zero hour was postponed, first to 11pm, then to midnight and then indefinitely. Finally, at 2:30am, the order was given to set out. The Irgun unit succeeded in breaking through the New Gate, but the other forces failed in their missions. At 5:45am Shaltiel's headquarters gave the order to retreat and the forces were ordered to cease hostilities.

CONCLUSION
With the beginning of the 'second truce', the war in Jerusalem effectively came to an end. A new situation prevailed in the city - the western section was now in Jewish hands, while eastern Jerusalem was under Arab rule. The plan for the internationalization of Jerusalem had come to nothing; it was clear that incorporation of the western sector of the city into the State of Israel was only a question of time. Irgun leaders consequently started negotiations with Yitzhak Greenboim (Minister of the Interior in the Provisional Government) for the co-opting of the Jerusalem Battalion into the IDF. It was agreed that the Irgun in Jerusalem would disband and its fighters would enlist in the IDF.

Count Bernadotte, the UN emissary, had meanwhile arrived in the country in an attempt to find a solution to the Jewish-Arab dispute. He did not consider himself bound by the UN resolution of November 29, and proposed a scheme of his own, each clause of which was unacceptable to the Jews. Among other things, the scheme proposed that unlimited immigration be permitted for only two years, whereafter it would become conditional on Arab consent. It also proposed that the Negev, in part or in its entirety, be included in the Arab state, and that, in exchange, western Galilee be part of the Jewish state.

Bernadotte's proposals aroused a storm of protest amongst the Jewish public in Israel. The Lehi, which considered him a national threat, planned and duly carried out his assassination on Friday, September 17, 1948. Ben-Gurion decided to exploit public outrage at this act and the following day an IDF force raided Lehi camps in Jerusalem. Lehi was proclaimed an illegal organization and many of its members were arrested by the security forces.

Several days later, on September 20, an ultimatum was issued to the Irgun to the effect that:


All members of the Irgun eligible for enlistment must enlist in the IDF.
All weapons must be handed over to the IDF.
[...]
If, in the specified period (twenty four hours) you do not respond to the demands of the government, the army will take action with all the means at its disposal. 

Two hours before the ultimatum lapsed, the Irgun heads convened a press conference, where they gave details of the negotiations with Greenboim. They explained that the Irgun was strong enough to repel any attack on its bases, but for reasons of patriotism, would not do so. They concluded:


In response to the ultimatum submitted to us yesterday, we hereby announce that, taking into consideration the threat of the use of force, and our desire to avoid shedding Jewish blood as a result of the execution of this threat, we accept the ultimatum. The Irgun Zvai Le'umi will disband in accordance with the Provisional Government's demands in a manner which will be determined between us and the commander of the IDF brigade in Jerusalem. 

From the day the British evacuated Jerusalem, the Irgun's fighting units were active in the defence of the city. The Irgun non fighting unit (Otzaron) built fortifications and the junior company carried out liaison missions and sometimes took part in combat. Dozens of Irgun fighters were killed in battle and more than one hundred were injured. The Irgun's contribution to the defence of Jerusalem far exceeded its relative proportion of the fighting force.
--- End quote ---

http://www.etzel.org.il/english/ac19.htm

Ultra Requete:

--- Quote ---The Altalena, purchased by Irgun members abroad, was originally intended to reach Israel on May 15, 1948, loaded with fighters and military equipment. Weapons purchase and organizational matters took longer than expected, however, and the sailing was postponed for several weeks. Meanwhile, on June 1st, an agreement had been signed for the absorption of the Irgun into the IDF and one of the clauses stated that the Irgun had to cease all independent arms acquisition activities. Consequently, representatives of the Israel Government were informed about the ship and its sailing schedule.

The Irgun headquarters in Paris did their best to keep the Altalena's preparations for departure a secret, but it was difficult to conceal the movement of 940 fighters and the loading of a large quantity of arms and ammunition. It was feared that if the plans were discovered, attempts might be made to sabotage the Altalena at sea. For this reason, when it raised anchor on June 11th, no cable was sent to the Irgun command in Israel, for fear that it would fall into the wrong hands. These precautionary measures proved fruitless, however, and the following day Radio London reported that the Altalena had sailed from Port-de-Bouc (France) in the direction of Israel with 1,000 Jewish volunteers and a large quantity of weapons on board.

It should be recalled that the first truce had begun on June 11th. When the Irgun leaders in Israel learned through the broadcast of the embarkation of the vessel, they feared that this breach of the truce conditions (i.e. the ban on bringing military equipment and fighters into the country) would be revealed. Menahem Begin decided therefore to postpone the arrival of the ship, and the Irgun staff secretary, Zippora Levi-Kessel, sent a wireless message to the Altalena to stay put and await orders. A similar cable was sent to Shmuel Katz (member of the General Headquarters), who was then in Paris, but contact with the ship was poor and the message was not understood.

On June 15th, Begin and his comrades held a meeting with government representatives, at which Begin announced that the ship had sailed without his knowledge and that he wanted to hold consultations on how to proceed. In his diary for June 16th, Ben-Gurion wrote the following about the meeting:



Yisrael [Galili] and Skolnik [Levi Eshkol] met yesterday with Begin. Tomorrow or the next day their ship is due to arrive: 4,500 tons, bringing 800-900 men, 5,000 rifles, 250 Bren guns, 5 million bullets, 50 Bazoukas, 10 Bren carriers. Zipstein (director of Tel Aviv port) assumes that at night it will be possible to unload it all. I believe we should not endanger Tel Aviv port. They should not be sent back. They should be disembarked at an unknown shore. 

