This discussion explains in depth why the sages said this:
http://www.vbm-torah.org/archive/salt-bemidbar/41-6pinchas.htmYesterday we made brief reference to the famous notion in Midrashic literature identifying the prophet Eliyahu as Pinchas. As we saw, some commentaries interpret the "covenant of peace" promised to Pinchas (25:12) as referring to long life. This interpretation very well accommodates this concept, that Pinchas was Eliyahu – who was taken the heavens alive, and never died (see Melakhim II, chapter 2). Today we will discuss this topic at further length, making use of some of many sources compiled with remarkable comprehensiveness by Rabbi David Mandelbaum, in his "Pardes Yosef He-chadash" to this parasha.
We begin by reviewing the sources that indeed identify Pinchas as Eliyahu. Pirkei De-Rabbi Eliezer (28) and Yalkut Shimoni (in several places) describe in fuller detail the conversation between G-d and Eliyahu at Mount Chorev (= Sinai) after the prophet's famous, victorious "showdown" against the idolatrous prophets at Mount Carmel. As recorded in the Tanakh (Melakhim I 19:10), Eliyahu tells G-d, "I have acted zealously for the Lord, the G-d of hosts, for the Israelites have forsaken Your covenant… " The Midrash relates G-d's critical response to Eliyahu: "You always act zealously! You were zealous at Shitim… " This zealotry at Shitim is a clear reference to the incident of Ba'al Pe'or, which occurred at Shitim (see Bamidbar 25:1), where Pinchas killed Zimri and Kozbi. Clearly, then, according to these Midrashim, Pinchas and Eliyahu are the same person.
Another interesting source relevant to this discussion is the Targum Yonatan Ben Uziel to Shemot 4:13. Moshe Rabbenu, in his insistent refusal to accept the task of going to Pharaoh to demand Benei Yisrael's release from bondage, pleads with G-d, "Send whomever you will send." Targum Yonatan explains this to mean, "Send the one whom you will eventually send" – meaning, send Pinchas, the one whom you will send in the end of days. Like the passage from Targum Yonatan in Parashat Pinchas that we saw yesterday, this refers to Eliyahu's mission to herald the coming of the final redemption (see final verses of Sefer Malakhi). Clearly, then, Targum Yonatan identifies Pinchas, Moshe's great-nephew, as the prophet Eliyahu. Targum Yonatan makes this point even more explicitly a bit later in Sefer Shemot (6:18), where he writes that Amram, Moshe's father, lived to see his great-grandson, Pinchas, "he is Eliyahu, the high priest, who in the future will be sent to the Israelite exile, in the end of days."
The Yalkut Shimoni in Parashat Balak (771) likewise mentions explicitly that Pinchas is Eliyahu. It records G-d telling Pinchas, "You brought peace between Me and My children – in the future, as well, you are the one who will bring peace between Me and My children." The Midrash proceeds by citing the verse from the end of Sefer Malakhi that indicates that Eliyahu will come to lead Benei Yisrael towards teshuva in anticipation of the final day of judgment.
This identification of Eliyahu as Pinchas may have a basis in the Talmud, as well. The Gemara in Masekhet Bava Metzia (114a-b) tells the story of Rabba Bar Avuha, who once met Eliyahu in a graveyard. The rabbi asked him, "Are you not a kohen?!" He wondered why Eliyahu was permitted in the cemetery if he was a kohen, given the prohibition against kohanim contracting tum'a. Eliyahu replied that the graves wthose of gentiles, and according to Rabbi Shimon Bar Yochai, the remains of gentiles render tum'a only upon direct contact; their graves, however, do not generate tum'a. In any event, it emerges from this Gemara that Eliyahu was a kohen, which would obviously accommodate the theory that he was Pinchas. Indeed, Rashi, in his commentary to this Gemara, writes that the Gemara works under this very assumption.
Rabbi Mandelbaum draws further Talmudic evidence from a brief passage in Masekhet Ta'anit. The mishnayot towards the beginning of the second chapter of that Masekhet describe the prayer service conducted during public fast days. One prayer, which has been incorporated into our Selichot service, as well, goes through the Bible and cites examples of where G-d answered the prayers of our ancestors. In this appeal to G-d, we ask that He answer us the way He answered them. The Gemara notes a chronological inconsistency in this prayer, that we mention G-d's favorable response to the prophet Yona before we speak of His having answered the prayers of David and Shelomo. Why would we discuss Yona before we mention David and Shelomo, whom lived many years earlier? Leaving aside the Gemara's response to this question, the Gemara, oddly enough, does not ask why this prayer mentions G-d's answer to Eliyahu's prayer before it talks of David and Shelomo, despite the fact that Eliyahu, too, lived a good deal later than David and Shelomo! Rabbi Mandelbaum suggests that perhaps the Gemara assumed that Eliyahu was Pinchas, who indeed lived before David and Shelomo.
Tomorrow we will iy"H discuss this topic further.
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Yesterday, we looked at several sources in Midrashic and Talmudic literature that either state explicitly or imply that Pinchas, the man after whom this week's parasha is named, is the same man as the prophet Eliyahu. Tosefot, in Masekhet Bava Metzia (114b), raise a very simple difficulty on this theory. A famous story is told in Sefer Melakhim I (chapter 17) of how Eliyahu brought back to life the deceased child of the "isha ha-tzarfatit," the woman who had supported Eliyahu during the famine that ravaged the Northern Kingdom of Israel. Eliyahu revived the child by "stretching out over him three times" (verse 21), which seemingly involved direct, physical contact. But if we identify Eliyahu as Pinchas, who, at the beginning of Parashat Pinchas, is blessed with priesthood, how could he come in contact with a dead body? Does this not violate the code of the kohanim, which forbids them from contracting tum'a by touching a dead body? (In truth, the question applies even if Eliyahu did not actually touch the child, since he did enter the same room as the child's body, from which a kohen is likewise forbidden.)
