Could the Allies have bombed Auschwitz without massive casualties to prisoners far in excess of Nazis, made successful dents in their operation with escape of some Jewish prisoners without excessive risk to Allied bombers and high Allied casualties and destroyed the rail lines leading to it? Remember that this is before precision laser-bombing which came at the end of the Vietnam War and there was redundancy of transport to the camps? Would these operations have lead to a prolonging of the war due to diversion of personnel away from the western front, the encirclement of U.S. troops at Bastogne and the ensuing Battle Of The Bulge? Consider the USAF raid on the Nazi held oil fields of PLOIESTI, Romania, in August, 1943, by Allied B-24 Liberators taking off from Libya, intending to put nine Nazi held Romanian oil refineries around Ploiești out of action; the mission was moderately successful in that it resulted in MINIMAL curtailment of overall oil output to the Nazi war machine. In terms of loss of life, this mission was one of the costliest for the United States Army Air Forces (USAAF) in the European Theatre, accounting for the loss of 53 aircraft and 660 aircrewmen and was the worst loss ever suffered by the US Air Force on a single mission in either theater in WWII. Undoubtedly, the Ploiesti Oil Fields would have been better defended than Auschwitz but neither would have been without risk.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Tidal_Wave In 2005, George McGovern, head pilot of a B-24 Liberator had a change of heart and stated in an interview with Israeli Television and the David S. Wyman Institute for Holocaust Studies that he could have bombed the Auschwitz Concentration Camp since he was bombing German synthetic oil plants within 5 miles of the Auschwitz-Birkenau complex and his bombing accuracy was good enough to hit the rail lines leading to the camp and its crematoria and and gas chambers. This was especially true after the Allies gained control of the Foggia Air Base in Central Italy in December, 1943 which put Auschwitz within striking distance of Allied planes for the first time. In June 1944, two Auschwitz escapees (Vrba and Wetzler) provided U.S. diplomats and Jewish leaders in Switzerland a detailed report about Auschwitz. It included descriptions of the mass-murder facilities and diagrams locating the gas chambers and crematoria. He states that he knows that this would have resulted in the deaths of several prisoners but these people were "doomed to death" and to slow up the Nazi death machine and to facilitate the escape of several prisoners would be worth it. He regrets FDR's decision to ignore this as well as the decisions to incarcerate Japanese-Americans and to block the docking of the MS St. Louis in Miami with the death of 254 German Jewish refugees who were returned to soon-to-be occupied France, Belgium and The Netherlands.
"Liberal-Democrat" George McGovern was a genuine decorated war hero, the head pilot of a B-24 Liberator crew that flew numerous bombing missions over Nazi-occupied Europe and the oldest member of his crew at 22 years old. Contrast this with the lackluster military career of his 1972 "Conservative-Republican" opponent, Richard Nixon, who saw NO actual combat. The following article was taken verbatim from a George McGovern editorial in the 1/27/04 Washington Post.
- Shabbes Goy ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
The Holocaust and the Allies: Military Options by George McGovern
Editorial- Washington Post- 1/27/04- Former Representative, Senator and Democratic presidential nominee George McGovern
Certainly there were limits as to what the Allies could do given the German military dominance in the early years of the War. Much of the killing was done in 1941-43 when Allied military alternatives were limited. Allied military capabilities by 1944, however, had increasing to the point that some actions were possible. None were ever employed. What could be done other than winning the War as rapidly as possible is difficult to assess. The death camps could have been added to the air campaign. Many have argued that the American Air Corps should have bombed the gas chambers at Auschvitz and the other death camps and the railheads leading to the camps. Such attempts in 1943 would have resulted in enormous losses of air crews given the strength of the German air defenses. Such raids would have had to be conducted in daylight to target the gas chambers, relatively small targets. It has to be understood that aerial bombing in World War II was a far cry from modern precision laser-guided targetting. On even a well executed raid, only a small fraction of the bombs actually fell on the target. Thus any raid on, for example, the gas chambers at Birkenau would have meant large numbers of bombs falling throughout the work camps at Auschwitz killing large numbers of the slave laborers at the camp. Targetting the several Nazi death camps would not have been a small surgical operation. It would have required a major undertaking and given the distances and German defenses it would have been very costly. I do not know to what extent the military possessed the detailed knowledge of camp operations that would have allowed them to make those assessments. Perhaps it should have been done, but it would not have been an easy decision. I am not sure, however, to what extent the military actually assessed the possibility of such an operation. Bombing the rail heads was also not an easy matter. Given the forced labor available to the Germans, rail lines could have been rapidly reconstructed forcing repeated strikes and further exposing aircrews to German air defenses. Another factor to be considered was that in early 1944 the air campaign against Germany was sidelined so that the Americans and British could focus on the German Channel defenses. It was only after the D-Day landings and subsequent break out (June-July 1944) that the Allies were able to resume the strategic bombing campaign in force. By that time, the Red Army had entered Poland and Himmler ordered the SS to begin closing down and evacuating the death camps.