Galili informed Begin of Ben-Gurion's consent to the landing of the ship, adding a request that it be done as fast as possible. Zippora Levi-Kessel then wirelessed the vessel to come in at full speed. The following day, a working meeting was held between Irgun representatives and Ministry of Defence personnel. While the Irgun proposed directing the Altalena to Tel Aviv beach, Ministry of Defence representatives claimed that the Kfar Vitkin beach was preferable, since it would be easier to evade UN observers there. The ship was therefore instructed to make for Kfar Vitkin.

Whilst there was agreement on the anchoring place of the Altalena, there were differences of opinion about the allocation of the cargo. Ben-Gurion agreed to Begin's initial request that 20% of the weapons be despatched to the Jerusalem Battalion. His second request, however, that the remainder be transferred to the IDF to equip the newly-incorporated Irgun battalions, was rejected by the Government representatives, who interpreted the request as a demand to reinforce an 'army within an army'. This was far from Begin's intention; rather, he saw it as a question of honor that the fighters enlist in the IDF fully-equipped.

The Altalena reached Kfar Vitkin in the late afternoon of Sunday, June 20th. Among the Irgun members waiting on the shore was Menahem Begin, who greeted the arrivals with great emotion. After the passengers had disembarked, members of the fishing village of Michmoret helped unload the cargo of military equipment. Concomitantly with the events at Kfar Vitkin, the government had convened in Tel Aviv for its weekly meeting. Ben-Gurion reported on the meetings which had preceded the arrival of the Altalena, and was adamant in his demand that Begin surrender and hand over of all the weapons:

 We must decide whether to hand over power to Begin or to order him to cease his separate activities. If he does not do so, we will open fire! Otherwise, we must decide to disperse our own army. 


The debate ended in a resolution to empower the army to use force if necessary to overcome the Irgun and to confiscate the ship and its cargo. Implementation of this decision was assigned to the Alexandroni Brigade, commanded by Dan Even (Epstein), which the following day surrounded the Kfar Vitkin area. Dan Even issued the following ultimatum:



To: M. Begin
By special order from the Chief of the General Staff of the Israel Defence Forces, I am empowered to confiscate the weapons and military materials which have arrived on the Israeli coast in the area of my jurisdiction in the name of the Israel Government. I have been authorized to demand that you hand over the weapons to me for safekeeping and to inform you that you should establish contact with the supreme command. You are required to carry out this order immediately.
If you do not agree to carry out this order, I shall use all the means at my disposal in order to implement the order and to requisition the weapons which have reached shore and transfer them from private possession into the possession of the Israel government.
I wish to inform you that the entire area is surrounded by fully armed military units and armored cars, and all roads are blocked.
I hold you fully responsible for any consequences in the event of your refusal to carry out this order.
The immigrants - unarmed - will be permitted to travel to the camps in accordance with your arrangements. You have ten minutes to give me your answer.

D.E.,Brigade Commander 

The ultimatum, and in particular the demand for an answer within ten minutes, was insulting and unrealistic. It was made, according to Even "in order not to give the Irgun commander time for lengthy considerations and to gain the advantage of surprise." Begin refused to respond to the ultimatum, and all attempts at mediation failed. Begin's failure to respond was a blow to Even's prestige, and a clash was now inevitable. Fighting ensued and there were a number of casualties. In order to prevent further bloodshed, the Kfar Vitkin settlers initiated negotiations between Yaakov Meridor (Begin's deputy) and Dan Even, which ended in a general ceasefire and the transfer of the weapons on shore to the local IDF commander.

Begin had meanwhile boarded the Altalena, which was now heading for Tel Aviv. He hoped that it would be possible to enter into a dialogue with the Provisional Government and to unload the remaining weapons peacefully. But this was not the case. Ben-Gurion ordered Yigael Yadin (acting Chief of Staff) to concentrate large forces on the Tel Aviv beach and to take the ship by force. Heavy guns were transferred to the area and at four in the afternoon, Ben-Gurion ordered the shelling of the Altalena . One of the shells hit the ship, which began to burn. There was danger that the fire would spread to the holds which contained explosives, and the captain ordered all aboard to abandon ship. People jumped into the water, whilst their comrades on shore set out to meet them on rafts. Although the captain flew the white flag of surrender, automatic fire continued to be directed at the unarmed survivors. Begin, who was on deck, agreed to leave the ship only after the last of the wounded had been evacuated.



Altelena on fire
Sixteen Irgun fighters were killed in the confrontation with the army; six were killed in the Kfar Vitkin area and ten on Tel Aviv beach. Three IDF soldiers were killed: two at Kfar Vitkin and one in Tel Aviv.

After the shelling of the Altalena, more than 200 Irgun fighters were arrested on Ben-Gurion's orders. Most of them were released several weeks later, with the exception of five senior commanders (Moshe Hason, Eliyahu Lankin, Yaakov Meridor, Bezalel Amitzur and Hillel Kook), who were detained for more than two months. (They were released, thanks to public pressure, on August 27, 1948).



Years later, on the eve of the Six Day War, in June 1967 (after Ben-Gurion had retired from political activity and Levi Eshkol was Prime Minister), Menahem Begin joined a delegation which visited Sede Boqer in order to ask David Ben-Gurion to return and accept the premiership again. After that meeting, Ben-Gurion said that if he had then known Begin as he did now, the face of history would have been different.
--- End quote ---

http://www.etzel.org.il/english/ac20.htm

So the history of the Irgun and Lehi fight for Israel ends here. This is my tribute for Chaim and other Jewish heroes. Shalom!

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