Israel buys 100+ Lockheed Martin’s F-35 Joint Strike Fighter

[Trumpeldor]

Israel Wants JSF As Soon As Possible

Dec 16, 2007

David A. Fulghum, Robert Wall and Douglas Barrie

Israel plans to keep its aerial domination of the Middle East intact, and that includes buying Lockheed Martin’s F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, accelerating its first deliveries, and deciding whose advanced equipment will be packed into the stealthy strike aircraft.

A senior Israeli air force (IAF) official says those major areas of concern appear to be on the right track because of an “understanding” with the U.S. officials. Washington’s representatives are more ambiguous, saying that there has been no official change to Israel’s F-35 program.

“The plan is that we will get the F-35 as soon as it’s possible,” the senior IAF official says. He says the service will end up with more than 100 F-35s, but he would not confirm the size of the purchase or that Israel is asking that the initial delivery date be accelerated by two years to 2012. The IAF wants the JSF “the minute it is available.”

“Israel has a unique requirement, it doesn’t operate in a coalition, [and it has a] different kind of strategic relationship” with the U.S. than the other F-35 partners,” says Tom Burbage, Lockheed Martin’s vice president and general manager for the F-35. However, he says the overseas release of the first export aircraft will be no sooner than 2014.

The purchase, which could include an initial batch of 25 aircraft, is still being negotiated. Brig. Gen. Johanan Locker, head of the IAF’s air division, was in Fort Worth as recently as late November.

Israel’s ambitions to integrate indigenous weaponry also pose some problems for the program. The weapons road map for the Blocks 1-3 F-35 standards has already been drawn up with no Israeli weaponry on the list. Partner nations are currently working on a list for Block 4, but there’s pressure to cut weapons from the process rather than add them. Israel undoubtedly will want its F‑35s to carry the Rafael Python 5 air-to-air missile and possibly its successor, as well as the Rafael Spice family of precision-guided weapons.

Moreover, an influential retired IAF general says total sales will be limited by the JSF’s disadvantages. He points to its overdependence on stealth, a single crewman and what could be proprietary U.S. avionics.

“Eventually somebody will come up with a way to detect it,” he says. “A stealthy configuration also means you can’t carry additional weaponry on the exterior. The weapons system is more important than stealth. Israel will have F-35s, but not as many as we once thought.”

Smaller numbers won’t detract from the aircraft’s deterrence value, he concedes. Even a small fleet will ensure a first-day-of-war, surprise-strike capability. But once daily combat operations escalate, nonstealthy aircraft aided by standoff weapons, escort jammers and information operations will sustain air operations.

Nonetheless, he worries that the JSF will start showing its limitations within five years. Among the drawbacks will be its one-person crew. As a result, “we can’t operate the F-35 by itself,” the retired general says. “We really need two-seaters, with one person concentrating on flying and someone else focused on the strike mission. One man can’t take advantage of all the options,” particularly since JSF capabilities will include jamming, information warfare and network attack.

Inevitably, the avionics will present an area of contention. For example, Israeli aerospace officials say they can offer a tailored, active, electronically scanned array radar for less money than an AESA bought from the U.S. However, many of the electronic warfare and attack techniques are routed through the radar to produce jamming, false-target and other effects at ranges of 125 mi. or more. As a result, integration could be difficult and expensive.

Elta, the electronics division of Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI), has a version of the AESA, according to the retired general. “We need our own radar that we don’t share with others. We also need our own advanced radar warning and active jamming.” The Israeli AESA was flown last year; but for now it remains a generic system, not tailored to any specific aircraft—although it’s sized for an F-16, an Elta official says. Flight trials are continuing.

Meanwhile, current IAF leadership appears less concerned about the international trade issue.

“The number of aircraft [we obtain initially] could be irrelevant,” a senior general says. “The main issue now is that we get the first squadron as soon as possible. We give the basic capability to the squadron, and later on we increase it [with technology upgrades].”

The idea is to get just enough aircraft to develop a concept of operations and to lay out a technology development road map to tailor the JSF’s systems—particularly EW and attack capabilities—to Israeli-specific needs.

“At the beginning, we expect to get at least one squadron, with more to follow by the end of the decade [in 2020],” he says. “This is the first time there is not only an understanding [with the U.S.], but also a plan.”

Another major issue is what comes with the aircraft and what is Israel allowed to develop on its own. Industry officials are struggling with the problem since the F-35 has a highly integrated sensor suite that makes it harder to replace one black box with another. A senior Lockheed Martin official says Israel will not be allowed to simply replace parts of the electronic suite.

However, an IAI executive sees a workaround. The company expects to build JSF structural elements. Once the structure is well understood, there could be opportunities for embedding unique sensors, he says. The information from these sensors could be shown in the cockpit through bolt-on displays if integration proves too difficult.

However, the air force is more concerned about threats than industrial hurdles. “We did not decide on the exact systems and processes by which we intend to [proceed],” the senior IAF officer says. “But I think there’s an understanding that Israel will get the best [U.S.] aircraft, and we’ll be able to put the best Israeli systems inside [to meet] the IAF’s unique needs. We need to adapt them to the systems and the platform. That’s what we’ve done with the F-15I and the F-16I, and I believe we will be able to do that with the JSF. It’s very important that we get this capability on our own.

“That includes systems related to network offense and defense,” he says. “Some are the same as the Americans’, but we insist on some unique [capabilities] in every area. [Israel has] to have a relevant operational capability. You can’t wait to get [an upgrade to meet a new threat] a year late. You need to get intelligence, capability [and] precision on your own in a very short time.”

Syria, for example, is reputed to have the largest air defense capability in the region, and they are upgrading it with new investments.

“We are working to understand what our enemies are trying to do so we can tailor our power to deal with it,” he says. “The main reason why we have to modify the F-35 [is to counter] the relevant systems at the relevant time. We must be able to deal with them. . . . We’re also developing new systems and weapons that we can’t talk about. Sometimes reality is more impressive than the imagination.”

Israel also must wrestle with its weapons inventory, which often differs from that of the U.S. or other JSF buyers. Rafael officials say they are already working on alternative designs for the Spice precision air-to-surface bomb that can be integrated into the F-35. Foldout wings for the existing 2,000-lb. Spice will not fit in the JSF’s internal bay. Adapting it could reduce the bomb’s standoff range, but officials think that may be moot, since stealth will enable the JSF to fly closer to its targets.

Tied closely to the F-35 procurement is a decision to upgrade the F-15s and F-16s, particularly with new AESA radars that offer more range, small-target detection and broadband communications. However, the advanced radars are expensive.

“Do we intend to let the F-15s fly more years than we had planned?” the IAF official says. “It’s on the table. I intend to do the same with the F-16s. We have the second largest fleet in the world. With the right investment in avionics upgrades, they can be relevant for years.”

“The JSF will not replace all our needs,” agrees a senior defense ministry official.

According to IAF plans, not every aircraft will have the full package of upgrades. Instead, more advanced aircraft will feed target information to the others. However, U.S. radar developers point out that AESAs won’t be able to pass the same amount of information to non-AESA aircraft as they can to one that’s similarly equipped.

“For the future, the idea is to work as a group,” the IAF official says. “That allows you to do [advanced operations] without investing in each aircraft. If we have some of the best of the best technology, we can spread it to the other platforms, weapons and systems. You upgrade the group via the network.”

Here too, the former general expressed caution. “You have to attack information more than targets,” he says. “You need air superiority and information dominance. If you’re not building network-centric operations the right way, the capability can be eliminated [by the foe’s own network attack].”

http://www.military.com/features/0,15240,158469,00.html