its been on the wrong track even before it's founding then because those traditions are old. Abuses happen everywhere. "Anal penetration" is not part of it. If you think they are seriously worshipping neptune, then you are just ignorant.
What do you mean 'seriously worshiping neptune'? ... Any appearance of worshiping an idol is absolutely forbidden.. Especially when it is 'worshiped' in its intended manner... A JEW is expressly forbidden from doing this..
Here is a Daf Yomi on Talmud Mesechet Avodah Zara {Idol/strange worship}:
http://www.shemayisrael.com/dafyomi2/azarah/insites/az-dt-12.htm1) HALACHAH: DRINKING WATER FROM A WATER FOUNTAIN STATUE
OPINIONS: The Gemara discusses actions that one is prohibited from doing because those actions resemble forms of idol worship. One of these actions involves drinking water that comes from the mouth of a statue. Idolaters would build water fountains in the shape of statues, with water coming out of the mouth of the statue.
The Gemara says that a person is not allowed to place his mouth on the mouth of the statues in the cities in order to drink the water, because it appears as though he is kissing the Avodah Zarah. The Gemara does not specify whether this prohibition applies to statues which themselves are used for Avodah Zarah, or whether it applies even to ordinary water fountain statues.
(a) The RIF, ROSH, and TUR (YD 150) record the prohibition of the Gemara without specifying that the fountain itself must be one which is used for Avodah Zarah.
According to this opinion, though, why does the Gemara specifically say this Halachah with regard to statues in the cities? The TAZ answers that it seems that the Gemara is giving a stringency by mentioning statues in the city, for such statues are commonly built merely for beauty and not for Avodah Zarah. (In contrast, statues in villages were usually built for idol worship; see SHULCHAN ARUCH YD 141:1, based on the Mishnah on 44b). The Gemara is telling us that one may not drink from statues even in the cities.
(b) The RAMBAM (Hilchos Avodas Kochavim 3:8), SEMAG, and SHULCHAN ARUCH (YD 150:3) specify that this prohibition pertains only to fountains which are situated in front of an Avodah Zarah. (Obviously, it applies as well when the statue itself is an idol.) The BACH cites a proof to this opinion. Our Gemara discusses three other cases: crouching in front of an Avodah Zarah in order to remove a thorn, picking up money in front of an Avodah Zarah, and drinking from a stream which lies in front of an Avodah Zarah. After explaining the necessity to mention all three cases, the Gemara asks why do we also need the case of the water fountain. RASHI (12b, DH Partzufos) explains that from the case of the stream we already see that even when someone is very thirsty he is not allowed to drink from that water, and thus what more can the case of the water fountain be teaching us? The Gemara answers that this case was said merely to introduce the next part of the Beraisa.
According to the opinion that the prohibition applies even when the statue is *not* in front of Avodah Zarah, why does the Gemara say that there is no intrinsic novelty in this case? This case *is* unique in that it forbids drinking from the fountain even when there is no Avodah Zarah present, unlike the other cases! It must be that this prohibition applies only when the fountain is in front of an Avodah Zarah.
HALACHAH: The Bach concludes that the Halachic opinion is that of the Rambam, and as recorded by the Shulchan Aruch. However, he maintains that someone who is stringent upon himself and does not drink from any water fountain statue will receive a blessing. This is also the opinion of the SHACH. The TAZ also writes that one should be stringent and follow the opinion of the Tur. However, he seems to say that it is more than just a stringency, but that it is the Halachah, but he does not explain why. Perhaps his reasoning is that of the Bach in his Hagahos to the Rif, where the Bach points out that since there are many Rishonim who prohibit drinking from such a fountain even when it is not used for Avodah Zarah, and since our Gemara does not mention that the statue must be in front of an Avodah Zarah, the Halachah would seem to follow the view of the Tur. (Y. Montrose)
2) MUST ONE GIVE UP HIS LIFE FOR "MAR'IS HA'AYIN" OF IDOLATRY?