Tosefot give a very simple answer: "This was permitted because of piku'ach nefesh [the interest in saving human life], for he was certain that he would live." In other words, the prohibition forbidding kohanim from coming in contact with a corpse was suspended in this instance in the interest of saving a life.
Many writers, however, have asked why Tosefot added, "for he was certain that he would live." This obviously implies that had Eliyahu entertained any doubts about his power to bring the boy back to life, halakha would have forbade him from making such an attempt by coming in contact with him. Why should this be the case? A well-established halakhic principle allows for the violation of Torah prohibitions (with the well known exception of the three grave prohibitions of adultery, idolatry and murder) for even a reasonable possibility of saving life. For example, in a case of an avalanche or toppled building, Shabbat may violated to continue searching for survivors so long as the possibility remains that dangerously injured people are still alive in the rubble – even if this cannot be ascertained. Why, then, would Tosefot require total confidence on Eliyahu's part in his ability to bring the boy back to life to permit him to violate Torah law for this purpose?
Some have explained Tosefot's position in light of the Rambam's ruling in his commentary to the mishna (Yoma, chapter 8) forbidding violations of halakha to save a life through mystical means ("be-ofen seguli"). Tosefot perhaps concurred with this position, and therefore justified Eliyahu's touching the dead child's body on the basis of the prophet's certitude in the effectiveness of his efforts. Given his assurance in the successful outcome of his attempt to revive the boy, this supernatural means of saving life was, for purposes of halakha, equivalent to a natural means of lifesaving, and was hence permitted even at the expense of the violation of a Torah prohibition.
Other answers are offered, as well, to explain how Eliyahu could come in contact with a dead body. The Shita Mekubetzet (there in Bava Metzia) claims that the child was not, in fact, dead, but rather a "goseis" – on the verge of death, a theory advanced by the Rambam (Moreh Nevukhim 1:42) and cited in the Radak's commentary to Sefer Melakhim. Tosefot did not accept this answer for one of two reasons. They may have felt that, as the Abarbanel argues, the verses there in Melakhim strongly indicate that the child had actually died and was brought back to life by Eliyahu. Alternatively, as Rav David Mandelbaum suggests in his "Pardeis Yoseif He-chadash" to Parashat Pinchas, Tosefot here may follow the position of Tosefot in Masekhet Nazir (4b), that a nazir, who is likewise forbidden from coming in contact with dead bodies, may not touch a "goseis," either, a halakha that may very well apply to a kohen, as well. (Although, as Rabbi Mandelbaum notes, Tosefot later in Nazir – 43a – rule explicitly that a kohen is permitted to come in contact with a "goseis.") For this reason, perhaps, Tosefot could not answer their question regarding the prophet Eliyahu by adopting this assumption, that the child had not died but was rather a "goseis."
Rabbi Mandelbaum cites possible Talmudic proof for the Shita Mekubetzet's claim that the child Eliyahu treated had not actually died, from a brief passage in Masekhet Nida (70b). The Gemara there records three "divrei borut," or foolish questions, posed by the Jews of Alexandria, one of them being, "Does the son of the Shunamite convey tum'a?" They refer here to a famous incident recorded in Melakhim II (chapter 4) where Elisha, the disciple and successor of Eliyahu, brings to life the son of the Shunamite woman – much like Eliyahu had resuscitated the son of the "tzarfatit." The Alexandrians wondered whether the Shunamite's son, who had died and been brought back to life, conveyed tum'a after having come back to life, or if his return to life terminated the ritual impurity he generated as a corpse. Leaving aside the Gemara's response, it is perhaps noteworthy that the people of Alexandria asked specifically about the boy revived by Elisha – but never questioned the status of the child treated by Eliyahu. The explanation, Rabbi Mandelbaum suggests, might be that, as the Shita Mekubetzet claimed, the child of the "tzarfatit" did not actually die, and thus the Alexandrians' question was not relevant to him. (Of course, it is highly questionable whether we can reach definitive conclusions based on a question the Gemara itself terms "foolish.")
We conclude our discussion by briefly mentioning two other explanations suggested to justify Eliyahu's actions. The Tosefot Ha-Rosh (in Bava Metzia) and the Radbaz (teshuvot, 6:301) answer very simply that this incident constituted a "hora'at sha'a," an extraordinary situation that allowed for a one-time breach of the Torah for the sake of "kiddush Hashem." The Radbaz suggests a different explanation, as well, citing Kabbalistic sources who explain that Pinchas and Eliyahu were not, in fact, the same person. When Chazal inform us that "Pinchas is Eliyahu," they meant that on some mystical level, their souls emanated from the same root, but not that there was a single person named Pinchas and subsequently Eliyahu. This will serve as our introduction to tomorrow's topic – the view in Chazal that Piis not Eliyahu. Here we will simply comment that this answer of the Radbaz does not explain the Gemara in Bava Metzia, which, as we saw yesterday, clearly assumed that Eliyahu was a kohen and thus bound by all the laws applicable to kohanim.
Topic: Pinchas IS Elijah (Read 7418 times)