Intelligence Reports
The British learned through Ultra intercepts in 1941 that the Nazis were killing large numbers of Jews as part of the invasion of the Soviet Union. This information because of the importance of Ultra could not be released to the public. Credible reports from Poland reached American authorities in 1942. Many writers who are disturbed about the Allies failure to act point to the 1942 reports in particular and often assume that because of these reports that Allied authorfities were fully aware of what was happening. This is a misunderstanding of intelligence in warfare. First we do not fully understand just how this informatiin was dessiminated among policy makers. Second just because an event reported does not mean that policy makers can accept it as fact. The Nazis for example received creditable reports that the Allied cross-channel invasion would come at the Pas de Calais and not Normandy. In fact these reports were so creditable that the Wehrmact did not commit their Panzer Divisions when the Allies actually invaded at Normandy. We also know about the many creditable reports that Sadam Hussein had stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction. One of the otoblems with the reports coming out of Poland was that they were coming from Jewish or Polish sources all with vested interests in what was happening and with a desire to draw the Western Allies into actions in Poland.
Allied Military Capability
There were severe limitations as to what the Allies had the capacity to do given the German military dominance in the early years of the War. Much of the killing was done in 1941-43 when Allied military alternatives were limited. Allied military capabilities by 1944, however, had increasing to the point that some actions were possible. This was especially true when long-range P-51 Mustang escorts became available. No bombing campaigns, however, ever employed. What could be done other than winning the War as rapidly as possible is difficult to assess.
Bombing Alternatives
The death camps could have been added to the air campaign. Many have argued that the American Air Corps should have bombed the gas chambers at Auschwitz and the other death camps and the railheads leading to the camps. Such attempts in 1943 would have resulted in enormous losses of air crews given the strength of the German air defenses. Such raids would have had to be conducted in day light to target the rail lines and gas chambers. The rail lines could have been hit, but this would not have been effective. Bombing the rail heads was also not an easy matter. Given the forced labor available to the Germans, rail lines could have been rapidly reconmstructed forcing repaeted strikes and further exposing aircrews to German air defenses. There was not just one line to the Auschwitz, but many alternate lines. In addition, rail lines hit by bombers could and were repaired in hours. The Germans were very adept at this. Hiting the gas chambers is much more difficult than commonly realized because they were such small targets. It has to be understood that aerial bombing in World War II was a far cry from modern precession targetting. On even a well executed raid, only a small fraction of the bombs actually fell on the target. Thus any raid on, for example, the gas chambers at Birkenau would have meant large numbers of bombs falling throughout the work camps at Auschwitz killing large numbers of the slave laborers at the camp. Targetting the several Nazi death camps, which were further East would have been even more problemstic. would not have been a small surgical operation. It would have required a major undertaking and given the distances and German defenses it would have been very costly.
Military Assessment
I do not know to what extent the military possessed the detailed knowledge of camp operaions that would have allowed them to make those assessments. It is much easier for us today to say that it should have been done, but it would not have been an easy operation as is often assumed. And as we have discussed, the Allied knowledge appreciation of the Holocaust was far from perfect. I am not sure, however, to what extent the military actually assessed the possibility of such an operation.
D-Day
Another factor to be considered was that in early 1944 the air campaign against Germany was sidelined so that the Americans and British could focus on the German Channel defenses. It was only after the D-Day landings and subsequent break out (June-July 1944) that the Allies were able to resume the strategic bombing campaign in force. By that time, the Red Army had entered Poland and the Himmler ordered the SS to begin closing down and evacuating the death camps. On January 27, 1945, the Nazis abandoned Auschwitz in advance of the oncoming Russian troops
George McGovern
Topic: Could the Allies have bombed Auschwitz and the rail lines leading to it? (Read 5453 times)