OPINIONS:
The Beraisa lists several actions that one is prohibited from doing because those actions resemble forms of idol worship. These actions are: crouching in front of an Avodah Zarah in order to remove a thorn, picking up money in front of an Avodah Zarah, and drinking from a stream which lies in front of an Avodah Zarah. The Gemara states that if the Beraisa had not taught us the law in the case of the stream, we might have thought that it is permitted to drink from the stream in front of an Avodah Zarah when not drinking will endanger his life. The Beraisa is teaching that it is nevertheless prohibited. We know that the sin of Avodah Zarah is one of three sins for which a Jew must die in order not to transgress. The Gemara here seems to be saying that one must die even in order to avoid transgressing "Mar'is ha'Ayin" (doing a permitted action which appears to be an act of transgression) of Avodah Zarah. Is this true? (a) The RASHBA, TUR (YD 150) and others state that the simple understanding of the Gemara is that indeed one must sacrifice his life in order not to do even an act of "Mar'is ha'Ayin" of Avodah Zarah. This also appears to be the intention of RASHI (DH Aval). The BI'UR HA'GRA (ibid.) cites another proof to this opinion. The Gemara in Sanhedrin (75a) discusses a case in which a man became sick from his lust for a woman. The doctors said that he would recover even if she would consent merely to talk to him from behind a wall. The Rabanan rule in such a case that it is better for the man to die than to have the woman talk with him. There are two opinions there regarding the status of the woman; one opinion states that she was married, and the other states that she was single. The Gemara states that according to the opinion that she was married, we can understand the ruling that it is better that he die than have her talk with him (since she is an Eshes Ish and would fall into the category of the Isur of Arayos, one of the categories of transgression for which a person must die in order to avoid transgressing). The Vilna Ga'on asks why is that opinion, that she was married, any more understandable than the opinion that she was single? According to the Ramban and many others, the prohibition there would only have been an Isur d'Rabanan! Why, then, should the man be left to die? It must be that even for a Rabbinic prohibition (in one of the three categories of sins of "Yehareg v'Al Ya'avor"), the rule that one must die and not transgress applies. Likewise, one must die and not transgress the Rabbinic prohibition of "Mar'is ha'Ayin" of Avodah Zarah.
(b) The RAN also writes that this is the straightforward meaning of the Gemara, but he qualifies that the requirement to die and not transgress does not apply in all cases of "Mar'is ha'Ayin," but only in certain cases. In the case of drinking from a stream, where the person looks as though he is bowing down to the Avodah Zarah, one is required to give up his life and not transgress "Mar'is ha'Ayin" of Avodah Zarah. However, in cases of "Mar'is ha'Ayin" where the person's act does not appear to be such a blatant act of idol worship (for example, travelling to a city in which there happens to be an idolatrous festival being celebrated), a person is not required to give up his life.
(c) However, the Ran seems to conclude that even the case of drinking from a stream in front of an Avodah Zarah is not a case of "Yehareg v'Al Ya'avor." How, though, does the Ran understand the Gemara? He understands that the Gemara is saying that even though the person is very thirsty and might *possibly* die before he finds water, he is still not allowed to drink the water. However, if he *knows* that he will not find any other water and that he will certainly die, then he is allowed to drink the water. He quotes this opinion as the opinion of RABEINU ASHER. This opinion is also cited by the REMA (YD 150:3).
The MEKOR MAYIM CHAYIM (ibid.) explains how the Ran will answer the proof of the Vilna Ga'on. In the case in Sanhedrin, the person was interested in doing more than just talking to the woman. The Chachamim said that, in general, a man should not talk in such a context to a married woman since it might lead to an actual transgression of Giluy Arayos. The case here is totally different, as the person involved has absolutely no interest in doing the actual sin of Avodah Zarah. Therefore, the Chachamim did not include this act in the category of "Yehareg v'Al Ya'avor." (Y. Montrose)
